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INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
How should decision-makers respond to failure9 After having invested money and time in a 
course of action, what should one do in the face of failure9 Rational models ol decision 
making say that after considering expected gains and losses, a decision maximizing the future 
outcomes should be taken, past investments, personal responsibilities, and previous choices 
are irrelevant But are they really irrelevant ' 
In the last decades, an extended body of research has investigated the commitment ol 
decision makers to losing courses of action Numerous studies have shown that decision 
makers have the tendency to keep on investing in failing courses of action (Staw, 1976) 
What is more interesting is that rationalizing motives, rather than rational ones have been 
shown to lead to such behavior This phenomenon has been given diltercnl names such as 
escalation of commitment (Staw, 1976, 1981, 1997), sunk cost effect (Arkes and Blumcr, 
1985, Garland, 1990, Garland and Newport, 1991), and entrapment (Brockner and Rubin, 
1985) Staw (1997 192) defines situations in which escalation of commitment takes place as 
those "where losses have been suffered, where there is an opportunity to persist or withdraw, 
and where the consequences ol these actions are uncertain" Hence, neither withdrawal nor 
persistence is a clear-cut solution to the problem of the decision-maker Staw ( 1976) provided 
the first experimental evidence of escalation and showed that after receiving negative 
consequences, those responsible for the choice of a course of action invested more than those 
who were not responsible for the choice Others (Garland, 1990, Garland and Newport, 1991, 
Moon, 2001) have shown that the higher the amount of past investments, namely sunk costs, 
the higher the future investments in a failing course of action Recently, there has been 
increased interest in the topic of escalation of commitment and its relevance has been shown 
in different management areas such as marketing (Biyalogorsky, Boulding, and Slaehn, 
2006), information systems projects (Pan, Pan, Newman, and Flynn, 2006, Tiwana, Keil, and 
Fichman, 2006), business ethics (Street and Street, 2006), accounting (Cheng, Schultz, 
Luckett, and Booth, 2003), and draft for the National Basketball Association (NBA) (Staw 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
and Hoang, 1995) There has also been recent interest in identifying the emotional side of 
escalation (Moon, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, and Maue, 2003, Wong, Yink, and Kwong, 2006, 
Wong and Kwong, 2007), the role of cognitive biases in escalation (Keil, Depledge, and Rai, 
2007), and the role of information in escalation decisions (He and Mittal, 2007) 
Research on escalation of commitment has mainly been experimental, but existing case 
evidence highlights the importance and costliness of escalation situations for business Based 
on a cross-sectional survey of 2,231 information systems audit and control professionals, Keil 
and Mann (2000 657) reported that "between 30% and 40% of all software projects exhibit 
some degree of escalation" Using the Standish group's (2003) survey. Pan, Pan, Newman, 
and Flynn (2006 4) reported that "43% of software projects were over budget and 54% had 
time overruns" 
One ol the first case evidence of escalation came from Staw and Ross (1986) Expo86, 
a world exposition in Vancouver hosted by British Columbia The initial proposal lor the 
exposition in 1978 estimated a cost of $78 million By 1985, however, Expo86 had become a 
project of "$1 5 billion with an official projected deficit of $311 million" (Staw and Ross, 
1986 280) Yet, throughout this period, even in 1984, officials kept on reaffirming their 
commitment to the project 
Later, Ross and Staw ( 1993) reported on a case of the construction of the Shoredam 
nuclear facility by Long Island Lighting Company The initial expectation was to construct a 
facility with the capacity of 540 megawatts in the period 1969 - 1973 for a cost of between 
$65 and $75 million "On March 18, 1984, it was announced that the Shoredam plant was 
complete but it would take a year or more to begin operations" (Ross and Staw, 1993 712) 
In 1985, a 5% operating permit was granted but it became clear that the full operation of the 
plant would lead to a major catastrophe Finally, "on May 12, 1988, LILCO reached 
agreement with the state of New York to close Shoredam" (Ross and Staw, 1993 713) The 
costs were at the order of $5 3 billion 
Other examples of escalation include the Taurus project at the London Stock Exchange 
for a computerized system (Drummond, 1996, a project started in May 1986 with an initial 
expectation of 3 years and 6 million pounds It was eventually cancelled in 1993 with a cost 
ol over 80 million pounds ), the CONFIG project (Keil, 1995a, a project for the development 
ol an expert system that was funded for about 12 years till it was finally terminated), Centco 
(Newman and Sabherwal, 1996, an information systems development project that was 
stopped and restarted many times over a 17-year period, 1975-1992) 
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All these cases show that escalation of commitment is a costly (in terms of time, money, and 
reputation) phenomenon that can occur in different (managerial) settings Understanding 
escalation situations better could help develop ways of coping with escalation as well as 
techniques to avoid it Past research on escalation mainly focused on identifying the 
determinants of escalation Two broad categories of determinants have been identified 
behavioral and project determinants (Staw and Ross, 1987, Staw, 1997) Behavioral 
determinants include three groups of determinants psychological (related to the decision­
makers involvement with the project), social (related to the social group surrounding a 
decision-maker), and organizational (related to the structural environment of the project) The 
project determinants, on the other hand, include the objective information on the project and 
its economics According to Staw (1997), the relative importance of behavioral versus project 
factors determines whether escalation of commitment will take place or not An interesting 
addition to this relation is that the perception of the project determinants is determined by the 
behavioral factors themselves (Staw, 1997) The significance of this is that what should be 
considered as determinants of escalation is not project determinants but percened project 
determinants 
Researchers have investigated the effect of project determinants and shown that, depending 
on its content, different information items can either cause escalation of commitment to or 
withdrawal from a failing course of action (c g Staw and Fox, 1977, Staw and Ross, 1978, 
Bateman, 1986, McCain, 1986) The common approach in this line ot research has been to 
assume information as an 'objective' given without considering how the perception of the 
decision-makers, shaped by the behavioral factors, can affect the choice and perception of the 
information used Unlike prior research, this dissertation will not make this assumption and 
focus on the perceived project determinants While doing so, the occurrence ol a cognitive 
bias, ι e selective exposure to information, alongside escalation will be studied Studying the 
occurrence of cognitive biases under escalation situations is in line with recent research (Keil, 
Depledge, and Rai, 2007, He and Mutai, 2007) and has both theoretical and practical 
relevance These will be discussed in section 1 I A second contribution of this dissertation 
will be in the domain of de-escalation which is an under-studied area within the domain of 
escalation Causal loop diagrams based on the principles of System Dynamics will be 
proposed as a de-escalation tool that can also potentially decrease selective exposure 
tendencies The theoretical and practical implications will be discussed in section 1 2 
Finally, in section I 3, an overview of the dissertation will be given 
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1.1 Selective exposure to information and escalation of commitment: 
relevance 
On Wednesday February 5, 2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United 
Nations Security Council presenting "proof that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction His 
presentation included evidence and satellite photos of what he called "mobile bioweapons 
laboratones" However, after the invasion of Iraq, no nuclear, biological, or chemical 
weapons were lound (ABC NewsOnhne, Friday September 9, 2005) Mr Powell and Col 
Lawrence Wilkerson, a long-time advisor to Mr Powell, both admitted that the evidence 
submitted to the United Nations may have been wrong (BBC News, Saturday 1 April, 2004, 
CNN com, Tuesday August 23, 2005, ABC NewsOnhne, Friday September 9, 2005) More 
recently, based on a study by two nonprofit journalism groups, CNNPohtics 
(CNNPohtic com, January 24, 2008) reported "President Bush and his top aides publicly 
made 935 false statements about the security risk posed by Iraq in the two years following 
September 11, 2001" It is too early to stale whether the involvement of US in Iraq is a case 
of escalation of commitment or not However, this example shows the use of confirming 
inlormation to back up decisions or commitments made 
Tendency of decision-makers to prefer and use information that is consistent with their 
beliefs, attitudes, and decisions is referred to as selective exposure to information (Festinger, 
1957, Frey, 1986, Fischer, Jonas, Frey, and Schulz Hardt, 2005) From case studies on 
escalation of commitment, it is possible to find evidence for the occurrence of confirming 
information use in escalation situations In the analysis of the Expo86 case, Staw and Ross 
(1986 289) indicated "Certainly one feature that may have contributed to the continuing 
Expo decision was information processing errors supporting perseverance of belief' For 
instance, as the budget overruns increased, the attendance estimates were increased and the 
warning signals on budget overruns were "ignored or downplayed" Staw and Ross reported 
that one of the stal Γ members noted, "The whole emphasis among the Expo staff was on 
being positive" (Staw and Ross, 1986 289) 
For the Shoredam case, Ross and Staw (1993) gave the following examples "LILCO 
decision-makers' estimates of the future demand for energy and the possibility of energy 
blackouts were vastly overstated, their estimates of the cost and completion dale were 
invariably optimistic, and their estimates of the benefits of Shoredam were greater than those 
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provided by observers in virtually every case" (Ross and Staw, 1993 716-717) Similarly, 
overestimation of the chances of success was also evident in the Centco case (Newman and 
Sabherwal, 1996) Another issue in the Shoredam case was the inability of the officials to 
identify the causes of the failure properly "there is much evidence to suggest that decision-
makers saw the failing decision not so much a product of their own faulty calculus or lack of 
management as the result of intervention by external regulators and anti-social elements" 
(Ross and Staw, 1993 717) Ross and Staw indicate that the company officials used such 
reasoning repeatedly in advertising and public statements 
Montealegre and Keil (2000), on the other hand, reported that at the Denver Airport 
case, negative feedback was either ignored or downplayed lor an extended period The same 
was reported by Keil (1995a) for the CONFIG case The project leaders made attempts to 
deny the negative feedback by not listening to the negative feedback and by making remarks 
such as "wrong answer, we don't like that answer" (Keil, 1995a 350) 
These examples show that in escalation situations, decision-makers make use of information 
that can support their position (e g overestimates of success, blaming external causes for 
possible failure) while ignoring negative leedback Such use of information can be seen as 
both a cause and consequence of escalation In theoretical research on escalation, however, 
biases in information processing have received attention as causes of escalation, but not as its 
consequence In this dissertation, the assertion is that the tendency to prefer and use 
confirming information is one of the consequences of escalation Dissonance theory 
(Festmger, 1957, 1964) will be used to explain why such selective exposure to information 
can be expected to occur in escalation situations If confirming information leads to further 
escalation and decision-makers prefer and actively select confirming information under 
escalation situations then they can get trapped in a vicious circle of escalation and 
information biasing In such a situation, withdrawal from a failing course ol action can 
become a very unlikely outcome 
From a practical perspective, this research can provide insights into the information 
preference of escalating decision-makers Based on this insight, better information search and 
processing strategies can be devised Such strategies could be useful in avoiding unnecessary 
escalation and unnecessary time and money investments 
From a theoretical perspective, this research will make a step to jointly studying 
escalation of commitment and selective exposure to information and understanding the 
consequences of their co-occurrence There have been many studies investigating these biases 
individually However, research linking the two has been scarce even though establishing the 
5 
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(lack of) link can improve our theoretical understanding of escalation situations and their 
consequences Knowing more about information preferences of decision-makers under 
escalation situations would also provide insight on the role of perceived project determinants 
in the escalation research As explained before, Staw (1997) pointed out the importance of 
perceived project determinants in escalation decisions Pnor research, on the other hand, 
focused mainly on project determinants and not their perception This research aims at 
bridging that gap by focusing on the perception of the project determinants 
Moreover, as will be further explained in chapter 3, investigating whether selective 
exposure to information occurs in escalation situations could give further theoretical support 
to one of the explanations of escalation, namely, self-justification motives (Staw, 1976) Both 
self-justification motives and selective exposure to information are predicted by the same 
theory According to dissonance theory, factors that induce self-justification and hence, 
escalation, would also induce tendency for confirmatory information search Therefore, 
linking these two research domains could serve as a means of testing and strengthening the 
self-justification explanation 
1.2 De-escalation: relevance 
Even though the different causes of escalation ol commitment are well understood, strategies 
for how people can reduce escalation did not receive much attention in research This is a pity 
because understanding how de-escalation can be achieved could be very useful in identifying 
policy recommendations (Simonson and Staw, 1992) Given that escalation decisions can be 
very costly, research should not only strive to understand the factors that cause escalation but 
also identify how this understanding can be used to devise strategies to avoid escalation or 
generate timely de-escalation Besides some experimental work (e g Simonson and Staw, 
1992, Schwenk, 1988, Boulding, Morgan, and Staelin, 1997), lately, researchers tried to 
understand de-escalation lurlher by examining cases in which de-escalation took place (E g , 
Keil, 1995a, Montealegrc and Keil, 2000, Pan, 2005, Pan, Pan, Newman, and Flynn, 2006) 
One of the contributions of this research will be identifying a de-escalation tool based on 
System Dynamics (SD), a methodology for modeling and analyzing complex problems from 
a feedback perspective (Forrester, 1961, Sterman, 2000) The main purpose of modeling in 
SD is understanding w In a certain situation has occurred (e g the failure of the strategy) and 
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use this information to design robust strategies to improve the situation (e g adjustments to 
the existing strategy or development of a new strategy to solve the problem) Such a tool 
could get the decision-makers to actively think about the problem and its causes and get them 
involved in the generation ot alternative strategies As such, through providing the decision-
makers more objective grounds to base their decisions on, using an SD model could help 
eliminate the irrational reasons that stimulate escalation In other words, it could help shift the 
reasons for continuation or withdrawal decisions from rationalizing back to rational 
From a theoretical perspective, this research will introduce System Dynamics as a potentially 
useful method that has not previously been considered as a possible de-biasing technique 
Future research can build on the findings of this research to introduce similar analysis 
techniques that could benefit management research 
From a practical perspective, using such a technique would not only help to decrease 
escalation tendencies but also provide grounds for more thorough decision-making 
1.3 Overview of the dissertation 
In chapter 2, literature on two issues relevant to the topic of this thesis will be reviewed 
escalation of commitment and selective exposure to information First, the focus will be on 
escalation of commitment Escalation situations will be defined and the determinants of 
escalation will be discussed Two most prominent theories, namely sunk cost ellecls and 
justification motives, explaining why escalation takes place will be discussed Of these, it will 
be shown that explanation based on the justification motives is the one that has received the 
most support Hence, justification motives will be chosen as the explanation to focus on in 
this thesis Second, the literature on the effects of objective information (i e , the project 
determinant) on escalation of commitment will be presented Third, the importance of 
relevant inlormation for decision-making and the difficulties in the identification of relevant 
information will be discussed and selective exposure to information will be identified as an 
important bias introducing difficulty in determining information relevance 
In chapter 3, the link between justification motives and selective exposure to information will 
be developed further While doing so, dissonance theory will be used The conceptual model, 
the research questions, and the hypotheses for the research will be presented The conceptual 
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model for the research depicts choice, responsibility for decision consequences, initial 
commitment, and decision consequences as the four factors that are expected to stimulate not 
only escalation of commitment but also selective exposure to confirming information In this 
thesis, laboratory expenments are used as the research method Subjects were asked to take 
part in a role-playing decision-making scenario that simulates a situation in which escalation 
of commitment may take place A questionnaire was used to gather data on the choices and 
commitment levels of the subjects Such methodological choices will further be motivated in 
chapter 3 
Chapters 4 and 5 are empirical in nature and will include the expenments designed to test the 
conceptual model developed in chapter 2 In chapter 4, the focus will be on the effect of 
choice and responsibility for decision consequences on the selective exposure to confirming 
information The hypothesis on whether decision-makers who are responsible for the choice 
and consequences of a strategy prefer confirming information over disconfirming information 
will be tested In chapter 5, the focus will be on the effect of initial commitment and decision 
consequences on selective exposure tendencies 
In chapter 6, the focus will shift to the second goal of this dissertation establishing an 
instrument that can work both as a de-escalation tool and counterbalance the tendencies to 
selectively search for confirming information Such a tool based on the System Dynamics 
method will be proposed and tested by means of an experiment 
Finally, in chapter 7, the conclusions of the four experiments presented in the preceding 
chapters and the implications of this thesis for theory and practice will be discussed, 
limitations of this research will be pointed out, and recommendations for future research will 
be identified 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
In this chapter, literature on two issues dictated by the topic ol this thesis will be reviewed 
escalation of commitment and selective exposure to inlormation First, the focus will be on 
escalation of commitment Escalation situations will be defined and the determinants of 
escalation will be discussed Sunk cost effects and justification motives will be discussed as 
the two prominent explanations on why escalation takes place Second, the literature on the 
effects of 'objective' information on escalation of commitment will be presented Third, the 
importance of relevant information for decision-making and the difficulties with identifying 
relevant information will be discussed Selective exposure to information will be identified as 
an important bias introducing difficulty in judging the relevance of information 
2.1 Escalation of commitment 
2.1.1 Definition and determinants of escalation of commitment 
Escalation of commitment is defined as the tendency to keep on investing m a failing course 
of action (Staw, 1976) Given the uncertainty surrounding the consequences of actions (Staw, 
1997), neither withdrawal nor persistence is a clear-cut solution to the problem of the 
decision-maker Staw and Ross (1987 40) identified three common factors to what they call 
escalation situation1; 
1 "All of the situations entail some loss or costs that have resulted from an original course 
of action 
2 They are not one-shot affairs, but dilemmas involving ongoing courses ol action 
3 They comprise situations where simple withdrawal is not an obvious solution to the 
problem, either because withdrawal involves substantial costs or because persistence 
holds at least the prospect for eventual gain." 
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One could question whether escalation decisions are always irrational Even though a course 
of action is failing it might still have high future prospects Would continuation be irrational 
in such cases ' Many of us succeeded in different situations just because we tried again and 
we tried harder When it comes to economically rational decision-making, an individual 
should consider the expected gains and losses and make a decision maximizing future 
outcomes How much has been invested in the past or who made the previous decisions or 
reputation should not have any bearing on the decision to continue or withdraw Yet, research 
has shown that people continue to invest in failing courses ot actions for reasons other than 
rational economic reasoning It has been shown that when laced with failure people 
responsible for previous decisions invest more than those who are not, they take sunk costs 
into account, and they keep on investing to save their reputation in the eyes ol others When 
the reason lor continuation shifts from rational to rationalizing we talk about non-rational 
escalation In situations where such reasons are used, the old wisdom we teach our children 
"try again, try harder, try until you can do it" may indeed not be the wisest way to proceed 
The focus of this dissertation is on situations where individual's behavior under one set 
of conditions differs from behavior under another set of conditions More specifically, the 
focus will be on escalation situations where upon the receipt of negative performance 
feedback, individuals who are responsible lor the initial choice of an action or are held 
responsible for its consequences or are, in general, initially committed to the course of action 
will behave differently and show more tendency to keep on investing in the same action than 
those who are not responsible for the initial choice or are not held responsible for its 
consequences or are not initially committed 
For understanding the causes ot escalation, it is useful to look at different definitions of 
commitment and factors that are believed to affect commitment Definitions of commitment 
that will be considered here are those that are most relevant to the escalation paradigm, ι e 
commitment to a course of action or strategy Kiesler (1971), as one of the first researchers to 
build a model of commitment, defined commitment as "the degree to which one is bound or 
tied to some behavior" (Kiesler, 1971 48) as well as "pledging or binding of the individual to 
behavioral acts" (Kiesler, 1971 'ΊΟ) Salancik (1977) also used this definition and pointed out 
that "to act is to commit oneself' (Salancik, 1977 4) Others have been equating choice with 
commitment For instance, Festinger (1964 156) said, "a decision carnes a commitment with 
it if the decision unequivocally aflects subsequent behavior" and Brehm and Cohen (1962 7) 
said, "A person is committed when he has decided to do or not do a certain thing, when he 
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has chosen one (or more) alternatives and thereby rejected one (or more) alternatives, when 
he actively engages in a given behavior or has engaged in a given behavior Any one or a 
combination of these behaviors can be considered a commitment" Kiesler (1971) argued that 
choice or decision to do something is not commitment itself but it causes a level of 
attachment to a certain course of action and makes the individual more resistant to change it 
Defined this way, commitment is a continuous variable (Kiesler, 1971) with various degrees 
"A statement of a belief or attitude is a less committing action than the signing of a petition in 
favor of the belief, which in tum is less committing than actively advocating the belici lo a 
hostile or skeptical audience" (Salancik, 1977 4) 
Both Kiesler (1971) and Salancik (1977) identified a number of factors that would affect the 
degree of commitment These lactors make a person's behavior more binding, and hence 
affect the degree of commitment These factors are as follows (Kiesler, 1971 31, Salancik 
1977 4-5) 
1 "The exphcitness of the act how public or unambiguous the act was" 
2 "The degree of irrevocability or irreversibility of the act" This relers to whether the act 
can be reversed or undone 
3 "The degree of volition (or freedom ol choice) perceived by the person performing the 
act" Kiesler (1971) defined volition to be inversely related to the degree of external 
pressure Salancik (1977) points out that volition links the act to the individual He points 
out that choice, the presence ol external demands lor action, the presence of extrinsic 
bases lor action, and the presence ol other contributors to action are the major 
characteristics that relate to the degree of perceived volition of action 
4 "The importance of the act for the subject" (only identified by Kiesler, 1971 ) 
5 "The number of acts performed repetitions of the same act or separate behaviors that are 
closely connected in some way" (only identified by Kiesler, 1971) 
Within the escalation research, Staw (1982 101-102) defined commitment as "the glue that 
holds individuals in a line of behavior, encompassing those psychological forces that bind 
individuals to an action as well as those situational forces that make change difficult" In his 
attempts to map the antecedents of commitment in a causal model, based on Kiesler (1971) 
and Salancik (1977), Staw (1982 103-106) developed a categorization of determinants of 
commitment to behaviors 
1 Responsibiht} for action This is the construct of (freedom of) choice or volition 
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2 Salience of the action ' Explicit and public actions are more binding because they 
presumably are more salient to both the individuals and others who are watching" 
3 Consequences of the action "Binding actions are thought to have implications beyond the 
behavior itself They may have ramifications upon the individual's past performance or 
identity They may have implications upon future acts And they may have spillover 
effects on the life of the decision-maker or others affected by his or her actions " 
4 Responsibility for consequences Staw points out that this factor has been overlooked in 
the commitment literature He reasons that this might be due to assuming that volition 
necessarily implies responsibility for consequences However, he points out that this is 
not necessarily the case "One may, for example, have had little choice in an action but 
still be held accountable for it, and an action may be high in volition but responsibility is 
low because its consequences are seen as heavily influenced by external forces" Hence, it 
becomes important to distinguish responsibility for choice and responsibility for 
consequences 
Initially, researchers focused on responsibility for action, ι e choice, and consequences ol 
action as the main determinants of escalation The first paper demonstrating their effects on 
escalation of commitment was by Staw (1976) In a decision-making experiment (see figure 
2 1), he manipulated the decision consequences and responsibility for action, ie choice, 
orthogonally In this study, subjects played the role of a financial vice president who had to 
make decisions on the allocation of research and development (R&D) funds Subjects were 
asked to make two investment decisions The first decision was to choose one of the two 
possible departments to invest all the available R&D funds (figure 2 1 the initial allocation 
decision) Half ol the subjects was asked to choose the department to invest in (high-
responsibility condition) and the other half was told that the allocation was done by another 
financial officer of the company (low-responsibility condition) The subjects were then 
presented with financial data of both divisions over the 5 years after the initial investment 
(figure 2 1 decision consequences) Half of the subjects was informed that the previously-
chosen division performed better than the not-chosen division whereas the other half was 
informed otherwise After studying the performance information, the subjects were asked to 
divide the new available funds amongst the two divisions (figure 2 1 second allocation 
decision) The dependent variable used in the study was the individuals' commitment to the 
previously chosen investment alternative and was operationahzed by the "amount of money 
subjects allocated on the second R&D funding decision to the corporate division chosen 
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earlier (either chosen earlier by the subject or the other financial officer mentioned in the 
case)" (Stdw, 1976 33) 
Case description Initial allocation 
decision 
Λ 
MANIPULATION 1 
Personal responsibility 
• High Subject makes the 
choice of division 
• Low Another financial 
otficer makes the choice 
Decision 
consequences 
Second allocation 
decision 
MANIPULATION 2 
Decision consequences 
• Positive Chosen division perform 
better than not-chosen 
• Negative Chosen division 
performs worse than not-chosen 
Figure 2.1: Expérimental design ol the experiment by Staw (1976) 
The results showed that there were main effects of both personal responsibility and decision 
consequences and a significant interaction ol these variables High-responsibility subjects 
invested more than the low-responsibility subjects and subjects under negative consequences 
condition invested more than those in positive consequences condition The amount invested 
in the previously-chosen alternative was greatest in the high-responsibility & negative 
consequences condition However, consequences did not have any effect in the low-
responsibihty condition and responsibility did not significantly aftect results under the 
positive consequences condition The main conclusion of the paper was that subjects 
responsible for the initial choice of the department escalated their commitment to the 
previously-chosen alternative especially when faced with negative decision consequences 
In the 30 years following this paper, there have been numerous experiments showing 
evidence for escalation of commitment These studies, with a lew exceptions, held the 
decision consequences constant at the negative level (since escalating commitment to an 
action that is performing well is not very interesting) Choice, as a proxy for personal 
responsibility for action, remained more or less a constant over all the escalation studies 
Besides these two factors, different researchers focused on different variables as determinants 
of commitment This led to a large number of determinants as well as some conflicting 
findings As the number of determinants increased, it became more difficult to make sense of 
Π 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
the different variables This led to the realization that there is no single determinant for the 
occurrence of escalation In an attempt to put different causes together, Staw and Ross (1987) 
presented a classification scheme that encompassed four categories of determinants project, 
psychological, social, and organizational 
Project determinants include the objective aspects of a project (Staw and Ross, 1987) 
reflecting the costs and the benefits (Newman and Sabherwal, 1996) For example, escalation 
of commitment is likely when closing costs, ι e costs associated with slopping a project, are 
high or when failure can be attributed to temporary external causes Other examples include 
the salvage value, economic merits of pursuing a project, efficacy of resources, feasibility of 
alternatives, and size of a project's goal 
Psychological determinants include attributes of the decision-makers' involvement with 
the project (Keil, 1995a) As Staw and Ross (1987 48) indicate "some of the psychological 
factors are forces that can induce errors in the calculation of gains and losses, while others 
refer to forces that can more directly bind individuals to a course of action" For example, 
decision-makers tend to stay committed when they want to prove the correctness of their 
previous choice to themselves (self-justification motives) or when they have high self-esteem 
(Newman and Sabherwal, 1996) Other examples include sunk cost effects, biases in 
information processing, ego importance of failure, and framing effects 
Social determinants include features of the social group surrounding a decision-maker 
(Staw and Ross, 1987) Examples would include face-saving and external justification needs, 
norms of consistency, public identification with the project, modeling of other's behavior in 
similar circumstances, job security, competition and/or political rivalry 
Organizational or structural determinants refer to the "structural and political 
environment surrounding a project" (Keil, 1995a 423) Some examples are projects' 
institutionalization, inertia in the organization, and economic and technical side-bets (such as 
hiring employees or buying machinery) In later years, Staw (1997) also added contextual 
effects to the list of determinants to include those forces that are beyond the organization 
itself such as governmental and political interest in the project 
All these variables and mechanisms can contribute to the occurrence of escalation of 
commitment This is not to say that all the determinants are of equal importance Some may 
be more dominant than others at times and over time, the dominance can shift from one factor 
to another This dynamic co-existence of antecedents makes escalation situations especially 
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interesting. Initially, Staw and Ross (1987) suggested a temporal model for escalation. They 
argued that at the outset, the project considerations are dominant. If the revenues are believed 
to exceed the expected costs the project is initiated, otherwise, not. In the next stages of the 
escalation process, psychological and social determinants are expected to become 
increasingly important and dominant (Brockner, 1992). Even at later stages of escalation, 
organizational factors are expected to stimulate further commitment. However, given the lack 
of empirical evidence supporting this temporal model, Staw (1997: 209) suggested a much 
simpler model showing the aggregate effects of different determinants (see figure 2.2). This 
model emphasizes that it is the relative importance of behavioral variables (totality of 
psychological, social, and organizational determinants) versus perceived project determinants 
that leads to escalation or withdrawal: "behavioral forces must match or exceed the strength 
of any negative economic data in order to hold organizations and their decision-makers in a 
losing course of action" (Staw, 1997: 209). This model also recognizes that behavioral factors 
do not only have a direct effect on commitment but also an indirect effect by determining the 
information attended to and the way this information is perceived. That is why the model 
includes perceived project determinant and this means that the information gathered and used 
is not necessarily objective. As a result, the individuals do not necessarily have the "correct" 
perception of the objective information regarding the project. 
Project Economics 
Positive Neutral Negative Very Negative 
Biases 
Perceived Project Economics 
Conwrtterierit to 8 Course <Jf Action 
mmimm 
Paychotoglcat Soc 1*1 Orgenlzellona! Contextujtl 
Determlrwrts Dettrmlnantt Mtnnfrwits Oetemihiarrts 
Figure 2.2: An aggregate model of escalation by Staw (1997). Printed with permission. 
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Overall, from this model, it is possible to identify three different effects that arc interesting to 
study: (i) the effect of behavioral determinants on commitment; (ii) the effect of project 
determinants on commitment; and (iii) the effect of behavioral determinants on the perception 
of project determinants. The following sections will review prior research concerning these 
effects. Of these three, the effect of behavioral determinants on escalation is well-studied and 
understood. The most prominent explanations of escalation are all based on behavioral 
motives. For instance, the sunk cost effect and self-justification motives are psychological 
determinants and external justification motives (also referred to as face saving) is a social 
determinant. The second and the third effects involve the project determinants, that is, 
objective information on the project and its progress. Whereas the direct effects of project 
determinants (i.e. information) on escalation has received quite some research attention, the 
effect of behavioral forces on the perception of project determinants has not. It is not clear 
how the information preferences of decision-makers are shaped under the influence of 
various behavioral forces. As will be explained later, depending on its content, information 
has the power to stimulate further continuation with or withdrawal from a failing course of 
action. Hence, understanding how behavioral forces affect the information preferences of 
individuals is very important to better understand escalation situations. This effect will be a 
focus of this research. Not all the behavioral forces will be studied in this thesis. The focus 
will be on self- and external justification motives. In the next section, as well as in chapter 3, 
the reasons for this selection will be explained. 
Before discussing the specifics regarding this research, in the sections to follow, more review 
will be given on the main explanations of escalation and the effects of the project 
determinants on escalation. In the next section, the focus will be on the two most dominant 
explanations: sunk cost effect and justification motives. Then, in section 2.1.3, an overview 
of the literature on the effects of project determinants on escalation will be presented. 
2.1.2 Effect of behavioral determinants on escalation of commitment 
As explained previously, there are many behavioral determinants that have been shown to 
effect escalation of commitment. In this section, the focus will be on the two' most dominant 
There is a third explanatory theory based on the prospect theory which explains individuals' risk taking 
behavior under uncertain conditions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) The theory posits that individual's risk 
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determinants that have been used to explain why escalation takes place: sunk cost effect and 
justification motives. 
Sunk cost effect: The sunk cost argument states that "the more money, effort, or time that has 
been invested in a project, the more likely the project will continue to receive resources" 
(Garland and Gonion, 1998: 2025). The research stream on the sunk cost effect has developed 
parallel to the escalation of commitment research stream. It is not clear whether sunk cost 
effect is one of the determinants of escalation or whether it is just another name for escalation 
tendencies. 
The first evidence for the sunk cost effect came from Teger (1979). In his pioneering work, 
Teger used the famous dollar auction game and showed that people were ready to pay much 
more than the monetary worth of a prize. Dollar auction game was an unusual bidding game 
where both the highest and the second-highest bidders were to pay at the end of the auction 
while only the highest bidder got the price. Even though the auction was for one dollar, 
bidders were ready to pay much more than its monetary-worth. Another well-known study on 
the sunk cost effect in decision-making situations was done by Arkes and Blumer (1985). To 
simulate a personal decision-making situation, they asked their subjects to imagine that they 
had accidentally purchased two ski trips, one for $100 and the other for $50. The $50 trip was 
expected to be more enjoyable. Neither of the tickets was refundable. When asked which trip 
they would choose 54% of the participants chose for the $100 trip even though the other one 
was expected to be more enjoyable. Arkes and Blumcr ran a similar experiment with theater 
tickets and showed that people who pay for a season ticket used their ticket more frequently 
than those who purchased it cheaper. They designed another set of experiments to investigate 
decision-making situations in a company setting. They asked their subjects to play the role of 
a president of an aircraft company deciding whether to invest $1 million of research funds 
taking preferences will change depending on whether they perceive themselves to be in the domain ol gains or 
losses such that they will be risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain ot losses. For 
escalation situations, prospect theorist would assume that "individuals would experience themselves in the 
domain of losses" (Brückner, 1992. 51 ). Once the initial investment fails and the decision-maker needs to decide 
on whether to re-invest or not. this "subsequent choice becomes one between a sure loss (the initial loss on the 
investment) and the possibility ot a larger loss combines with a chance to return to the reference point" (Whyte, 
1986: 318). Given loss aversion, individuals would be risk seeking and would prefer to allocate additional 
resources with the hope ot turning the situation around. The alternative, ι e stopping right away, would mean 
accepting a sure loss This theory is not explained further in this thesis since it did not receive much support in 
previous research Moreover, Davis and Bobko's (1986) work comparing prospect theory explanation to self-
justification explanation was more supportive of the latter 
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into the development of a plane that cannot be caught by conventional radar In one 
condition, the lunds were to be used to start building the plane In the second condition, the 
subjects were informed that the project was 90% completed and the funds were to be used to 
finish the plane All the subjects were also informed that another firm was also beginning to 
market a radar-blank plane which appeared to be faster and more economical When asked 
whether they would invest the money, 64% chose to spend the money to complete the plane 
whereas only 5% chose to spend the money to start the project Based on these experimental 
findings, Arkes and Blumer represented sunk cost effect as a "judgment error" (Arker and 
Blumer, 1985 139) and explained that people take sunk costs into account with the "desire 
not to appear wastelul" In order not to waste the money already invested people invest even 
more money 
Using the same radar-blank plane case. Garland (1990), presented his subjects 5 scenarios 
where he manipulated the amount of sunk cost (SI - or S3/$5/$7/$9 - million spent and 10% 
- or 30%/50%/70%/90% - completed) He found a strong effect of sunk cost Later, using 
similar scenanos from different settings. Garland and Newport (1991) showed that it is not 
the absolute amount of sunk cost but rather "the proportion of allotted resources expended on 
the project" (Garland and Newport, 1991 65) that stimulated further investment One major 
problem with these experiments was that sunk costs were completely confounded with the 
project completion even though they are theoretically different concepts (Gonion and 
Garland, 1993) Realization of this led to a number of new experiments in which these two 
variables were manipulated independently (Gonion and Garland, 1993, Garland and Gonion, 
1998) These experiments showed that it was the project completion effect that significantly 
contributed to continued investment and not the sunk cost effect Garland and Gonion (1998) 
explained these results by stating that sunk costs would play an important role in adoption 
decisions (which concern the initial choice about what projects to undertake or reject) but not 
in progress decisions (which concern whether a plan is making sufficient progress toward 
goal attainment) They proposed that the progress decisions, ι e those regarding the 
continuation of a project, are caused by the "goal substitution" effect "As progress moves 
forward on a project, completion of the project itself takes increasing precedence over other 
goals (e g economic profit) that may have been salient at the time the decision was made to 
begin the project" (Garland and Gonion 1998 2025) and "individuals get caught up in the 
desire to complete what they have started, and as this completion draws nearer, information 
that might have been taken into account before choosing to undertake the project (e g 
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cost/benefit ratios, etc ) becomes increasingly unimportant" (Garland and Gonion, 1998 
2042) 
Staw and Hoang (1995) attributed the lack of sunk cost effect in Gonion and Garland (1993) 
experiments to an artifact of the way the experiments were conducted They stated "Although 
Gonion and Garland could not find sunk-cost effects that were independent of project-
completion information, this does not mean that costs are unimportant In natural settings, 
decision-makers may regularly confound the amount they have expended with progress on a 
project" (Staw and Hoang, 1995 490) In a case study where they studied decisions in the 
National Basketball Association (NBA), Staw and Hoang (1995) showed that sunk cost 
effects are operational in decisions regarding the playing time, length of career on NBA, and 
being traded to another team On the other hand. Moon (2001) demonstrated that the results 
of Gonion and Garland were an artifact ot not controlling for the perceived likelihood of 
success "The closer the decision-maker feels that the project is to being complete, the better 
chance the decision-maker may teel that the project had to succeed" (Moon, 2001 107) 
Controlling for perceived success Moon found main effects lor both sunk cost and 
completion and an interaction effect such that the importance of sunk cost increased with 
high levels of completion 
Overall, these are contradictory findings on the effect of sunk cost If the sunk cost effect 
does exist the cause of this effect is not very clear Given reasoning of Arkcs and Blumer 
(1985) and Heath (1995), it is the hopes of recouping the prior investments that make people 
pay attention to sunk costs So the goal is economic gain (Staw and Hoang 1995) Staw and 
Hoang (1995), on the other hand, argued that it is a combination of factors such as "the 
presence of cognitive bias, commitment, desire not to appear wasteful, and justification" 
(Staw and Hoang, 1995 492) that leads to the sunk cost effect Linking the sunk cost and 
escalation research streams to one another could help determine the causes of the sunk cost 
effect and the effect(s) of sunk costs on escalation 
Justification motives: Staw (1976) argued that decision-makers keep on investing in the 
previously-chosen, but failing, courses of action because of the self-justification motives In 
order to justify their prior behavior to themselves or to others, subjects allocate more money 
to the earlier choice Such rationalizing or justifying behavior is driven by the "unwillingness 
to admit that they [decision-makers] were mistaken in having become committed to the 
initially chosen course of action" (Brockner, 1992 41) Self-justification explanation is based 
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on Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance which states that individuals would like 
to avoid dissonance and would strive for consistency amongst their beliefs or between their 
beliefs and actions Having made the initial decision, people would convince themselves that 
they have done the right thing This would create a pleasant cognitive state Facing a negative 
outcome and quitting an action, on the other hand, would be equivalent to admitting that the 
previous decision was wrong and this would lead to the unpleasant and unwanted state of 
dissonance Staw (1976) argued that precisely for the need to justify their correctness and 
decrease dissonance, decision-makers would keep on investing even in the lace of setback 
(See chapter 3 for further discussion on the dissonance theory and self-justification motives) 
Justification motives could manifest themselves in two different ways A responsible 
decision-makers might want to justily (the correctness of) the previous choice to him/hersell 
or to others Previous research mainly focused on choice ol the initial course of action to 
induce personal responsibility and justification needs It should, however, be made clear that 
justification motives induced by choice alone are mainly internal justification motives the 
decision-maker wants to justify to him (or herself) that he (she) made the right decision 
Besides internal justification, people might have the need to show to the others that their 
initial decision was not erroneous For instance, when the choice is public or if others hold 
the person responsible for the negative outcomes (Salancik, 1977, Caldwell and O'Reilly, 
1982) the so-called external justification motives can be aroused and such motives are 
directed at saving face External justification motives, a social determinant of escalation, can 
be powerlul but whether they are enough to induce escalation on their own is not yet clear In 
this section, both internal and external justification motives will be explained 
Internal justification motives are induced due to the feeling of responsibility for the 
initial choice of an action Following Staw's (1976) work that showed the importance of 
choice (i e personal responsibility) in inducing escalation, various experimental researchers, 
using different cases and procedures, replicated his results For instance. Gonion and Parks 
(1987) demonstrated the escalation effect where as compared to the subjects with low-
responsibihty, high-responsibility subjects allocated more after failure than success Davis 
and Bobko (1986) showed similar results in the context ol public sector decision-making 
involving a financial allocation task Bazerman, Beekun, and Schoorman (1982) conducted 
an experiment where undergraduates in the role of a vice president were asked to evaluate the 
past performance of subordinates and make predictions of their future performance High-
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responsibility subjects, namely, those responsible for the earlier promotion ol the managers, 
were more positive in their rating than the low-responsibility subjects 
One of the main supports for the self-justification explanation of escalation came from a 
study by Bazerman and his colleagues (Bazerman, Giuliano, and Appelman, 1984) Since 
dissonance theory underlies the self-justification explanation, Bazerman et al (1984) 
examined the dissonance processes by looking at two sets of dependent variables those 
contributing to the arousal and reduction of dissonance The dissonance theory would predict 
that greater commitment to a negative decision would result in a greater need to justity and 
this justification need would be aroused to the extent that the two consecutive decisions are 
seen as related Hence, Bazerman et al measured commitment and relatedness as the two 
factors contributing to the arousal of dissonance They also measured confidence ("in the 
ability to have made the optimal decision"), and reversal ("how much the subjects thought 
that further allocation would turn the situation around") as factors contributing to the 
reduction of dissonance They argued that confidence and reversal are "cognitions that make 
the allocation of additional resources consonant with the initial decision" (Bazerman et al, 
1984 145) Their results showed that high-responsibility subjects experienced higher arousal 
and an increased motivation to reduce dissonance than low responsibility subjects Hence, 
they concluded that "it is plausible that dissonance processes underlie escalation of 
commitment" (Bazerman et al, 1984 150) 
The studies discussed so far support the notion that decision-makers who feel responsible for 
the initial choice of an action keep on being committed to that action even alter the receipt of 
negative decision consequences In all these studies, choice was used to generate 
responsibility for both the action and its consequences However, responsibility for choice 
does not necessarily imply responsibility for the decision consequences For instance, if the 
choice is not public then the feeling of responsibility may not occur (Salancik, 1977) 
Moreover, responsibility may also result from the assignment of an action (Caldwell and 
O'Reilly, 1982) by, for instance, the superiors Hence, researchers tried to identity whether it 
is mere choice or the responsibility felt for the consequences or a combination that leads to 
commitment 
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External justification motives received less research attention and were mainly studied 
as responsibility for decision outcomes (from now on, referred to as responsibility"). Caldwell 
and O'Reilly (1982) designed an experiment where they manipulated choice and 
responsibility orthogonally. The subjects were assigned the role of an administrative manager 
(of a small, growing technical company) who was going to hire a new employee. The 
subjects in the choice condition were asked to choose one of the three candidates whereas the 
subjects in the no-choice condition were presented with a single individual that was hired by 
the president of the company. After this manipulation, the subjects were informed that the 
company had lost a major government contact due to the new employee. At this point, the 
subjects in the high-responsibility condition were informed that they would be held 
accountable for the failure of this new employee whereas the low-responsibility subjects were 
informed that they would not be held responsible. The results suggested that responsibility for 
failure, on its own, can lead to escalation. 
Schoorman and Holahan (1996) separated the effects of choice and responsibility for decision 
consequences in another way. They manipulated choice as in the previous studies. Then, 
responsibility was manipulated by telling the subjects in the low-responsibility condition that 
their initial decision was overruled and hence, not implemented. Both the high- and low-
responsibility subjects were given the same performance feedback. All subjects were asked to 
decide how much money they would invest in the department that initially received the 
allocation. This meant that the subjects in the low-responsibility group had to decide on 
allocation to the division not chosen. Through these manipulations, Schoorman and Holahan 
created three groups which they named positive commitment (made the choice and the choice 
is implemented, that is, responsible for the decision consequences), negative commitment 
(made the choice but the choice is not implemented, that is, not responsible for the decision 
consequences), and no commitment (did not make the choice and is not responsible for the 
decision consequences). The study did not include 'no choice but responsible' condition. 
The results showed that subjects in the negative commitment condition (whose initial 
choice was not implemented), when faced with positive consequences of the action that was 
implemented (i.e. the action they rejected) invested less money than subjects in the no 
commitment condition. Schoorman and Holahan indicated that this could show that choice, 
" The reader should realize that here, responsibility is used differently than how Slaw (1976) used u Staw used 
responsibility to mean responsibility for the choice ot an action. In this dissertation, responsibility lor choice is 
referred to as choice and responsibility for outcome is referred to as responsibility 
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on Us own, may be enough to create the escalation effect, however, the same pattern was not 
seen in the negative outcome condition Hence, the results were not conclusive regarding the 
differential effects of choice and responsibility Moreover, the study did not include the no-
choice but responsible group so it is difficult to make an inference on the separate effects of 
the two factors 
The most important finding from their study was that they showed that the magnitude of 
escalation was greatest when decision consequences were inconsistent with the expectations. 
Both under the positive and negative decision consequences, subjects in the positive 
commitment condition invested more than those in the no commitment condition Hence, 
contrary to previous research that showed the importance ol negative outcomes for 
escalation, these results suggest that "choice and responsibility lor decision outcomes are 
sufficient lor inducing the escalation effect" (Schoorman and Holahan, 1996 790) The 
authors suggest that what matters is not whether the outcome is positive or negative but 
whether it is consistent or inconsistent (i e dissonant) with the decision-maker's initial 
choice This result is consistent with the dissonance theory that points out the necessity of 
consistency between cognitions and gives an overall support for the justification explanation 
Yet, this study could not give additional support for the external justification motives as a 
driver ol escalation of commitment 
A rather different manipulation of responsibility was used by Lcathcrwood and Gonion 
(1987) who designed a study that partially extended and partially refuted the justification 
explanation They manipulated responsibility and diffusibihty of blame (i e the ability or 
possibility to shift the blame to someone else) In their study, the subjects resumed the role of 
a vice president of a real estate development corporation who had to choose one of the two 
available projects to allocate money in Responsibility was induced via the manipulation of 
the foreseeability of the setback Those in the foreseeable condition were in the high-
responsibility condition These subjects were beforehand told of the possibility ol a setback (a 
disagreement with the union that could lead to a conflict which in the second round of the 
experiment constituted the setback) There was no mention of a possible setback in the low-
responsibilily condition Leatherwood and Gonion found out that responsibility led to 
escalation only when the subjects could not shiit the blame to someone else These results 
point out that the tendency to escalate is not only a function of responsibility but also of 
whether the decision-maker is held accountable and whether he can explain the negative 
outcomes. 
23 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overall, these studies do not give conclusive findings regarding the distinct eftccts ol internal 
vs external justification motives Yet, support lor the justification motives as an explanation 
for escalation is abundant Feelings of responsibility (either induced by choice or being held 
responsible for the consequences or both) generate justification motives which are 
materialized as further commitment in the losing course of action 
Summary and focus of this research 
In this section, sunk cost efiects and justification motives have been discussed as the two 
possible explanations lor escalation Of these, currently, justification explanation gives the 
firmest and most supported basis for studying escalation Therefore, as the theory that 
"provides an important explanation of escalation behavior" (Brockner, 1992 58), this thesis 
will be focusing on the justification explanation 
One should realize that both sunk cost effect and justification motives (as well as the framing 
effects) explain the direct effect of a behavioral factor on escalation The aggregate model ol 
Staw (1997, see figure 2 2), however, emphasizes the relative importance of behavioral 
factors over perceived project determinants Hence, the locus will now shift to understanding 
project determinants and their effect on escalation In what follows, first, an overview of 
experimental research looking into the effect of project determinants on escalation will be 
summarized Then, a discussion on factors that can affect the perception ol project 
determinants will be given Finally, the attention will be directed at the effect ol justification 
motives, as the chosen behavioral determinant, on the perception of project determinants 
2.1.3 Effect of project determinants on escalation of commitment 
As explained previously, objective information about the progress and economics of the 
course of action is classified under project determinants Research studying the role of project 
determinants can lake two perspectives (i) Effect ol project determinants (i e information) 
on escalation and (u) cflcct of behavioral determinants on the perception and acquisition ol 
project determinants The first one of these, namely, the effect of different project 
determinants on escalation has been the main focus of past research Researchers studied how 
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different values of project determinants affect decisions to escalate or withdraw and showed 
that while certain values stimulate escalation, others enable withdrawal The results of this 
line of research do not only show the importance of information lor decision-making in 
escalation situations but also the importance of the second line ol research identified above 
effect of behavioral factors in the perception and acquisition of information items that are 
classified under project determinants To understand escalation better it is important to 
identify whether behavioral factors that stimulate escalation also trigger the preference, 
perception or acquisition ot the escalation-stimulating values of the project determinants 
Before moving onto explaining how the perception of project determinants can be affected by 
certain behavioral factors, first, research on the effect of project determinants on escalation 
will be summarized While doing so, not all the project determinants will be dealt with but a 
representative sample demonstrating their ellect will be used The specific project 
determinants included in this section arc frequency ol perlormance leedback, cause of 
setback, availability of an explicit goal, efficacy of resources, availability of alternatives and 
salience of costs 
Frequency of performance feedback rclers to the continued nature ol negative 
performance information It was shown that if a decision maker receives negative leedback 
repeatedly then this increases the likelihood of withdrawal Staw and Fox (1977) ran an 
experiment where the subjects made three successive decisions each followed by negative 
performance feedback Results showed a main ellect lor the frequency and a significant 
interaction effect for frequency by choice The amount invested at the second investment was 
less than the first investment, however, afterwards, there was an increase and the amount 
invested at the third investment was more than the second (but still less than the first) Staw 
and Fox argued that the subjects could have blamed the decreased second investments lor the 
consecutive low performance and hence, increased their investment again Looking at the 
effects of choice, they noted that choice subjects were either stable in their investment or 
slightly increased them over time (not statistically significant) whereas no-choice subjects 
decreased their investment Overall, the results show the "temporal nature of the escalation 
process" (Staw and Fox, 1977 447) such that choice subjects made unstable investments 
involving an initial decrease followed by a slight increase in the next decision whereas no-
choice subjects made stable investment over time A similar experiment was run by McCain 
(1986) using an adapted version of the Staw and Fox (1977) case The subjects were asked to 
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make consecutive decisions lor up to ten time periods (they could quit whenever they wanted 
after completing the first three penods) The results indicated that escalation was limited lo 
the first stages of decision-making Garland, Sandefur, and Rogers (1990) also designed a 
longitudinal study and showed that the sunk cost effect did not exist in the face of repeated 
negative feedback Alter two rounds of negative feedback, subjects de-escalaled 
These experiments are interesting because they show limits of escalation As time passes and 
new information on the negative consequences becomes available, decision-makers de-
escalate instead ol continuing to invest resources in a failing action Hence, repeated 
investment as well as more frequent controls over a course ol action could be (actors that 
restrict escalation (McCain, 1986) 
Cause of setback includes information on why the setback, ι e negative decision 
consequences, has occurred II was typically studied as two separate variables loreseeabihty 
and persistence of setback Foreseeabihty of setback refers to whether the setback was 
foreseeable at the time of the first investment and the persistence of setback signifies whether 
the setback is expected to occur again if investment continues Staw and Ross (1978) 
designed an experiment where they looked at the effects of prior failure (with another 
decision) and persistence ol setback The subjects were first asked to make a decision on a 
case (choice ol a dam location in Nigeria) Half the subjects were inlormed that their decision 
was not optimal whereas the other half was informed that their decision was the best option 
available The subjects were then asked to work on another decision (choice of an industrial 
complex location in Kenya). After choice, the subjects received failure leedback and 
information on the causes of failure Part of the subjects was informed that the lailure was 
due to endogenous-permanent causes (corruption of local officials) and the rest were 
inlormed ol exogenous-temporary (unusual rains) causes Next, they were asked a follow-up 
decision on how much of the available funds they would like to invest in the project The 
results showed that there was a significant interaction between previous performance and 
type of cause Under the prior failure condition, the type of cause had a main elicci on 
commitment The least amount ol money was invested by those who laced a previous failure 
and an endogenous cause and the greatest amount of money was invested by those who faced 
a previous failure and exogenous causes This experiment showed two things (i) individuals 
might process information differently after a failure and (n) when people are presented with 
clear-cut causes they do not get trapped in an on-going escalation of commitment However, 
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Staw and Ross also cautioned that in real life, the causes of failure are most of the time not as 
clear And it is known that people might be "subject to a defensive bias that failures are more 
frequently attributed to exogenous causes" Hence, they called for further research on the 
"acceptance of endogenous vs exogenous causes, and how such information can be utilized 
effectively in policy formation" (Staw and Ross, 1978 61) 
Availability of an explicit goal and proximity to the goal for the decision process was 
shown to have an effect on escalation Rubin and Brockner (1975) designed an experiment 
studying proximity to the goal They asked their subjects to solve a crossword puzzle in order 
to win a jackpot, the value of which decreased the longer the subjects worked on the puzzle 
Subjects could use a dictionary but were to share it with four other subjects The proximity to 
getting the dictionary was manipulated The subjects were told that they were either first or 
third in the line Escalation (operationahzed as the time the subjects spent on solving the 
puzzle) was more when the subjects were first in the line to get the dictionary than third The 
closer the subjects were to getting the dictionary the closer they felt to the goal of finishing 
the crossword and winning the jackpot 
Kernan and Lord ( 1989) looked at the effects of both availability ol an explicit goal and 
the proximity to the goal They designed an experiment where the subjects played the role of 
an industnal manager facing a production problem unacceptable percentage ol defective car 
phones They manipulated the goal (explicit goal reaching five percent defect target vs 
general goal correcting the defect problem) as well as the level ol failure feedback (small, 
moderate or large failure), which is analogous to the inverse of proximity to the goal After 
the first investment, subjects received one of the three performance feedbacks Subjects in the 
general goal condition committed more resources to the (ailing course of action than those in 
the specific goal condition The failure feedback level had no effect on the general goal 
subjects whereas in the explicit goal group, as the goal discrepancy increased from small to 
moderate the subjects increased their commitment, but de-escalated when discrepancy 
became large 
In a more recent study, Lant and Hurley (1999) took a different approach to 
experimental research and used a marketing strategy simulation game They found evidence 
for escalation of commitment and that "most cases of escalation occurred for cases in which 
performance, although below the aspiration level, was fairly near this target" (Lant and 
Hurley, 1999 433) 
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All these studies showed that proximity to the goal stimulates escalation The closer 
individuals feel to accomplishing a goal the more committed they become This result is very 
similar to what Garland and Gonion (1998) called the "goal substitution" effect (see the 
section on the sunk cost effect) 
Efficacy of resources or probability of future success represents the high vs low 
likelihood that additional investment would help the financial condition ol the company 
Staw and Fox (1977) studied the effects of choice and efficacy of resources Resource 
efficacy was manipulated by telling the subjects that there was either a high or low likelihood 
that additional investment would improve the financial condition The results showed that 
subjects in the high-clficacy condition invested more than those in the low-efficacy condition 
and choice subjects invested more than the no-choice subjects Bateman (1986) manipulated 
not only information on the future success probability of the chosen course of action (30% vs 
70%) but also of the non-chosen action (30% vs 70%) The results showed that subjects 
invested more money when the probability of success for the original action was higher The 
highest (lowest) investment took place when failure was followed by a high (low) future 
success probability Both of these experiments show that escalation tendencies increase when 
decision makers have the information that the initially-chosen course of action is likely to 
succeed with further investment 
Availability of alternatives or opportunity cost represents making the decision-makers 
aware of the associated costs of investing in a course of action at the expense ol other 
alternatives (McCain, 1986) For this variable, there were mixed results Davis and Babko 
(1986) gave their subjects the possibility to invest money in the non-chosen alternative They 
could not find any significant elfects for alternatives McCain (1986), on the other hand, 
showed that the number of alternatives had a strong effect on the amount of allocations and 
limited escalation He argued that availability of alternative investments makes the cost 
information more salient Within the sunk cost paradigm. Garland and Gonion (1998) 
manipulated opportunity cost by highlighting an alternative use of funds There was no 
significant effect of opportunity cost but a significant interaction with project completion 
When project completion was low, the subjects receiving the opportunity cost information 
were less likely to allocate additional funds than when project completion was high 
These experiments give mixed findings for the effect of alternatives on escalation In 
the McCain experiment, the subjects did not only receive alternatives but also information 
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that if chosen, the performance of the alternatives would have improved This way the 
uncertainty around the decision was alleviated Even though this is an encouraging outcome, 
in real life, uncertainty cannot always be taken away For instance, performance feedback tor 
the non-chosen alternative is, most of the lime, not available One could speculate on what 
would have happened il the alternative was implemented instead, but such speculations can 
easily be biased by the (committed) decision-makers Overall, based on these limited number 
of experiments, one could argue that for information on alternatives to generate de-escalation, 
more information than just naming the alternatives might be necessary This proposition, 
however, remains to be tested 
Summary: effect of project determinants on escalation of commitment 
The results ol past research summarized in this section show the power of information in 
generating escalation or de escalation depending on its content However the limitations of 
these experiments should be kept in mind In all these experiments, the subjects were given 
only one value for each type of information (e g only exogenous causes or only endogenous 
causes) Moreover, they were not given the opportunity to show their preference for 
iniormation II they were, would they have chosen and processed the information 
"objectively"9 Or would behavioral factors, such as justification tendencies, have played a 
role in biasing the information'7 Answers to such questions are crucial to understanding the 
escalation process It should be pointed out that whether iniormation contributes to further 
commitment or withdrawal depends on Us content, how it is perceived by the decision-maker, 
and how much importance the decision-maker gives to it And based on the model by Staw 
(1997) (figure 2 2), one could propose that what a decision-maker perceives and deems as 
important can be a function of his or her psychological state and/or the environment he or she 
is in This constitutes the third set of effects, namely, the effect of behavioral factors on the 
perception ol project determinants, identified from this model at the end of section 2 1 1 To 
develop this line of reasoning further, first, factors affecting the perception ol information 
need to be understood To facilitate this understanding, in the next section, the importance of 
relevant information for decision-making and difficulties in identifying relevant information 
will be discussed Then, the links between escalation of commitment and information 
perception will be highlighted at the end of section 2 2 and chapter 'Ί 
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2.2 Relevance of information and difficulties in identifying relevant 
information 
Information is one of the key components of (strategic) decision-making Ungson, 
Braunstein, and Hall (1987 117) defined information as the "stimuli (or cues) capable of 
altering an individual's expectations and evaluation in problem solving and decision­
making" Decision-makers spend much time in gathering, storing, analyzing, and 
communicating information during their decision-making activities Some researchers even 
argued that information gathering and processing are more crucial to the success of an 
organization than the actual decision choice (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, Starbuck and 
Milliken, 1988) To torm a judgment on the current situation and decide on the goodness of a 
strategy, decision-makers need to collect and process inlormation In order to make good 
decisions, two types of information are needed (Daft, Sormunen, and Parks, 1988) external, 
ι e environmental, information (to be able to detect trends and changes in the environment) 
(Daft and Weick, 1984, Kiesler and Sproull, 1982, Milliken, 1990) and internal information 
(to evaluate performance) (Cowan, 1986, Thomas, Clark, and Gioia, 1993) The mixture of 
internal and external information is necessary for decision-makers to idenlily the gaps 
between its strategy and the environment as well as the necessary adaptation(s) to their 
strategy 
Decision-makers acquire inlormation through identifying the relevant indicators to be 
scanned and collecting the inlormation Then, through information processing, they analyze 
the collected information and classify it as (ir)relevant The quality of information processing, 
also referred to as interpretation (Daft and Weick, 1984, Thomas et al, 1993), is very crucial 
to the quality of the decisions made Finally, the output of the information acquisition and 
processing stages is the judgment that determines the action to be implemented (Hogarth, 
1980, Hogarth and Makndakis, 1981) 
In terms of linking information with decision quality, the amount of information available has 
been associated with faster perceived problem identification and faster decision-making 
(Huber, 1990, Leidner and Elam, 1995), but its relation to performance has been unclear The 
availability ol a lot ol information increases the confidence in judgment but not necessarily 
Us utility (Payne 1976, Hogarth and Makndikis, 1981) Researchers have also identified that 
decision-makers scan those parts of the environment that have greater strategic uncertainty 
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(Daft et al., 1988; Auster and Choo, 1994; Elenkov, 1997; May, Stewart, and Sweo, 2000) 
and that are perceived as important (Aguilar, 1967; Feldman and March, 1981). Perceived 
importance of information is related to the relevance of the information for the decision being 
made. Many researchers have emphasized the importance of gathering good, relevant 
information. According to Aguilar (1967), information is perceived as useful only if it is 
perceived to be relevant. Feldman and March (1981: 172) stated "the value of information 
depends in a well-defined way on the information's relevance to the decision to be made [...] 
Information has value if it can be expected to affect choice". There is indeed evidence 
indicating that increased amounts of relevant information lead to better decisions. Increased 
amount of irrelevant information, on the other hand, decreases the decision quality because it 
reduces the ability to identify the relevant information (O'Reilly, 1980). And not having the 
relevant information can lead to undesired consequences such as decision-makers missing on 
important information, for instance, on competitors or customers (Lcvinthal and March, 
1993;Gilad, 1996). 
Even though the importance of information for decision-making is recognized and there is 
agreement that scanning should target relevant information, as early as 1967, Aguilar (1967: 
13-14) identified "the failure to recognize the relevance of information" as one of the two 
factors that make scanning unreliable. One restraining factor is the enormous amount of data 
that can be collected (Choudhury and Sampler, 1997). This leads to information overload. As 
the load increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to accurately identify the relevant cues 
(O'Reilly, 1980). Yet, another restraint is set by the decision-makers. Generally, the amount 
of available information exceeds the human information acquisition and processing capacity. 
Both due to this limited capacity and limited resources such as time and money, decision-
makers cannot scan all the available information (Daft et al., 1988; Saunders and Jones, 1990; 
Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). As a result, individuals acquire information selectively rather than 
comprehensively (Hogarth, 1980). They use filters to select the information to pay attention 
to (Choudhury and Sampler, 1997; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 
1981). These filters, which are used to let in only the information that is perceived to be 
relevant, are formed based on past experiences, mental models, and organizational functions 
of the individuals. Hence, the knowledge structures of prior behavior become "the constructs 
against which new information is tested for relevance" (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982: 557). It 
The second faclor is "the distorted reproduction of information" 
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has been argued and shown that people pay more attention to stimuli that are consistent with 
their existing mental models, beliefs, and desired conclusions (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982, 
Cowan, 1986, Day and Lord, 1992, Jermias, 2001, Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, and Thelen, 
2001) 
This tendency to look for consistent, confirming information has been studied under different 
labels such as selective perception, confirmation bias, confirmatory information search, and 
selective exposure to information Hogarth and Makridakis (1981 117) identified the 
information acquisition stage as the source oi the selective perception bias and defined the 
bias to be composed of the following 
"People structure problems on the basis of their own experience, 
Anticipations of what one expects to see bias what one does see. 
People seek information consistent with their own views/hypotheses, and 
People downplay/disregard conflicting evidence' 
A specific aspect of selective perception, related to the first part of Hogath and Makridakis' 
definition, has received most of the attention In their influential work. Dearborn and Simon 
(1958) studied whether Junctional work areas allect the way the executives perceive 
problems Their findings supported their hypothesis that "executives will perceive those 
aspects of a situation that relate specifically to the activities and goals of their department" 
(Dearborn and Simon, 1958 142) After 30 years, Walsh (1988) replicated and extended the 
work of Dearborn and Simon Drawing on a large body ol lileralure, Walsh (1988) used the 
argument that managers' belief structures (i e simplified mental models or representations) 
as determined by their functional experience would affect both the problem identification and 
the scope of information used in the decision-making process Walsh failed to find support 
for his hypothesis and the findings of Dearborn and Simon He even argued that 'it is not at 
all clear that Dearborn and Simon's data support their conclusion" and that the "actual results 
of the two studies do not appear to be contradictory" (Walsh, 1988 889) Waller, Huber, and 
Ghck (1995 965), on the other hand, found out that "functional background does not aifect 
the perception of changes in organizational environments but does effect the perception ol 
changes in organizational effectiveness" Beyer, Chatlopadhyay, George, Ghck, and 
Pugliesee (1997) investigaled the matter lurlher by a "systematic replication and extension 
of' the studies of Dearborn and Simon (1958) and Walsh (1988) They argued that looking at 
only the direction (i e content that matches the functional experience) of information 
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processing is a limited measure of selective perception and that the breadth of information 
processing should also be considered Regarding the previous studies, they showed that the 
difference between the results were due to differences in the experimental procedures In the 
Walsh study, the subjects were encouraged to think of multiple problems whereas in the 
Dearborn and Simon study, they were asked to identify the most important problem 
Regarding the selective perception bias, they found support for the conclusion that lunctional 
experience tends to narrow cognitive processes but in a different way than originally 
accepted They suggested that "functional experience does not increase managers' attention 
to related information but instead lends to restrict the areas of information to which they pay 
attention" (Beyer et al, 1997 730) Since this relates not to what individuals perceive but to 
what they do not perceive, the authors called the phenomenon selective unperteption and 
explained that to narrow perception "it is more likely to direct attention a\\,a\ lorm unrelated 
areas of information than toward related areas" (Beyer et al, 1997 734, italics in original) 
Even though no final reason was otfered lor selective imperception, they considered certain 
possibilities For instance, following Tversky (1972), they indicated that narrowing might be 
occurring by eliminating single aspects decision-makers consider peripheral rather than 
focusing on the central aspects Another possibility could be that people switch between 
schema-consistent and inconsistent information "When conlrontcd with complex stimuli, 
they tend to look, in what is called controlled inlormation processing, foi schema-consistent 
information first Once they have confirmed their schemata, they turn their attention away 
from schema-consistent inlormation to schema-inconsistent inlormation, but continue to 
monitor schema-consistent information in an automatic, less demanding process" (Beyer et 
al, 1997 732) The authors argued that managers might be paying attention to consistent 
information only during an initial period ol search and/or they might need relatively little 
information for confirmation 
Overall, this line of work on selective perception is inconclusive regarding the effect of belief 
structures on information processing demands and problem identification Bundcrson and 
Sutcliffe (1995) found the lack of support lor the functionally-biased perception surprising 
and counter-intuitive and argued that other variables might explain how work history affects 
perception They indicated that two factors could be limiting selective perception 
accountability (if a person knows that she is being held accountable she will be more vigilant 
in her analysis) and strategy (decision-makers will notice those issues and events that arc 
related to the competitive strategy ol the firm) These two factors might indeed limit the 
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selective perception induced by functional background They might also introduce other 
forms of selective perception Hogarth and Makridakis' (1981) definition also indicates that 
people seek confirming evidence while disregarding conflicting evidence Nisbett and Ross 
(1980) pointed out that individuals have the ability to bias facts in the direction ol previously 
accepted preferences Being accountable for performance could force people to rely on 
information showing that they are not to blame or information indicating that their 
performance is good Believing in a strategy, on the other hand, could make people focus on 
strategy-confirming information Such selective information preferences have been studied 
under headings as confirmation bias and selective exposure to information In what follows 
each of these will be discussed separately 
Initial research on confirmation bias was in the context of hypothesis testing Various 
researchers (e g Snyder and S wann, 1979, Darley and Gross, 1983) showed that while testing 
a hypothesis people only tried to confirm their hypothesis In an experiment Wason (I960 
1968) presented his subjects with a rule-discovery task He presented the subjects a set of 
numbers and informed them that the numbers fit a given rule Subjects were then asked to 
find the rule and to do so, they could offer any number of combinations they wanted 
Typically, the subjects offered sets ol numbers that fitted their own hypothesis of the rule 
with the hope of getting confirmation for their hypothesis This phenomenon was labeled 
confirmatory hypothesis testing to indicate that people when testing a hypothesis, ask 
questions that are consistent with their hypothesis Wason (1968) proposed that a 
disconfirmation strategy is a more appropriate strategy for hypothesis testing Klaymand and 
Ha (1987), on the other hand, indicated that whether confirmation or disconfirmation strategy 
is better depends on the "characteristics of the task at hand" (Klayman and Ha, 1987 225) 
They called the confirmation tendency the positive test strategy and showed that this strategy 
of hypothesis testing does not necessarily guarantee the confirmation sought and that "under 
some circumstances, positive testing may be the only way to discover falsifying instances" 
(Klayman and Ha, 1987 225) 
Confirmation bias has also been applied to the decision-making context In these situations, 
however the bias has a slightly different meaning It refers to using information such that the 
hypothesis that is being tested appears to be true Skov and Sherman (1986) indicated that 
individuals can gather confirming information to bias the interpretation of the inlormation or 
J
 Other labels were also used motivated reasoning or molivaled skepticism biased assimilalion 
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search for information increasing the likelihood of confirmation so that the hypothesis 
appears to be true Confirmation bias in decision-making and the one referred to in this 
dissertation means "requesting information that supports a pre-selected alternative" (Jonas el 
al, 2001 557) Hence, the decision-maker searching for the inlormation know s that he or she 
will reach the desired confirmation Kunda (1990 480) stated that "people arc more likely to 
arrive at conclusions that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by 
their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions" 
Confirming information search can provide the necessary information to form this 
justification However, preference for information biased in favor of a preferred conclusion or 
alternative would make the identification of relevant inlormation less probable Ditto and 
Lopez (1992 569) pointed out that confirming information is perceived as "valid, accurate, 
and internally caused" whereas disconfirming information is perceived as "less valid, less 
accurate, and externally caused" Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979 2099) indicated that the bias 
can manifest itself as "a propensity to remember the strengths of confirming evidence but the 
weaknesses of disconfirming evidence, to judge confirming evidence as relevant and reliable 
but disconfirming evidence as irrelevant and unreliable, and to accept confirming evidence at 
face value while scrutinizing disconfirming evidence hypercntically" All these three 
tendencies would cause disconfirming information to be perceived as irrelevant regardless ol 
its actual merits Such a bias may be dangerous since warning signs, threats, and 
opportunities might be missed (Jonas et al, 2001) 
Information preferences regarding a certain alternative or decision have also been researched 
under the name selective exposure to information Even after having made a decision people 
keep on searching for information However, this search is not impartial "People prefer 
information that supports their decision (hypothesis, beliefs, standpoints, etc ) and avoid 
information that contradicts these cognitions" (Frey, 1986 42) It has been shown that 
making a choice and being committed to that choice are factors that stimulate the bias In 
experimental settings, it was shown that after performing a dull task, as opposed to those who 
were forced, people who willingly performed the task desired supportive information ol their 
choice and avoided information that was non-supportive of their choice (Frey and Wicklund, 
1978, Cotton and Hieser, 1980) Commitment to a decision was shown to have similar 
effects Brock and Balloun (1967) exposed smokers with audiotapes of information with pro-
smoking communication and anti-smoking communication Both tapes were disturbed with 
some noise which the subjects could eliminate by pressing a button The smokers clarified the 
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pro-smoking communication more whereas non-smokers clarified the anti-smoking 
communication The same experiment was replicated with church-goers yielding the same 
results It was also shown that people writing an essay favoring an alternative (Schwarz, Frey, 
and Kumpf, 1980) or making a behavioral commitment (Frey and Stahlberg, 1986, in Frey, 
1986) subsequently preferred favorable mlormation supporting their commitment More 
recently, the existence of confirming information search was shown in different fields For 
instance, Cloyd and Spilker (1999, 2000) showed that tax professionals focus on positive 
cases (i e those that conlirm their client's preferred position) at the expense ol negative cues 
Jonas et al (2001) showed that onte committed to an alternative (whether alternative healing 
methods should be covered by health insurances), confirmation bias took place both in 
sequential and simultaneous information search (with more bias in sequential search) Russo, 
Medvec, and Mcloy (1996) also showed that for decision-makers to locus on confirming 
information, a belief or a decision was not necessary Even in the absence of a pre-existing 
preference for an option, confirmation bias look place They reasoned that confirmation starts 
while a preference is being developed and offered two potential explanations desire to a) 
maintain consistency and b) to reduce effort 
Overall, this line of research indicates that individuals when committed to a decision prefer 
confirming information over disconfirming This preference can be mediated by factors such 
as the decision-makers' past beliefs, mental models, prior commitments, and work areas As 
indicated, prior choice and commitment stimulate selective exposure to confirming 
information The same (actors also stimulate escalation tendencies which basically lorm a 
special case of commitment to a prior choice The difference of escalation situations from the 
examples explained in this section is two-told First, escalation situations involve 
commitment to an on-going course of action Second, there is indication that this action to 
which the decision-maker is committed is failing In selective perception research, normally, 
people did not receive leedback about their choices (Jermias, 2001) The question is would 
such confirmation tendencies exist after negati\ e consequences are experienced for actions to 
which decision makers are committed'' In the next chapters, this question will be dealt with 
36 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.3 Summary 
This chapter reviewed two literature streams relevant for this research escalation of 
commitment and selective search for confirming information 
In explaining escalation ol commitment (section 2 1), based on the aggregate model of 
escalation proposed by Staw (1997), three important relations were identified (i) the effect of 
behavioral determinants on escalation of commitment, (n) the ellect ol project determinants 
on escalation ot commitment, and (in) the effect of behavioral determinants on the perception 
of project determinants It was stated that the first two effects have been well-studied and 
understood Section 2 1 2 loeused on the first relation and included an overview of the effect 
of two most important behavioral determinants on escalation of commitment sunk cost 
effects and justification motives (internal and external) Of these, justification motives were 
chosen to concentrate on in this thesis due to its robustness and dominance in explaining 
escalation In section 2 1 3, the locus was on the second relation and a summary of the effects 
of various project determinants on escalation of commitment was given This literature 
overview highlighted that certain contents of information items stimulate commitment 
whereas others lead to withdrawal It was then identified that the third relation Irom the 
model ol Staw (1997), namely the effect of behavioral determinants on the perception of 
project determinants, had not yet been researched 
In section 2 2, attention was on the importance of relevant inlormalion lor good decision 
making It was explained that even though a thorough information search is desired, due to 
cognitive and resource limitations such search is not possible Various factors hinder the 
identification of relevant information Selective exposure to information, or conhrmatory 
information search, was identified as important factor making the recognition ol relevant 
information extra difficult 
In the next chapter, the link between justification motives, as the chosen behavioral 
determinants of escalation, and selective exposure to information, which affects which 
information decision-makers perceive as relevant, will be established further The conceptual 
model and the hypotheses for the research will be presented 
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Chapter 3 
Conceptual framework and research questions: 
Selective exposure to information in escalation situations 
Chapter 2 provided a literature review on two topics: (i) escalation of commitment and the 
justification motives as a cause of escalation and (ii) selective exposure to information as a 
factor affecting the perception of information relevance. In this chapter, the link between 
these topics will be established further. Identifying and using relevant information is 
important for decision-making in general. Also, in escalation situations, information, as 
classified under the project determinants of escalation, plays an important role. As pointed out 
in chapter 2, different values of project determinants can either stimulate escalation or lead to 
withdrawal. As such, the content (or values) of the information used is very important for 
making a sound decision following the receipt of negative performance feedback. At the same 
time, however, identification and perception of relevant information is not without problems. 
As Staw (1997) indicated in the aggregate model of escalation, behavioral determinants of 
escalation can affect the perception of the project determinants. In this chapter, this effect will 
be the focus5. That is, the nature of the relation between justification motives, as a behavioral 
determinant of escalation, and selective exposure tendencies, as a factor aflecting the 
perception of (the relevance of) project determinants, will be explained. At the end of the 
chapter, some methodological issues will be discussed. 
3.1 Research focus: Selective exposure to confirming information under 
escalation conditions 
This section focuses on the occurrence of selective information search under escalation of 
commitment situations. Dissonance theory will be used to explain why decision-makers, in 
escalation situations, can be expected to search for information selectively and prefer 
The other topic of this dissertation, namely System Dynamics modelling tor de-escalation, will be explained 
and studied in chapter 6. 
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confirming inlormation over disconfirming In what follows, dissonance theory and its 
relation to escalation of commitment will be explained, the conceptual framework and the 
hypotheses will be developed 
3.1.1 Dissonance theory, selective exposure to information, and escalation of 
commitment 
Self-justification theory states that the need to justify prior choice may cause a decision-maker 
"to increase his commitment in the face of negative consequences" (Staw, 1976 29) As 
explained in chapter 2, having chosen and hence, feeling responsible tor a decision, people 
feel the need to justify their previous choice at the receipt ol negative decision consequences 
In order to do so, decision makers increase their commitment to the decision and keep on 
investing in the same alternative (see figure 3 I) 
Feeling ot 
J* responsibihty ^ ^
 ( S e | f ) Willingness Escalation of 
Choice ' NcEdtivc ^ Ju s t l t 1 c a t l o n *" to justify • commitment 
.
 6
 ^ ^ motives past behavior 
decision 
consequences 
Figure 3.1: Juslilicalion motives and escalation ol commitment 
The justification explanation was derived from Festinger's dissonance theory (Festinger, 
1957, 1964) which indicates that people would like to avoid dissonance and have consistency 
amongst their cognitions These cognitions can be about behaviors, perceptions, attitudes, 
behels, and feelings (Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999) Any mismatch would lead to 
dissonance There are different paradigms in dissonance research indicating several sources 
for dissonance arousal (Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999) The free-choice research paradigm 
states that making a decision is likely to cause dissonance arousal since negative aspects of 
the chosen alternative and the positive aspects ol the rejected alternative arc inconsistent or 
dissonant with the decision (Frey, 1986, Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999) The other sources of 
possible dissonance arousal are exposure to information inconsistent with beliefs (the belief-
disconfirmation paradigm), engaging in an unpleasant activity in order to reach a desired 
outcome (the effort-justification paradigm), and saying something that is inconsistent with 
one's belici or altitude (the induced-compliance paradigm) 
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Research on dissonance mainly focused on the conditions necessary tor dissonance arousal 
The first version (1957) of Festinger's theory focused mostly on 'the perception ol 
inconsistency among cognitions' as the cause of dissonance arousal Later, researchers 
demonstrated that a particular set of conditions need to be realized to cause the arousal of 
dissonance The factors that contribute to dissonance arousal are the perceived Iree-choice 
(Brehm and Cohen, 1962, Beauvois and Joule, 1999), initial commitment to behavior, 
aversive consequences caused by the behavior, and perceived responsibility for the avcrsive 
consequences (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, Cooper, 2007) Figure 3 2 shows the sequence ol 
events that lead to dissonance arousal When people perceive that they caused an aversive, 
irrevocable event (Cooper and Fazio, 1984) they search for responsibility for this 
consequence If they feel responsible then dissonance is aroused The feeling of responsibility 
is related to both free choice and foreseeabihty of the consequences "In general, people will 
be able to absolve themselves of responsibility for an aversive consequence if they believe 
they had no choice but to behave as they did and/or the consequence was unloreseeable when 
they made the choice" (Cooper, 2007 76) 
Aversive Responsibility Responsibility Dissonance 
consequences search acceptance arousal 
Figure 3.2: The sequence of events leading to the arousal of dissonance (Cooper and Fazio, 
1984, Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, Cooper, 2007) 
Since dissonance is an unpleasant cognitive state, once it is aroused, an individual would be 
motivated to reduce it The greater the magnitude of the dissonance, the greater is the pressure 
and will to reduce it The magnitude ol dissonance is a function of the importance of the 
dissonant cognitive elements and the relative number of dissonant and consonant elements 
(Leippe and Eisenstadt, 1999) Hence, the dissonance-reducing mechanisms also involve the 
number of dissonant and consonant elements and their perceived importance Festmger ( 1957) 
identified three modes of dissonance reduction (Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999, Leippe and 
Eisenstadt, 1999) (i) Changing or removing one of the dissonant cognitions This can be 
achieved by changing the behavior or changing the belief, (n) adding new consonant 
elements, and (in) reducing the importance of dissonant cognitions and/or increasing the 
importance of the consonant cognitions An example given by Festmger (1999) illustrates all 
Behavior 
choice and 
initial 
commitment 
Assessment 
of 
consequences 
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these elements A smoker will feel dissonance when he leams that smoking is bad lor health 
He can reduce dissonance by changing his behavior (first mode), ι e by stopping smoking 
Changing the behavior is "one of the major avenues of dissonance reduction" (Festinger, 
1999 384) The smoker can also change his cognition about the ellcct of smoking on health 
and believe that smoking does not have a bad effect on health (first mode) He can do so, for 
instance by discrediting the inlormation source The smoker might also add new consonant 
elements (second mode) by looking for positive effects of smoking, e g smoking keeps him 
from gaining weight Or he could reduce the importance of the dissonant cognition (third 
mode) by believing that the risk to health due to smoking is much lower than the danger ol car 
accidents He can also increase the importance ot consonant cognitions (third mode) by 
believing that the enjoyment from smoking is a very important part of hie Recently, Gosling, 
Demzeau, and Obcrle (2006) proposed a new mode of dissonance reduction They showed 
that denial of responsibility reduced the negative affective state (shame, guilt, self-criticism, 
anger and disgust with oneself) induced by dissonance 
A way of enabling the second and third modes of dissonance reduction was discussed by 
Festinger under the heading ol selective exposure to inlormation For decision-making 
situations, Festinger (1999 478) hypothesized that "post-dccisional dissonance would lead 
decision-makers to selectively seek out decision-congruent information and a\oid exposure to 
decision-incongrucnt information" Thus, the dissonance theory predicts that people prefer 
information that supports their decisions and avoid information that contradicts them and this 
"process of dissonance reduction should lead to an increase in the desirability ol the chosen 
alternative and a decrease in the desirability ol the rejected alternative" (Jermias 2001 143) 
Such selettne exposure to information is an important aspect ol Feslinger's theory The 
objective is to decrease the discrepancy between the dissonant cognitions (Frey, 1986) 
Research over the years has shown that choice, commitment, and intensity of dissonance are 
important in influencing information selectivity (Brehm and Cohen, 1962, Frey, 1986) 
Aronson's (1999 111-112) writing clearly states why dissonance theory is useful lor 
explaining the reasons for escalation ol commitment "Efforts to reduce dissonance involve a 
process ol self-justification because, in most instances, people experience dissonance after 
engaging in an action that leaves them feeling stupid, immoral, or confused Moreover, the 
greater the personal commitment or self-involvcmcnt implied by the action and the smaller 
the external justification for that action the greater the dissonance and, therefore, the more 
powerful the need for self-justification" This is also the reasoning behind the self-justification 
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explanation of escalation; prior choice, feeling of responsibility, and initial commitment 
coupled with negative decision consequences for the chosen alternative would generate 
dissonance inducing self-justification needs. A committed decision-maker achieves self-
justification by re-investing in the same course of action, i.e. by repeating the behavior. 
If individuals escalate due to felt dissonance and to (self-) justify a previous choice then one 
would expect that they would also want to reduce dissonance and to do so, engage in activities 
that are consistent with those predicted by the dissonance theory. Given the nature of 
escalation situations, decision-makers keep on engaging in the same activity that initially 
caused the aversive consequences. This act of on-going commitment to the same course of 
action fulfills the justification needs but precludes behavior change as a possible mechanism 
for reducing dissonance. Hence, to reduce dissonance, an escalating decision-maker would 
have to make use of the mechanisms other than behavior change, as shown in figure 3.3. 
More specifically, a committed decision-maker willing to decrease dissonance and justify 
previous and current investments in a failing alternative can be expected to do one or more of 
the following (see figure 3.3). First6, s/he might strive to change the dissonant cognition, 
namely behavior or belief. Given that behavior change is not taking place, belief can be 
changed by denying the setback. Information can be distorted in such a way that the setback 
might not look as bad or the perception of the aversiveness of the outcome can be changed 
(Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). This can also be done by discrediting the information source 
giving the setback. Second, the decision-maker might add new consonant elements by 
selectively searching, acquiring, processing, and using information confirming the goodness 
of the strategy. Third, s/he might reduce the importance of the dissonant elements by 
discrediting information sources from which disconfirming information comes or by 
persuading him or herself that the rejected alternative is much worse than it was initially 
perceived. This can be done by finding additional justification by exaggerating the 
unattractiveness of the rejected alternative. Fourth, s/he might increase the importance of 
consonant elements by favoring such sources or by persuading him or herself that the chosen 
alternative is actually much better than it was initially perceived. This can be done by finding 
additional justification by exaggerating the attractiveness of the chosen alternative. Finally, 
6
 The order in which Ihese allernatives are presented does not signify any priority The order used by Fcstinger 
(1999) is adhered to II is possible thai, depending on the situation, one ot these is more preferred way ot 
dissonance reduction than the others. This pnonlizalion of dissonance reduction mechanisms is beyond the scope 
of this research. 
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the decision-maker might absolve him or herself from the responsibility by perceiving that the 
setback was caused by someone else or external forces such as economic situation or 
governmental interference. 
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Figure 3.3: Dissonance, escalation, and dissonance reducing mechanisms. 
In the escalation of commitment research domain, interest in dissonance reduction through 
selective exposure to information as a result of self-justification motives did not receive much 
attention. Theoretically, the possibility for selective exposure was slated by Staw (1981: 583): 
"It can be expected that motivation to justify decisions will affect the search for and storage of 
44 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
information by individuals". Staw (1981) indicated selective filtering of information as a 
possible way of maintaining commitment to a policy or a course of action. Staw and Ross 
(1987) classified information processing biases as a psychological determinant. As mentioned 
in chapter 2, in the model of Staw (1997) (see figure 2.2), the possible effects of behavioral 
factors on the perception of project determinants were recognized: "Behavioral variables can 
also be seen as influencing the perception of project economics" (Staw, 1997: 208). In the 
empirical domain, there is some evidence that decision-makers bias decision consequences. 
For instance, it has been shown that committed decision-makers ignore negative feedback or 
bias its interpretation such that it is seen as more positive (Boulding, Morgan, and Staehn, 
1997; Schmidt and Calantone, 2002). Keil, Depledge, and Rai (2007) showed that under 
escalation conditions, selective perception affects problem recognition. Regarding the elfecls 
of behavioral determinants on information preference, there have been two studies. Gonion 
and Parks (1987) found that people who were responsible for the choice of a course of action 
and received failure feedback were more interested in retrospective information than 
prospective information. Caldwell and O'Reilly (1982) looked at the effect of choice and 
responsibility on information search. They showed that responsible subjects were more likely 
to emphasize the positive aspects of their choice. These studies show the interest of the 
decision-makers in retrospective and favorable information. However, from these studies, it is 
not possible to make conclusions on the occurrence of selective exposure to information under 
escalation conditions. Gonion and Parks presented their subjects with the information choice 
prior to the second decision; hence, before escalation could lake place. In the Caldwell and 
O'Reilly's study, on the other hand, the subjects did not make a second investment decision at 
all, so it is not clear whether escalation took place. 
As a result, to the best of the author's knowledge, a direct test of whether selective exposure 
to confirming information occurs alongside escalation does not yet exist. Information 
preference of committed decision-makers under escalation situations still needs further 
investigation. Brockner and Rubin (1985) drew attention to the fact that if decision-makers 
fail to consider disconfirming evidence it would be difficult for them to correct a faulty 
decision and hence avoid loss escalation. The commitment of individuals to a certain action 
would induce a strong motivation to defend their decision which, in turn, can induce a strong 
bias towards supporting information (Jonas et al., 2001). As such, selectively focusing on 
confirming information and avoiding disconfirming information can be seen both as a 
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consequence of escalation and one of its causes If, as Staw (1997) predicts, the decision to 
escalate is indeed determined by the interplay between the behavioral factors and the 
perceived information, ι e project determinants, and if this perception is shaped by the 
behavioral factors then decision-makers can selectively expose themselves to information 
and/or bias the incoming inlormation to enable justification for their actions and decrease 
dissonance In such a situation, withdrawal could become an unlikely outcome of the decision 
process and decision-makers can get trapped in a vicious circle of escalation and information 
biasing Figure 3 4 shows these effects Motivation to justily previous choice would induce 
tendency to selectively expose 
oneself to confirming information 
which would lead to the use ol 
confirming inlormation that 
further stimulates commitment and 
further justification motives The 
result of this process would be an 
on-going escalation of 
commitment to the failing course 
c
 ^ Figure 3.4: Vicious circle of escalation and information 
of action * 
biasing 
For instance, while collecting information to identify what the causes of the setback were, a 
decision-maker is equally likely to come across the lollowing conflicting two types of 
information the setback was caused by 1 ) external factors, ι e reasons that are exogenous to 
the decision-making mechanism and the strategy implemented or 2) internal factors, ι c 
reasons that are endogenous to the decision-making mechanism and the strategy implemented 
Collecting information on internal, endogenous causes would mean accepting the blame for 
the negative consequences and that the chosen strategy was not good On the other hand, by 
collecting information on external, exogenous cases, the decision-maker can absolve him or 
herself from the responsibility lor negative consequences as well as clear the name of the 
chosen strategy Hence, preferring information on external causes would be a very good way 
of reducing dissonance and justifying previous actions simultaneously However, such a 
preference could lead to the incorrect decision of escalation if the causes were actually 
internal As such, selectively using confirming information would answer both needs of the 
decision-maker dissonance reduction and justification If such a bias in information search 
Motivation to 
justify choice 
Ο 
Tendency tor selective 
exposure to information 
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indeed occurs then better information search could be used as a possible de-escalation 
strategy7. Thus, understanding the nature of information preference in escalation conditions 
can help devise better information processing and decision-making strategies that could help 
avoid unnecessary escalation. 
The main argument of this research is that when faced with negative consequences, 
committed decision-makers will not only justify choice by means of escalation but will also 
try to reduce dissonance by means of selectively exposing themselves to confirming 
information. These relationships are shown in figure 3.5. Following this line of reasoning as 
well as Staw's (1997) model, the focus will be on investigating whether the justification 
motives, as an important behavioral determinant, that stimulate escalation also influence the 
perception of project determinants such that the decision-makers selectively expose 
themselves to confirming information. That is, whether they select or prefer information that 
helps them avoid the setback and/or information that absolves them from responsibility and/or 
information that confirms the goodness of the previously chosen alternative and/or the 
inferiority of the previously rejected alternative. 
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Figure 3.5: Justification motives, escalation of commitment, and selective exposure to 
information. 
7
 Selective exposure to information is a means of decreasing dissonance. If in an escalation situation, selective 
exposure docs not take place and the information attended to leads lo de-escalation then dissonance can be 
reduced by means of behavior change, the most powerful way of reducing dissonance On the other hand, 
searching for and selecting unbiased information does not take away the possibility that information is distorted 
and/or represenled in biased ways Such situations are likely to lead to further escalation In those cases, 
dissonance reduction would be achieved since the distorted information would be in alignment with the behavior 
of continued commitment. 
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The justification motives are aroused by the same factors that lead to dissonance arousal. 
Thus, this research will focus on these factors: choice, responsibility for the decision 
consequences, decision consequences, and initial commitment. It is accepted that these factors 
lead to dissonance arousal. However, their distinct effects on escalation of commitment are 
not that clear. Of these four factors, researchers have shown that choice induces internal 
justification motives and under negative decision consequences, lead to escalation. There is 
also evidence, however, that justification needs might not only be induced by choice coupled 
with negative consequences but more generally, by the mismatch between initial decision 
choice and consequences (e.g., positive consequences for an alternative not chosen can also 
produce justification motives). Responsibility for decision consequences induces the external 
justification motives. There are, however, mixed findings regarding its effect on commitment. 
Initial commitment, on the other hand, has not received special attention in the escalation of 
commitment literature since in general, it is assumed that choice leads to or even replaces 
initial commitment. Therefore, this research will focus on all these factors and investigate 
their role in escalation of commitment as well as the perception of the project determinants 
under escalation situations. Figure 3.6 shows the conceptual model for the research including 
only the direct relations that will be tested in this dissertation. 
Choice 
Responsibility 
Decision 
consequences^ 
Initial 
• Commitment 
Final 
Commitment 
Selective/Confirmatory 
Information Search 
Figure 3.6: Conceptual model for the research: relationships to be investigated. 
The research question and the sub-research questions arc as follows: 
To what extent do factors that stimulate justification motives lead to selective 
exposure to confirming information in escalation of commitment situations? 
i. To what extent does initial choice, as a psychological determinant of 
escalation of commitment, lead to preference for confirming information? 
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11 To what extent does responsibility for decision consequences, as a social 
determinant of escalation of commitment, lead to preference for confirming 
information9 
m To what extent does initial commitment, as an antecedent of escalation 
and dissonance arousal, lead to preference for confirming informalion ' 
iv To what extent do decision consequences lead to the preference for 
confirming information ' 
Summary: In this section, the factors leading to selective exposure to confirming information 
were discussed and the conceptual model was developed In the next section, the object of this 
information search, namely the information categories, in which selective exposure can take 
place, will be discussed and the hypotheses will be developed 
3.1.2 Hypotheses: Escalation of commitment and selective exposure to 
information 
Information comes in various categories Decision-makers can collect information on various 
aspects of an on-going project While focusing on selective exposure, it would be interesting 
to look at dillercnt categories ol information because it is possible that search for confirming 
information does not takes place in all information categories but only in those in which the 
individuals see the opportunity for justification and dissonance reduction By paying special 
attention to the information categories that are likely to be used for justification purposes 
during scanning activities, quality of the decision-making process can be improved 
Given that the project determinants include the so-called objective inlormalion on various 
aspects of the project, information categories classified under project determinants can be 
used to identify the different types of information that can be used by the decision-makers By 
using the list ol project determinants and related research on escalation of commitment, the 
following categories were identified as possible sources for decision-makers 
I) Predicted future performance This category refers to the likelihood ol success or failure 
that would be achieved with the strategy in case the decision-makers reinvests in it (Staw 
and Fox, 1977, Gonion and Wolf, 1980, Bateman, 1986) 
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2) Factors that contributed to the decision consequences This category refers to the causes of 
the achieved performance and can include two items 
a Locus of causality - internal versus external causes lor failure (Staw and Ross, 1978) 
This is information that locuses on linking the performance of the strategy to internal 
(i e endogenous) versus external (i e exogenous) causes 
b Stability of causes - Temporal aspects of causes for failure (Leatherwood and Gonion, 
1987) This is information that stresses whether the main causes of the decision 
consequences were permanent or temporary 
3) Alternative strategies (Batcman, 1986, Northcratt and Neale, 1986) This category refers 
to the (expected) performance of alternative strategies as compared to the implemented 
strategy and indicates whether the alternative strategies are superior or inferior as 
compared to the implemented strategy 
4) Anecdotal information on similar companies This category refers to information on 
whether the implementation ol the strategy brought success or failure to similar other 
companies 
5) Perceived correctness of the reported performance This category refers to the perceived 
fit between the reported and the perceived actual performance 
6) Costs associated with implementing the strategy (Brockner, Rubin, and Lang, 1981) This 
category refers to sunk vs future costs necessary for implementation 
Table 3 I gives a summary of how selectively exposing oneself to information confirming the 
correctness of the implemented course of action in any ol these categones can contribute to 
dissonance reduction For each ol these categones, the decision-makers can selectively look 
for information that would support their strategy with the hope of decreasing dissonance and 
justifying previous choice and escalating commitment Below, each information category will 
be explained further and the expectations will be given in the form of hypotheses 
Predicted future performance: In this category, confirming information would be 
information indicating that the strategy will be successful in the future whereas the 
disconfirming information would be the one indicating future failure Levy and Hershey 
(2006 53) proposed that "engaging in value-induced bias (i e distorting the probability of 
relevant outcomes to justify one's preferred choice)" can indeed be thought as a type of 
cognitive dissonance reduction Such a bias would be undesirable since it "can create 
misperceptions of the decision outcomes and may result in suboptimal decisions" (Levy and 
50 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Hershey, 2006 52) For instance, they showed that lor medical decisions, "subjects adjusted 
the probability of treatment success to justify their prelerence for or against treatment" (Levy 
and Hershey, 2006 56) Similarly, decision-makers who escalate in their commitment can 
prefer information suggesting future success and such information can help both to deny the 
present setback and exaggerate the goodness of the chosen alternative Hence, regarding the 
predicted performance of the strategy, the following hypotheses will be tested 
Hypothesis 1. In escalation situations subjects who a) initialh choose b) are held 
responsible for the results of or t) are initialh committed to a course of action that 
subsequenth fails villi be more likely to prefer information that indicates the future 
success of the action than will subjects who are not a) able to choose freeh b) held 
responsible for the results or c) initially committed 
Factors that contribute to the decision consequences. This information category is very 
useful and informative for decision-makers in identifying the causes of the setback In this 
respect, attribution theory provides insight Heider (1958) laid the fundaments of attribution 
theory by developing a model of how people structure their environment through causal 
attributions Asking the question "why9" is a way of attaining knowledge in order to 
effectively manage oneself and one's environment (Kelly, 1971, Werner, 1985) In explaining 
success and failure, different possible causes can be used Heider (1958) initially 
distinguished between "factors within the person" and "lactors within the environment", also 
called internal and external causes (Fitch 1970, Werner and Kukla, 1970 Werner, 1985) 
Generally, ability and effort are seen as internal factors whereas nature of the task and luck 
are seen as external causes Next to internal-external distinction {locus of causality), Werner 
and his colleagues (Werner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum, 1971) introduced a 
second dimension stability of causality distinguishing between stable (i e unlikely to change 
over time, relatively constant) vs unstable (i e likely to change over time) causes Perception 
of whether causes are internal or external and stable or unstable has bearing both on how 
decision-makers manage the responsibility for the achieved performance and on the 
anticipations of future performance Below, each of these two factors will be explained 
separately 
Locus of causality - internal vs. external causes for decision consequences: It has been 
shown that people do not use the same causal explanations for their successes and failures 
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Individuals tend to attribute their successes to themselves but view external factors or chance 
as responsible for their failures (Langer and Roth, 1975, Miller, 1976, Hogarth and 
Makndakis, 1981) This tendency to assume that external factors cause the failure can also 
play a role in escalation of commitment situations when decision-makers want to justify their 
actions by absolving themselves from responsibility By collecting information implicating 
the external causes for the failure, they can save face and justify their choice By shifting the 
blame, the decision-maker can avoid responsibility for the decision consequences and reduce 
dissonance (Cooper, 1971) Moreover, by indicating that the setback was caused by external 
(and temporary) factors, a decision-maker can also increase the attractiveness of the 
implemented course of action Therefore, regarding locus of causality, the following 
hypotheses will be tested 
Hypothesis 2. In escalation situation',, subjects who a) uutialh choose, b) are held 
responsible Jor the results of, or c) are imUalh committed to a course of action that 
subsequently fails will be more hkeh to prefer information that attributes failure to 
external causes than will subjects who are not a) able to choose freeh, b) held 
responsible for the results, ore) uutialh committed 
Stability of causes - Temporal aspects of causes for decision consequences: Regarding 
expectancy from the future, attribution theory predicts that "the stability ol a cause, rather 
than its locus, determines expectancy shifts If conditions are expected to remain the same, 
then the outcome(s) experienced in the past will be expected to occur" (Werner, 1985 556-
557) Hence, a committed decision-maker can indicate that the setback was temporary, ι e 
unstable, to justify further commitment and investments This way, he or she can deny 
responsibility and at the same time, increase the attractiveness of the course of action 
Therefore, regarding stability of causes, the following hypotheses will be tested 
Hypothesis 3. In escalation situations, subjects who a) mitialh choose, b) are held 
responsible for the results of, or c) are imtialh committed to a course of action that 
subsequenth fails will be more hkeh to prefer information that attributes the failure 
to temporan causes than will subjects who are not a) able to choose freeh, b) held 
responsible for the results, ore) mitialh committed 
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Table 3.1: Information categories and dissonance-reducing mechanisms 
Information categories 
Predicted future 
performance 
Factors that 
contribute to 
the decision 
consequences 
Locus of 
causality 
Stability 
of causes 
Alternative strategies 
Anecdotal information on 
similar companies 
(implementing the same 
strategy) 
Perceived correctness of 
the reported performance 
Costs associated with 
implementing t ie strategy 
Information 
content 
(confirming 
information 
is given bold 
& italic) 
Successful 
future 
performance 
Failure as 
future 
performance 
Internal 
causes 
External 
causes 
Temporary 
causes 
Permanent 
causes 
Alternative 
strategies are 
worse 
Alternative 
strategies are 
better 
Success to 
similar 
companies 
Failure to 
similar 
companies 
Actual 
performance 
is better than 
reported 
Actual 
performance 
is worse than 
reported 
Reported 
performance 
was accurate 
Sunk costs 
Future costs 
Dissonance reducing mechanisms 
Deny 
setback 
V 
V 
Deny 
responsibility 
V 
V 
Exaggerate the 
attractiveness of 
the chosen 
alternative 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
Exaggerate the 
unattractiveness 
of the rejected 
alternative 
V 
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Alternative strategies. The effect of alternative courses ot action on escalation has been 
non-conclusive Whereas McCain (1986) showed that having knowledge on alternatives 
limits escalation, Davis and Bobko (1986) could not show any effects Even though its effect 
on escalation is not conclusive, information on alternative strategies can be an important 
means of dissonance reduction and justification Under escalation conditions, felt dissonance 
cannot be reduced if the decision-makers get to hear that the alternatives are better This 
information would undermine the correctness of their choice Instead, it might be expected 
that decision-makers prefer information which states the advantages of their strategy over the 
alternative strategies This way, a decision maker can decrease dissonance by exaggerating 
the negative sides of the rejected alternatives while praising the positive sides of the chosen 
alternative Therefore, regarding alternative strategies, the lollowing hypotheses will be 
tested 
Hypothesis 4. in escalation situations subjects nho a) mitialh choose b) are held 
responsible for the results of, or c) are initiall) committed to a course of action that 
subsequently fails will be more likel) to prefer information that stresses the superiority 
of the implemented action oxer the alternatne(s) than will subjects who are not a) 
able to choose freely b) held responsible for the results or c) initialh committed 
Anecdotal information on similar companies. Schwenk ( 1984) points out the importance 
of anecdotal information and how decision-makers find it valuable "people tend to give too 
much weight to vivid anecdotal information about executives or companies" (Schwenk, 1984 
300), "experimental evidence shows that vivid anecdotal information may bias judgments by 
encouraging the representativeness heuristic and drawing decision-makers' attention away 
from other types of information" (Schwenk, 1984 302) Hogarth (1980) suggested that il 
anecdotal information is consistent then it might discourage people from looking for further 
information In a decision-making situation, information suggesting that similar companies 
experienced success with the very same course action would constitute confirming anecdotal 
information Here, the locus is on the anecdotal nature of the information rather than its 
vividness However, it is likely that a success story ol a similar company will be more vivid 
than some statistical information and can help increase the optimism of the decision-maker 
regarding the success potential ol the course of action By choosing such confirming 
information, a committed decision-maker can increase the attractiveness of the chosen 
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alternative. Therefore, regarding anecdotal information on similar companies, the following 
hypotheses will be tested: 
Hypothesis 5. In escalation situations, subjects who a) initially choose, b) are held 
responsible for the results of, or c) are initially committed to a course of action that 
subsequently fails will be more likely to prefer information that contains stories of 
success similar companies achieved with the same strategy than will subjects who are 
not a) able to choose freely, b) held responsible for the results, or c) initially 
committed. 
Actual performance -perceived correctness of the reported performance. The negative 
consequences faced with the implemented strategy are the main causes of dissonance and the 
justification needs. One way of reducing dissonance and justifying choice would be denying 
the existence of the setback. The best way to do so would be to indicate that the consequences 
are not as bad as they were thought to be. A committed decision-maker can selectively pay 
attention to performance measures that show that the strategy has actually performed well 
and/or criticize the criteria used forjudging the decision consequences. This way, the setback 
can be denied and the choice and commitment can be justified. Hence, regarding the 
perceived correctness of the reported performance, the following hypotheses will be tested: 
Hypothesis 6. In escalation situations, subjects who a) initially choose, b) are held 
responsible for the results of or c) are initially committed to a course of action that 
subsequently fails will be more likely to prefer information that shows more successful 
performance consequences than will subjects who are not a) able to choose freely, b) 
held responsible for the results, or c) initially committed. 
Costs associated with implementing the strategy: It is difficult to classify information in 
this category as confirming or disconfirming. Sunk vs. future costs do not have a direct link 
with any of the dissonance-reducing mechanisms. However, sunk cost is an important 
information item for escalation situations. Staw (1981) indicated that justification motives can 
lead to a form of "retrospective rationality": "The individual, when motivated by a need to 
justify, seeks to appear competent in previous as opposed lo future action" (Staw, 1981: 583, 
italics in original). Following the retrospective rationality argument, one can hypothesize that 
individuals who seek to justify their choice, responsibility and/or commitment will search for 
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and use information on sunk costs Thcrelore, regarding costs associated with implementing 
the strategy, the following hypotheses will be tested 
Hypothesis 7. In escalation situations, subjects nho a) mitialh choose, b) are held 
responsible for the results of, or t) are mitialh committed lo a course of action that 
subsequently fails will be more likely to prefer information on sunk costs than will 
subjects who are not a) able to choose freeh, b) held responsible for the results, or c) 
mitialh committed 
Overall confirmation bias: To justify their choice and commitment or to absolve themselves 
from responsibility, committed individuals would be more likely to selectively expose 
themselves to confirming information Hence, overall, it can be expected that as compared to 
the non-committed people, committed people will look for more confirming information 
However, this expectation should be considered with caution Neither the relative power of 
the dissonance-reduction mechanisms in reducing dissonance nor the contribution of the 
individual information items to the dissonance reduction is known It is possible that a 
decision-maker can suffice with just one (or a few) type(s) of confirming inlormation to 
reduce dissonance If, for instance, avoiding the setback is a preferred response mechanism 
then confirming information on actual performance would be enough to reduce dissonance 
and further search for confirming information would not be necessary Ditto and Lopez (1992 
570) gave a reason for such behavior "Because individuals are relatively unlikely to consider 
alternative explanations for preference-consistent information, relatively little inlormation (or 
information of relatively poor quality) should be required lor people to arrive at a preference-
consistent conclusion" Similarly, Beyer et al (1997) indicated that decision-makers might 
need relatively little information for confirmation Yet, these expectations are about the search 
behavior of one individual trying to reach either a preference consistent or inconsistent 
conclusion This is different from comparing a committed individual to a non-committed 
regarding their confirming information preference Hence, with this caution in mind, the 
following hypotheses will be tested 
Hypothesis 8. In escalation situations, subjects uho a) mitialh choose, b) are held 
responsible for the results of, or c) are initially committed to a course of action that 
subsequenth fails will search for more confirming information items than will subjects 
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who are not a) able to choose freeh b) held responsible for the resulti,, or c) imtiall) 
committed 
3.2 Research Design 
Research method: This research takes an experimental approach with role-playing 
simulations Even though laboratory experiments could be criticized for their external 
validity, the use ol role-playing scenarios and experiments is consistent with past research on 
escalation of commitment Moreover, given that both escalation of commitment and 
inlormation biasing have multiple determinants, an environment in which factors other than 
the independent variables that were of interest in this research, could be controlled was 
desired A laboratory experiment with a role-playing simulation was, therefore, chosen an the 
appropriate research strategy 
Altogether, four experiments were designed and ran to test the hypotheses developed in this 
research All ol these experiments involved a decision-making situation where the subjects 
were asked to play the role of a manager at a company and cither to choose a strategy to 
implement or to decide on whether to support a given strategy Such decision-making 
simulations where subjects are asked to make decisions as a manager at a fictitious company 
have been very common in escalation research Examples include hiring decisions based on 
candidate characteristics (Bazerman el al, 1982, Caldwell and O'Reilly 1982), resource 
allocation (e g choice of an R&D department to invest in) based on past financial data (Staw, 
1976, Bazerman et al, 1984, Davis and Babko, 1986, Schoorman and Holahan, 1996), choice 
of a country to build a dam (Staw and Ross, 1978, Gonion and Wolf, 1980), production defect 
percentage problem (Kernan and Lord, 1989) 
Experimental design: All the experiments were paper-based and took about 50 minutes 
The experiments involved five stages (figure 3 7) I Case description the company and the 
role of the subjects within the company were explained The case description also involved 
information on the available strategy(ies) This information depended on the case used and the 
expenmental group the subjects were in but the main purpose ot inducing choice or 
commitment manipulation remained constant in all the experiments II Initial investment 
decision the subjects were asked to make a decision on the amount of money they would like 
to invest in the strategy to be implemented III Decision consequence after making the initial 
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investment decision, the subjects were informed of the results of the strategy that was 
implemented IV Final investment decision the subjects were asked how much of the new 
funds they would be willing to invest in the initially implemented strategy V Information 
preference the subjects were asked to indicate, per information category, which information 
they would like to use The first part of the experiments (stages I-IV) was aimed at creating an 
escalation situation whereas the second part (stage V) was aimed at measuring the information 
preference of the subjects under escalation situations Detailed information on the 
manipulations and the design of the specific experiments can be found in chapters 4 and 5 
I II III IV V 
Final 
investment 
decision 
Information 
preference 
Case 
description 
Initial 
investment 
decision 
Decision 
consequences 
Figure 3.7: Experimental design 
Experimental cases and questionnaire: Two different cases were used The first two 
experiments used a case based British restaurant chain named Beefeater The shortened case 
was developed for this research based on the case material of the simulation game 
BEEFEATER (Global Strategy Dynamics, 2001) The experiment involved two separate 
strategies, one of which to be implemented The purpose of these expenments was to focus 
on identifying the effects of choice and responsibility for decision consequences on 
information preferences The third experiment involved a case of a successful supermarket 
chain facing some recent difficulties The subjects had to decide whether they support a so-
called discounting strategy The purpose of this experiment was to focus on identifying the 
effects of initial commitment and decision consequences on information preference 
The experimental questionnaire included questions measuring the commitment, 
information preference, manipulation checks, and demographics The expenments followed 
one another in time Therefore, in the subsequent experiments, some new questions were 
added to the questionnaire More information on the case and the questionnaire content will 
be given in the next chapters 
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Subjects: Subjects were either undergraduate (expenments 1 and 4) or HBO-students" 
(expenment 2, 3) enrolled at Wageningen Universtiy (experiment 1) or Nijmegen Business 
School (expenments 2, 3, and 4) Participation was on a voluntary basis Even though the use 
of students as subjects can limit generahzabihty, there is indication that students and 
employees make similar decisions (eg Locke, 1986) For instance, while examining the 
biasing effects of framing on business decisions, Mowen and Mowen (1986) found that 
students without business experience made similar decisions to business people Harrison and 
Harrell (1993) reported similar findings Yavas (1994) showed that students and adults 
attached similar levels of importance to various information sources Remus (1986) also 
showed that there were no significant differences between students and managers in 
production scheduling decisions In the domain of escalation of commitment, Garland and 
Newport (1991) found consistent findings for undergraduates and MBA students. In an 
overview, Ashton and Kramer (1980 3) slated, "the available evidence suggests that real-
world decision makers possess information-processing characteristics and biases that are 
extremely similar to their student counterparts Given the results reviewed here, one could 
argue that students are likely to be good surrogates lor the real-world individuals of interest in 
tasks involving human information processing and decision making" Slovic, Fleissner, and 
Bauman (1972) indicated that due to recent classroom and examination experiences, students 
would be more aware of their judgment processes If that is true, then in the domain of biases, 
one could expect the results of the managers to be worse than those of the students 
Nevertheless, care has to be taken while generalizing the results The cases were 
developed carefully to ascertain that decision scenanos did not require extensive, in-depth 
knowledge to make decisions A restaurants' attractiveness for consumers is a topic where 
students can make sound judgments The case of the third experiment involved a supermarket 
chain investing in price discount In the period the experiment was run, price war amongst 
supermarkets was a very popular phenomenon in the Netherlands and received extensive 
media coverage Hence, the students were familiar with the topic, discounting strategies, and 
their possible effects Still, it has to be kept in mind that the feelings ol responsibility and 
involvement in the experiment can be different than in real life 
HBO studenls are those who have already finalized a study targeting a professional education A HBO study 
does not have the academic focus a university education has but aims at preparing individuals that can function 
as professionals in business life After finishing a HBO study, successful students can stream into university and 
follow a master's program after successfully completing a 'bridging' year at the university 
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3.3 Summary 
In this chapter, the conceptual model and the hypotheses to be tested in this research were 
developed. Given the claims of dissonance theory, which forms the basis of the self-
justification explanation of escalation, it is expected that decision-makers escalating in their 
commitment to a losing course of action will make use of selective exposure to information. 
That is, they will prefer information that confirms the goodness of the initially-chosen course 
of action and hence, justifies the choice and commitment of the decision-maker and/or 
absolves the decision-maker from the responsibility for the negative consequences. Based on 
the project determinants of escalation, eight information items were identified. These are: 
predicted future performance, locus of causality, stability of the causes for failure, 
foreseeability of the setback, alternative strategies, anecdotal information on similar 
companies, perceived correctness of the reported performance, and costs associated with 
implementing the strategy. For each of these items, it was hypothesized that in escalation 
situations, choice, responsibility, and/or initial commitment will lead to tendencies for 
confirming information search. Moreover, it was hypothesized that choice, responsibility, and 
initial commitment will be positively associated with increased number of confirming 
information items requested. Finally, general information on the research design was given. In 
the next two chapters, more information on the experimental tools and questionnaires will be 
given, the analysis of the experimental data will be presented, and the results will be 
discussed. 
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Chapter 4 
Effect of choice and responsibility on 
selective exposure to information 
In this chapter, the design and analysis of two experiments that focus on answering the first 
two research questions will be discussed. Choice and responsibility for decision 
consequences will be studied as the driving forces behind escalation of commitment and 
dissonance arousal. The hypothesis sets a and b presented in chapter 3 indicated the 
expectation that choice and responsibility will stimulate not only escalation to a failing course 
of action but also confirmatory information search. The experiments in this chapter are aimed 
at testing these hypotheses. In order to do so, a decision-making situation in which escalation 
of commitment could occur was induced and the effects of choice and responsibility on both 
escalation and selective exposure to information were investigated. These will serve as a test 
for one of the relationships in Slaw's (1997) aggregate model of escalation, i.e. the effect of 
behavioral factors (choice and responsibility) on the perception of project determinants 
(information items). Moreover, the experiments will provide a check to whether the claims of 
dissonance theory other than justification also hold for escalation situations. 
Below, the general experimental design, the method, the experimental manipulations, 
operalionalization of the dependent variables, and the results of each experiment will be 
explained. Experiment one served as a pre-tesl of the case and the experimental 
questionnaire. Based on the experience from this experiment, certain questions were changed 
and extra questions were added to the experimental questionnaire lor the second experiment. 
Since the case used and the general structure of the experiments remained the same, first, the 
general experimental design will be explained first. 
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4.1 General experimental design 
A case of a British restaurant chain named Beefeater was used (see Appendix I) The case 
was developed based on the case material ol the Beefeater simulation game by Strategy 
Dynamics (Global Strategy Dynamics, 2001) The experiments were paper-based and took 
about 50 minutes 
Upon arriving at the room where the experiment took place, the participants were asked to 
take a seat The material they would work on was set ready on the tables The first page of the 
experimental questionnaire included written general instructions on how they should proceed 
In these instructions, the importance ol getting into the role they were assigned was stressed 
Then, the respondents were asked to read a two-page long case oi Beefeater describing the 
history of the restaurant chain as well as its market, customer profile, competitors, and the 
restaurant environment The case ended with information on the performance of the last years 
and challenges for the future After reading the case, the participants were presented with 
further written information on the current situation of the business and their task in the 
company 
"However, lately, the business has proved more challenging A new compelitor Harvester 
recently started up and seems to be developing quickly They are opening restauranis 
quickly and are heading towards overtaking the market lead from you within the next year 
The restaurant sector, in general, is also becoming more competilive especially with 
widespread discounting in meal prices Moreover, the country once again went into 
recession, consumer incomes fell back, and eating out expenditures declined Your task is to 
manage Beefeater in order to repel the competitive threats and sustain a lead in the market, 
while continuing to deliver growth and linancial performance' 
Apart from information on the company, the participants also received information on their 
role in the company and the decision that they need to take This is where the manipulation of 
choice took place The decision on strategy choice constituted the manipulation Half of the 
subjects were informed that they have been successfully managing the business of Beefeater 
for the last 5 five years and now, they were asked to choose a new strategy to implement in 
the upcoming difficult times The other half was informed that they were taking over the 
business after the unexpected departure of the previous (successful) manager and that even 
though it was their task to manage the restaurant, they had to implement a strategy that the 
headquarters imposed on them 
62 
EFFECT OF CHOICE & RESPONSIBILITY ON SELECTIVE EXPOSURE TO INFORMATION 
For the manipulation of responsibility for decision consequences, half ol the subjects 
were assigned to the high-responsibility condition and were told that they will be held 
personally responsible for the performance results attained in the coming years and the bonus 
they will receive will depend on the performance outcomes, that is, how well they meet the 
targets of the headquarters The other half constituted the low-responsibility condition and 
were told that they will not be held personally responsible for the performance results 
attained in the coming years and the bonus they will receive will not depend on the 
performance outcomes, that is, how well they meet the targets of the headquarters but mil be 
a fixed percentage ol their yearly salary 
After this, all the subjects were asked to answer questions intended to measure their initial 
commitment to the strategy they chose (choice group) or the strategy that was imposed on 
them (no-choice group) After answering these questions, the respondents were iniormed that 
five years had past by since the strategy was implemented and they were presented with the 
consequences All the subjects received the same failure feedback which iniormed them that 
the overall profit had been below the target and they have been receiving regular warnings 
trom the headquarters The threat from the competitor was not diverted Moreover, the 
customers' perception of Beefeater's quality was going down whereas the perception ol 
competitor's quality was going up and the number of meals served per restaurant has been 
continuously declining Overall, "Beefeater could not fulfill the targets set five years ago" 
While giving the performance feedback, care was taken that the feedback was not too 
negative As Staw (1999 ρ 193) points out, in escalation situations, "withdrawal or 
persistence are not obvious or clear-cut solutions to the problem" To enable this the 
feedback was made negative but not too negative such that all the participants would choose 
to quit the action Following the performance feedback, the participants were informed 
' Headquarters are willing to authorize another five million pounds (£ 5 000 000) but they 
would first like you lo explain how you would spend this money 
In order to do so, they were asked to answer the questions on how much of the five million 
pounds they would spend on the strategy and how committed they felt to the strategy These 
questions were used to measure their commitment and were the same as the one used to 
measure their initial commitment They were also informed that they need to write a report to 
the headquarters explaining how they would spend the additional money They were then 
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asked to indicate the type of information they would like to include in this report The 
respondents were not actually made to write the report The purpose was to measure their 
inlormation preference Finally, the participants answered questions designed to check the 
effectiveness ol the manipulations and to gather demographic information on the subjects 
The first experiment took place in June 2004 with 114 undergraduate students at Wageningen 
University Participation was on a voluntary basis and the participants received five Euros as 
compensation The second experiment took place in April 2005 with 163 HBO students at the 
Nijmegen School of Management The experiment was part of a Market Research course and 
participation was on a voluntary basis 
4.2 Experiment one: effect of choice 
In this section, experiment one will be explained in detail This experiment served as a pre-
test tor the case and the experimental questionnaire To be able to test the hypotheses of this 
research, it was essential to create an escalation situation It was important to establish that 
the scenario included in the case description generated the conditions under which escalation 
of commitment could take place More specifically, it was necessary to lest whether the 
decision situation and the choice used in the scenario resulted in escalation Therefore, this 
experiment was used to test whether the Beefeater case was appropriate for inducing the 
escalation conditions Moreover, this experiment also served as a prc-test for checking the 
reliability of the independent and dependant variables It was also used to get first results on 
the effect of choice on inlormation preference under escalation situations 
4.2.1 Experimental questionnaire and operationalization 
4.2.1.1 Independent variable: Experimental manipulation 
The manipulation of choice was the only one in this experiment Choice is one ol the main 
antecedents of commitment and is important in evoking self-justification motives, which can 
lead to escalation ol commitment In most previous experimental work in the domain of 
escalation of commitment, choice was shown sufficient to create escalation Therefore, in 
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this experiment, in order to create an escalation situation, choice was used as the 
manipulation. The conceptual model tested in this experiment is given in figure 4.1. The full 
text of the experimental questionnaire, manipulation, and the dependent variables can be seen 
in appendix I. 
Choice Initial 
commitment 
Final 
commitmenl > 
' ' 
Selective exposure 
to information 
Figure 4.1: Conceptual model tested in experiment one. The manipulation is shown in italics. 
Manipulation of choice: The manipulation was similar to manipulations in previous 
research. The subject population was randomly assigned to one of the two experimental 
groups: choice and no-choice of strategy. The choice subjects were told that they have donc a 
great job in managing the business of Beefeater for the last five years. They were informed 
that during these five years, 
"Restaurant numbers, sales, and profit have remained strong and you have continuously 
assured that consumers are happy enough with the value that your restaurants offer Your 
team earned regular bonuses during the past". 
They were then informed that the headquarters made five million pounds available lor 
investing in the strategy of Beefeater for the five years to come, at the end of which the 
performance of Beefeater was to be evaluated. This is the choice subjects were given the 
option to choose a strategy: 
"As the manager, it is your task to choose and implement a strategy. Given the current 
market situation, you would like to choose one of the following two strategies to 
implement: 
Strategy A: You can choose a strategy that invests specifically in service quality and targets 
high-income groups. Choosing this strategy, you would put emphasis on: 
• Growth by opening restaurants in high-income areas only while closing down 
smaller, non-profitable restaurants, especially those in low-income areas. 
• High quality by investing specifically in service and me/iM appeal. 
• Keeping the prices at their current level slightly above those of the competitors. 
Strategy B: You can choose a strategy that targets the general population and focuses on the 
market pressures. Choosing this strategy, you would put emphasis on: 
• Growth by acquiring new restaurants while closing down smaller restaurants that are 
not profitable. 
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• High quality by investing specifically in restaurant em ironment 
• Responding to competitive pressures by following the competitors in discounting so 
that the prices would at the same level or shghth lea than those of the competitors " 
The other half, who were not in the choice condition, were informed that they were taking 
over the management of the business of Beefeater after the unexpected early departure of the 
previous managing director and that 
"The previous director made sure that restaurant numbers, sales, and profit have remained 
strong and he has continuously assured that consumers are happy enough with the value that 
your restaurants offer You have been informed that the managing learn, under the previous 
manager, earned regular bonuses during the past" 
Contrary to the choice condition, these subjects were not given the option to choose a 
strategy They were told that 
"Although it is your task to invest in the future strategy, the headquarters imposed on you 
the strategy they want implemented They want you to follow a strategy that targets 
At this point, the no-choice group was also divided into two groups randomly to mirror the 2 
available options of the choice group To mirror strategy B, half of the no-choice subjects 
were told 
"They want you to follow a strategy that targets the general population and locuses on the 
market pressures They would like you to keep on emphasizing growth by acquiring new 
restaurants However, now, they want you to close down smaller, non-profitable restaurants 
In the meanwhile, they want you to keep high quality by investing specifically in restaurant 
environment They would also like you to respond to competitive pressures by tollowing 
the competitors in discounting so that the pnees of Beeteater would be at the same level or 
slightly less than those of the competitors" 
To mirror strategy A, the other half was told 
"They want you to follow a strategy that invests specifically in service quality and targets 
high-income groups They would like you to keep on emphasizing growth by acquiring new 
restaurants However, now they want you to tocus on opening restaurants only in high-
income areas while closing down smaller, non-profitable restaurants, especially those in 
low income areas In the meanwhile, they want you to keep high quality by investing 
specifically in service and menu appeal while keeping the prices at their current level 
slightly above those of the competitors" 
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4.2.1.2 Dependent variables 
There were two dependent variables in this study. First, commitment was measured to 
identify whether the subjects escalated in their commitment. Second, information preference 
was measured to see whether selective exposure to information took place. 
Measurement of commitment: Two different measures of commitment were used. First, 
following prior research on escalation, commitment was operationahzed as the amount of 
money invested in the initially-implemented strategy. Second, a new operationalization of 
commitment was used to measure felt-commitment to the strategy9. Measuring commitment 
only in terms of money invested could give a limited view on commitment since this measure 
only represents the behavioral aspect of commitment. In the organizational behavior 
literature, organizational commitment (i.e. employee's commitment to an organization) is 
accepted to have both a behavioral and an attitudinal component (Mowday, Steers, and 
Porter, 1979; McGee and Ford, 1987; Mathieu and Zajac, 1990; Kalleberg and Reve, 1993). 
Based on Mowday, Porter, and Steers (1982), Mathieu and Zajac (1990: 185) noted that most 
of the definitions of commitment reflected the distinction between "commitment as an 
attitude or as a behavioral investment". Attitudinal dimension of organizational commitment 
represents "a person's loyalty to the firm and identification with its values"' (Kalleberg and 
Reve, 1993: 1107). Mowday et al. (1979) slated that attitudinal commitment (also referred to 
as affective commitment (Meyer and Allen, 1984; Meyer, Stanleym Herscovitch, and 
Topolnysky, 2002)) can be characterized by a strong belief in the organization's goals and 
values, a willingness to exert effort on behalf of the organization, and strong desire to 
maintain membership in the organization. As such, organizational commitment can be seen as 
"a set of behavioral intentions" (Scholl, 1981). Even though the concept of organizational 
commitment is different from commitment to a decision or a course of action, the distinction 
between behavioral and attitudinal commitment could be useful in understanding how 
commitment to a decision evolves. There is indeed research indicating that people's attitudes 
(that is, what say or think they will do) does not necessarily coincide with what they actually 
do (cf., Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). There can be a discrepancy between people's behavior and 
their attitude towards the behavior. The behavior can be conservative in relation to the 
9
 II should be realized thai strictly speaking, what is measured in ihesc experiments are ihe "stated" behaviour 
and attitude rather than the actual behaviour and attitude. 
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attitude but can also exceed the behavior dictated by the attitude level For instance, in the 
context of investments, people who feel committed to a strategy might choose to invest less 
than they would otherwise if they want to avoid risk, feel resistance from others, or worry 
about losing support from their superiors In these cases, money invested as a single measure 
ol commitment would indicate a level of commitment that is less than what is actual fell In 
the same way, people might choose to invest for reasons other than lelt-commilment For 
instance, money might be available for only one course of action and might be lost if not 
invested The individual might, then, decide to invest even though she or he does not support 
the action Alternatively, one might leel obliged to invest in a course of action due to pressure 
from peers or superiors even though he does not believe in the goodness of the action or feel 
committed to it Distinguishing attitudinal and behavioral commitments is ol particular 
relevance in the escalation ol commitment domain, because people who invest money 
without feeling committed can more easily withdraw Irom the action once the cause ol the 
investment is gone, regardless of the quality or the performance level of the action In the 
same way, people who invest little, even though they feel very committed, might keep on 
investing even though the action fails In such cases, looking only at money invested as a 
measure of commitment would give a false sense of commitment. Therefore, looking at felt-
commitment or attitudinal commitment alongside behavioral commitment could increase our 
knowledge on commitment lo a decision 
To measure the commitment the subjects feel towards the strategy, a new multi-item 
measure of felt-commitment or attitudinal commitment was created The items were 1 I 
believe this strategy is going to work, 2 I would not stick to this strategy, 3 I would like to 
invest all existing resources to implement this strategy, 4 I think there arc better strategies 
than this strategy 
Compared to the previous escalation studies, there was also a difference in the 
operationahzation and lest of escalation ol commitment So far, commitment has typically 
been measured only after the receipt of the decision consequences This measure has been 
used as an indication of escalation II subjects in the choice group invested more than those in 
the no-choice group escalation is said to take place Yet, the word escalation cames in itselt a 
connotation of rise, growth, acceleration, increase, is defined "to increase in extent, volume, 
number, amount, intensity, or scope" (Memam-Webster Online dictionary) Given this 
definition, a one time measure of commitment cannot be enough to identify whether 
escalation takes place In order to decide on its occurrence, one needs to look at, at least, two 
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points in time If commitment is measured at two different points in time, once before and 
once alter the pertormance feedback, the difference between these two measures can give an 
indication of the change in commitment To conclude that escalation takes place upon the 
receipt of negative consequences, individuals that escalate should cither increase their 
commitment more or decrease it less than others do To test for this, two measurements ol 
commitment were taken The first measurement was after the case information but before the 
performance feedback In the previous escalation studies, the choice, on its own, constituted 
the decision and since the chosen alternative received all the available funds there was no 
decision on how much money to invest In this study, the subjects could determine the 
amount of money they would invest on the strategy initially This seems more realistic since 
in real life, dctision-makcrs can also decide on how much of the available funds to invest in 
implementing a strategy This initial investment decision gives a measure for the strength ol 
the initial commitment The purpose was to identify a base (or initial) level of commitment 
participants have lor the strategy The second measurement was after receiving the feedback 
on the decision consequences This gives a measure of the strength of the final commitment 
As a result, this study used two measures of commitment (behavioral and attitudinal) and two 
measures ol escalation which will be compared to one another First measure of escalation 
was the commitment level after the receipt of the decision consequences This represents the 
measure used in previous escalation literature The second measure ol escalation was the 
difference between the initial and final commitment levels 
Measurement for information preference: confirmation bias: After the second investment 
decision, the subjects were inlormed that they needed to write a report to the headquarters 
supporting the decision they have made For this report, they could make use of information 
that a consulting company would collect for them However, given the time and monetary 
constraints, they needed to choose the information they wanted collected They were given 
six information items (see table 4 I ) and for each item, two possible information contents to 
choose Irom Confirming inlormation content per information item was identified beforehand 
and the percentage of people choosing for the confirming item in each experimental group 
was used as a dependent variable A second measure for the confirmation bias was the total 
number of confirming items chosen by an individual 
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The style of the questions was as follows (here, only one example is given, the rest of the 
questions is in appendix I): 
Report 1: 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive? Please indicate your choice by 
circling the letter corresponding to the report of your choice. 
a) A report that estimates the likelihood that the further implementation of this 
strategy will bring success to the company and explains the reasons for this possible 
success. 
b) A report that estimates the likelihood that the further implementation of this 
strategy will bring failure to the company and explains the reasons for this possible 
failure. 
Table 4.1: Information categories for experiment one. The confirming items are shown bold 
and italic in column 3. 
Information type 
Predicted future 
performance 
Locus of causality 
Stability of causes 
Alternative 
strategies 
Anecdotal 
information on 
similar companies 
Costs 
Explanation 
This category contains information on the 
likelihood of success or failure with the 
strategy in case it is continued 
This category contains information on 
whether the causes of the poor performance 
over the last 5 years were external or internal. 
This category contains information on 
whether the causes of the setback were 
temporary (not likely to occur again) or 
permanent (likely to occur again). 
This category contains information on 
whether the alternative strategies are better or 
worse than the implemented strategy. 
This category contains information on the 
performance of similar companies that 
implemented the same strategy in the past 
This category contains information on the 
costs associated with implementing the 
strategy. 
The content of the reports 
Likelihood of future success 
Likelihood of future failure 
Internal causes 
External causes 
Temporary cause 
Permanent cause 
Alternative strategy is better 
than the current strategy 
Alternative strategy is worse 
than the current strategy 
Strategy brought success to 
other similar companies 
Strategy brought failure to other 
similar companies 
Sunk costs 
Future costs 
4.2.1.3 Other questions and the post-experimental questionnaire 
After both investment decisions, the confidence of the respondents in the strategy as well as 
the responsibility they feel for the choice of the strategy were measured. Moreover, at the 
end, a post-experimental questionnaire was administered with manipulation check and 
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demographic questions The manipulation check for choice was done by asking to what 
extent the subjects felt that someone other than him or herself made the choice of the strategy 
(seven-point Likerl type response format with anchors I to no extent, 7 to a very large 
extent) Moreover, two questions were asked to check whether the performance feedback was 
perceived as negative by the respondents See appendix I for the questions 
4.2.2 Results 
In this section, the results will be discussed First, the results of some initial analysis, 
including manipulation checks, will be presented Then, results regarding escalation of 
commitment will be given Finally, the results on information preference will be discussed 
4.2.2.1 Manipulation checks 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the choice manipulation, the responses ol the subjects to the 
manipulation check were compared One-way ANOVA showed that were choice 
manipulation was the main and only ellect (F (1, 79) = 19 041, ρ < 0 001) The subjects m the 
no-choice group felt more strongly that someone other than themselves made the initial 
decision (MeansNo choice =541 and Meancho.cc = 3 91, t = 4 591, /? < 0 001, 1 to no extent, 7 
to a very large extent) Questions on how the performance leedback was perceived revealed 
an interesting result Even though all the subjects received the same performance leedback, 
the subjects in the choice group perceived the performance as less negative than the subjects 
in the no-choice group (MeansNo chou.,. = 2 68 and Meanç hoice = 3 78, t = -4 425, ρ < 0 005, 1 
negative, 7 positive) 
Whether the strategy chosen (strategy A or B) made any difference on the subsequent 
allocation decision was also tested For the subjects in the choice condition, there was no 
difference in the subsequent investment behavior between the subjects who initially selected 
strategy A or Β (means £ 3,491,379 vs £ 3,617,647, t = -0 387,ρ = 0701) Therefore, these 
groups were combined for further analysis In the no-choice condition, the chosen strategy 
was randomly assigned to the participants rather than self-selected Also for this group, there 
was no difference in the subsequent investment behavior between the subjects who were 
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assigned strategy A or Β (means: £ 3,472,222 vs. £ 2,858,824, t = 1.417, ρ = 0.166). Hence, 
these groups were also combined. 
A preliminary analysis showed that the choice subjects felt more confidence in the strategy 
and also felt more responsible for the choice of the strategy. This difference in the feeling of 
confidence and responsibility did not change upon the receipt of negative consequences. 
These combined with the manipulation check gives confidence that the choice manipulation 
was successful. 
Another analysis was conducted for nationality and gender. 33 subjects who were Chinese 
were left out of the analysis since they acted differently than the Dutch subjects. Contrary to 
the rest of the subjects (as will be explained below), the Chinese subjects did not show any 
effects for choice. Whether they chose the strategy themselves or it was imposed on them did 
not make any difference lor either the commitment or the information preference. Gender did 
not have any significant effects on the results. With respect to age, the group was 
homogeneous. 
Finally, the reliability of four items to measure felt-commitment was 0.637 (Cronbach's 
alpha). Given this low reliability, the results for this measure are not reported here and for 
experiment two, a new measure was developed. 
4.2.2.2 Analysis for commitment and escalation of commitment 
Analyses were performed for the initial commitment, final commitment, and the difference 
between the initial and final commitments. 
Initial commitment was measured right after the subjects were informed of their role in the 
company, that is, the choice manipulation (see table 4.2). They were asked to indicate how 
much of the available funds they would invest in the strategy. There was no difference in the 
initial average investment amongst the choice and no choice groups (t (79) = -1.388, ρ -
0.169). 
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To investigate whether escalation took place, analysis on the ßnal coinmitinent was 
performed (see table 4 2) This has been used as a measure ol escalation of commitment in 
previous escalation studies Consistent with pnor research, significant differences existed 
between the groups T-tests showed that the subjects who made the choice invested 
significantly more than those on whom the strategy was imposed (Meanwo choice = 1,771,429 
vs Meanchoice = 3,413,043, t (79) = -4 388, ρ < 0.001) This shows the occurrence ol the 
escalation bias 
Table 4.2: Initial and final commitment levels 
Choice manipulation 
No-choice 
Choice 
Ν 
15 
46 
Initial 
commitment 
Mean 
3,174,286 
3,538,043 
Std Dev 
1,298,719 
1,059,107 
Final 
Commitment 
Mean 
1,771,429 
3 411,041 
Std Dev 
1,628,527 
1.697 197 
Additional analysis was done to see how commitment changed alter the receipt of the 
performance feedback First, final commitment was analyzed while controlling lor the initial 
commitment The purpose was to see whether choice was still an effective determinant of 
escalation once the effect of the first investment was controlled lor Second, the dillcrence 
between the two commitment levels was analyzed The purpose of this test was to check 
whether the choice subjects increased their commitment more or at least, decreased it less 
than the no-choice subjects Both analyses gave the same result regarding escalation 
Univariate ANOVA for final money invested nhile taking the initial money invested cu a 
tovanate gave a significant main effect for choice (MeanNo choice = 1,792,206 and MeanchoiLt 
= 3,397,235, F (1, 78) = 17 825, ρ < 0 001) Hence, regardless of the initial investment level, 
choice is an effective determinant Subjects in the choice group invested significantly more 
than those in the no-choice group 
T-test for the difference in money invested showed that choice was a significant 
determinant (t (79) = -2 895, ρ < 005) The subjects in the no-choice group decreased the 
amount invested (mean = -1,402,857) more than the subjects in the choice group (mean = -
125,000) 
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These tests show that regardless of the initial investment, choice leads to escalation. 
Those who made the initial choice invested more and decreased their commitment less than 
those on whom the strategy was imposed10. 
Finally, in order to test the conceptual model for this experiment, a path regression analysis 
was performed. Choice was regressed on initial money invested (AdjR" = 0.011, F(l, 79) = 
1.927 ρ = 0.169) whereas both choice and initial money invested were regressed on final 
money invested (AdjR2 = 0.179, F(2, 78) = 9.745, ρ < 0.0001). The results are shown in 
figure 4.2. Even though having made the choice of the strategy did not have any effect on the 
initial amount of money invested, it had a strong significant effect on the final amount of 
money invested. Those in the choice condition invested more than those in the no-choice 
condition. The initial amount of money invested did not have an effect on the amount of 
money invested after failure feedback. 
β = 0.433 
l = 4 222,p<0001 
Choice 
β = 0 154 
l= I 388. ρ = 0 169 
Initial money 
invested 
1 
β = 0 064 
I = 0 624. ρ = 0 535 
Final money 
invesled 
Figure 4.2: Results for path regression for the conceptual model of experiment one. 
Summary and discussion for commitment: The overall results show that the initial 
amount of money invested did not differ between the two groups. On the average, the 
subjects in the no-choice group invested as much as those in the choice group. The reason for 
this could be that even though the no-choice group did not choose the strategy to implement, 
they were told that the headquarters wanted them to invest in it. Hence, they might have felt 
obliged to do so since this is what was asked of them. After hearing the negative decision 
consequences, the two groups diverged from one another. The subjects in the no-choice 
group decreased the amount of money they invested significantly more than the subjects in 
An additional analysis was pertormed tor the difference in money invested in order to see whether the initial 
amount invested affects the change in investment For instance, extreme high or low initial investments can have 
an effect on the change in the investment level ANOVA for the difference while controlling for the initial 
investment returned a significant effect for choice (F (I. 78) = 17 825. ρ < 0 001) and the initial money invested 
(F (1. 78) = 31 110, ρ < 0 001) The result regarding the occurrence ot escalation remains the same but is 
strengthened Subjects in the choice group increased their investment (mean = 16.370) whereas those in the no-
choice group decreased it (mean = -1,588.659). 
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the choice group As a result, the no-choice subjects ended up with a lower investment than 
the choice subjects did This shows that the escalation tendencies are stimulated by having 
the possibility of choosing an action Those who actually chose the strategy remained more 
committed to it than those who did not choose This result gives support for the occurrence of 
the escalation of commitment 
The fact that the design of the experiment and the experimental case generated 
escalation of commitment shows that the case is appropriate to be used in this study to 
generate an escalation situation under which to test the hypotheses developed in chapter 3 
4.2.2.3 Analysis for information preference under escalating commitment 
In this experiment, the subjects could indicate their preference for six information categories 
For each of these information categories, a t-test was performed to see whether more subjects 
in the choice group asked lor the confirming inlormation than in the no-choice group The 
same analysis was pertormed for the total number of confirming items requested over all the 
categories Table 4 3 gives an overview of this analysis 
For the information category predicted future performance the subjects could choose 
between a forecast for success or lailure The percentage of subjects preferring success 
inlormation was the same in both the choice and the no-choice groups Hence, the choice did 
not affect the search lor confirming information regarding the predicted future performance 
of the strategy Given this result, hypothesis la is rejected 
For the inlormation category locus of causality, even though the majority ol subjects 
preferred information on the internal causes, the percentage preferring the option on external 
causes was more (marginally significant) in the choice group than in the no-choice group 
Given this result, there is marginal support for hypothesis 2a 
For the information category stabilir) of cause·;, the majonty of all the subjects in both 
groups preferred to hear that the causes of failure were permanent and likely to occur again. 
Given this result, hypothesis 3a is rejected 
For the information category alternative •strategies, even though the majority in both 
groups preferred the information that the alternative strategies are better, more people in the 
choice group wanted to hear that the current strategy is better than the alternatives Given this 
result, there is support lor hypothesis 4a 
75 
EFFECT OF CHOICE & RESPONSIBILITY ON SELECTIVE EXPOSURE TO INFORMATION 
Table 4.3: Inlormation preference for choice and no-choice groups 
Information category 
(confirming information content) 
Predicted future performance 
(likelihood of future success) 
Locus of causality 
(external causes tor failure) 
Stability of causes 
(temporary causes) 
Alternative strategies 
(current strategy is better than the 
alternatives) 
Anecdotal information on similar 
companies 
(success to similar companies) 
Costs associated with implementing the 
strategy 
(sunk costs) 
total number of confirming information 
chosen out of a total of 6 reports 
Choice 
No choice 
Choice 
No choice 
Choice 
No-choice 
Choice 
No-choice 
Choice 
No-choice 
Choice 
No-choice 
Choice 
No-choice 
Choice 
Ν 
35 
46 
35 
46 
35 
46 
35 
46 
35 
46 
34 
45 
Ν 
34 
45 
Mean: percentage 
requesting 
confirming 
information 
46 
,48 
,20 
,39 
,06 
09 
,20 
,46 
,51 
,80 
,12 
04 
Number of 
reports 
1,5000 
2,2667 
t-value 
-,186 
-1 913' 
,502 
-2,538* 
-2,785" 
1,142 
t-value 
2,688" 
p<0 1 ,><005, , ><()01 
For the information category anecdotal information on similar restaurants, the majority 
preferred to hear success stories The percentage in the choice group was significantly higher 
than the percentage in no-choice group Given this result, there is support for hypothesis 5a 
For the inlormation category coifi associated with implementing the strategy, in both 
groups, the majonty preferred inlormation on future costs This contradicts the expectations 
and hence, hypothesis 7a is rejected 
To test hypothesis 8a, the total number of confirming items requested was calculated 
The individuals in the choice group asked to receive more confirming items than those in the 
no-choice group This result gives support for hypothesis 8a However, it is interesting to 
note that out of 6 items, the choice group asked for an average of only 2 27 confirming items 
The situation seems to indicate a will for disconfirmation rather than confirmation Choice 
subjects, however, sought for less disconfirmation than no-choice subjects Following Fischer 
et al (2005), confirmation bias, which is used as a typical indicator of selective exposure (e g 
Jonas, Frey, and Kastenmuller, 2001), can be defined as "the extent to which a person prefers 
supporting over conflicting inlormation (i e the number of chosen supporting minus the 
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number of chosen conflicting pieces of information)" Measuring confirmation bias this way, 
this data indeed indicates the existence of a disconfirmation bias in general However, choice 
leads to search for less disconfirming information (Meanchoicc = -2 7547 versus MeanNo choice 
= -1 6610, t(l 10) = -2 319, p < 0 001) 
In order to test the conceptual model, a path regression analysis was run (figure 4 3) Both 
choice and final money invested were regressed on the percentage choosing the confirming 
information in all the information categones Choice had a significant elicci on the 
preference regarding locus of causality and anecdotal information whereas final money 
invested had a marginally significant effect on the preference regarding the alternative 
strategies For the information item on alternative strategies, the t-test had shown that choice 
has a significant effect but overall, the majonty preferred the disconfirming inlormation 
indicating that alternatives are better than the current strategy Taking the final money 
invested into the analysis showed that as the final investment ol people increased their 
preference for the confirming information also increased 
Choice Initial money 
invested 
β = 0.264 ^ 
1 V 
β 
= 0.433^ 
Final money 
invested 
\ 
\ , 
β = 0 . 2 1 0 \ 
Locus ot 
causality 
Alternative 
strategies 
β = 0.258 Anecdotal 
information 
Figure 4.3: Results for path regression for the conceptual model of experiment one 
Summary and discussion for information preference: The expectation was to show that as 
opposed to the subjects who did not initially choose the implemented strategy, those who 
made the initial choice would show more preference for confirming information In this 
experiment, choice was studied since it is one of the prominent antecedents ol escalation and 
dissonance arousal The results indicate that the subjects in the choice group preferred to 
collect more confirming information than those in the no-choice group However, it turned 
out that all the subjects, regardless of their commitment, preferred more disconfirming 
information than confirming This result calls for a re-examination ot the hypothesis that 
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committed people are prone to selectively exposing themselves to information and will strive 
to collect as much confirming information as possible 
Regarding the specific information items, hypotheses la (predicted future performance), 
2a (locus of causality), 3a (stability causes), 4a (alternative strategies), 5a (anecdotal 
information on similar companies with the same strategy), and 7a (costs associated with 
implementing the strategy) were tested Compared to the no-choice group, more people in the 
choice group preferred information indicating that the causes of failure were external 
(hypothesis 2a), that the current strategy is better than the alternatives (hypothesis 4a), and 
that similar companies implementing a similar strategy were successful (hypothesis 6a) 
4.2.3 Conclusions from experiment 1 
The results from this experiment were consistent with the previous work on escalation in the 
sense that after receiving negative decision consequences, the subjects who chose the initial 
strategy invested more than those on whom the strategy was imposed The difference in this 
investment was due to the change in commitment level induced by the negative feedback 
People who chose the strategy decreased their commitment significantly less than the people 
who did not choose 
For the hypotheses regarding the effect of choice on the tendency for selective exposure to 
information, not much support was found As compared to the people who did not choose, 
people who chose showed more preference for confirming information in the domains of 
locus of causality, alternative strategies, and anecdotal information. Moreover, over all the 
information categories, those who chose asked for more confirming information Yet, the 
total number of confirming information requested remained very low across all the groups 
The lack of support for the hypothesis could be due to the following reasons First, in this 
experiment, choice was manipulated to induce internal justification motives The text was 
silent about whether the failure of the strategy was seen as the responsibility of the subjects or 
not Some subjects in the choice group might have felt responsible for the failure" and others 
not In that case, perceiving the implications of choice differently, the subjects in the choice 
group would have reacted differently to having chosen the strategy initially This is not 
If so then choice manipulation would have been confounded with the responsibility tor consequences 
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desirable in an expenmental setting and might have affected the results regarding information 
preference Hence, in the follow-up experiment, responsibility for consequences was also 
manipulated to study the effect of external justification motives independent of the internal 
justification motives This was also the initial purpose as pointed out in chapter 3 The second 
reason for the lack of findings could be that the information items were not clear to the 
subjects Hence, in the next expenment, wording of some of the items were changed 
Moreover, one extra information item was added to test whether individuals question the 
correctness of the reported performance (hypotheses 6a and 6b)1" 
Overall, this test experiment showed that the scenano used in the case is appropriate to 
study escalation situations Based on the results from this experiment, the two adjustments 
explained above are taken into consideration in the second expenments Another change 
made to the questionnaire was the operationahzation of the felt-commitment A new measure 
was developed and used in the second experiment 
4.3 Experiment two: effect of choice and responsibility for 
consequences 
In this section, the second expenment will be explained in detail First, the operationahzation 
of the independent and the dependent vanables will be discussed Then, the detailed analysis 
of the data will be presented The full text of the experimental questionnaire, manipulation, 
and the dependent variables can be seen in appendix II 
4.3.1 Experimental questionnaire and operationalization 
4.3.1.1 Independent variables: Experimental manipulations 
The expenment had a 3x2 design with the manipulations of choice (to induce internal 
justification motives), responsibility for decision consequences (to induce external 
justification motives), and information choice pnor to the second investment decision 
Information choice was manipulated to control tor eventual initial (regardless of escalation) 
" A third reason could be Ihe group used in the expenment The subject population was not a homogenous 
group Participation was on a voluntary basis and the subjects were from different faculties In the follow up 
expenments, care was taken to have a more homogeneous group ol subjects 
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selective exposure tendencies. The conceptual model tested in this experiment is given in 
figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4: Conceptual model tested in experiment two. The manipulations are given in 
italics. 
Manipulation of choice: Choice was manipulated in the same way as in the first experiment. 
Half of the subjects had the opportunity to make a choice between two strategies whereas the 
other half was asked to implement a strategy that the headquarters imposed on them. 
Manipulation of responsibility: The subject population was randomly assigned to one of the 
two experimental groups: high-responsibility and low-responsibility. The subjects in the 
high-responsibility condition were told that they were to be held responsible by the 
headquarters: 
"You have recently been informed that you will be held personally responsible for the 
performance results attained in the coming years. The bonus you will receive will depend 
on the performance outcomes, that is, how well you meet the targets of the headquarters." 
The subjects in the low-responsibility condition were assured that they would not be held 
responsible for the outcomes: 
"You have recently been informed that you will not be held personally responsible for the 
performance results attained in the coming years. The bonus you will receive will not 
depend on the performance outcomes, that is, how well you meet the targets of the 
headquarters, but will be a fixed percentage of your yearly salary." 
Manipulation of opportunity to request information prior to the second investment 
decision: In order to control whether tendency for selective exposure to information existed 
prior to the occurrence of commitment escalation, a third manipulation was introduced. Half 
of the subjects were given the opportunity to indicate their information preference both prior 
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to the second investment decision and after. The other half only indicated their preference 
after the second investment decision. 
4.3.1.2 Dependent variables 
Measurement of commitment: Like in experiment one, two different measures of 
commitment were used: behavioral and attitudinal commitment. Behavioral commitment was 
operalionalized as the amount of money invested in the strategy. To measure felt-
commitment or attitudinal commitment' , a new scale was developed based on the work of 
Lydon and Zanna (1990). Recognizing the different aspects of commitment (Meyer and 
Allen, 1984), Lydon and Zanna (1990) developed a three-item scale to measure commitment. 
The questions (Lydon and Zanna, 1990: 1042) were "To what extent do you feel committed 
to this project?" (face-valid question), "How attached are you to this project?" (as a measure 
of "an enthusiastic, bonding component of commitment), and "How obligated do you feel to 
pursue the project?" (as a measure of required, binding component of commitment). They 
asked their subjects to answer these questions on a seven-point scale. In this experiment, the 
subjects were given five statements and were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree 
with each of them using a seven-point Likert type response format (I: strongly disagree, 7: 
strongly agree). Three of these statements were adapted from Lydon and Zanna (1990). Two 
additional statements were added to measure the loyalty component (Kalleberg and Reve, 
1993; Gilliland and Bello, 2002) and motivalion-to-conlinue components of commitment. 
The statements were "I will stick to the discounting strategy" (motivation-to-conlinue 
component), "I do not feel any loyalty to the discounting strategy" (loyalty component), "I 
am committed to the discounting strategy", "I feel obligated to invest in the discounting 
strategy", and "I feel attached to the discounting strategy". 
As in experiment one, to be able to investigate the change in commitment as a result of 
negative feedback, both measurements were taken twice, once before and once after receiving 
the decision consequences. 
Measurement of reasons for the final commitment: To understand better why individuals 
escalate in their commitment, the participants were given eight statements on possible 
Strictly speaking, what is measured in the experiment is 'stated' felt-commilmcnt 
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reasons and were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with them A seven-point 
Likert scale response type was used (strongly disagree - strongly agree) These statements 
were on different possible explanations (rational as well as irrational) individuals may have to 
re-invest in a failing course of action The statements were as follows 1) I decided to re-
invest in the strategy so that I will not lose the headquarters' support 2) I chose to invest in 
this strategy in the past Deciding to stop now would undermine my reputation as a manager 
who makes consistent decisions 3) I thought the amount of money invested in 2005 was not 
enough to make this strategy work at its full potential Hence, I decided to invest more money 
to make sure that the strategy will work 4) I think some aspects of this strategy are good So 
I decided to invest some ol the available funds to strengthen these aspects and keep the rest 
for developing and implementing another strategy 5) By re-investing in the strategy, I would 
like to show that my decision in 2005 was a correct one 6) I want to keep on supporting this 
strategy because I have already invested so much time and money in it 7) I do not think we 
have enough information to evaluate this strategy thoroughly By re-investing in this strategy, 
I would like to have time to collect additional information to understand its effects better 8) I 
decided to re-invest in the strategy, because I did not think that the performance results were 
bad 
Each of the reasons was analyzed to see whether subjects in different experimental 
groups used different reasons for explaining their final commitment level 
Measurement of information preference: confirmation bias: Confirmation bias was 
measured in the same way as in expenment one Subjects were asked to indicate the 
information content they would prefer for each information item The style of the questions 
and the information items were the same as in experiment one (see table 4 1) There was an 
additional item on how much the respondent would like to receive a report "showing that the 
performance outcomes of the last five years are actually much better than they were stated in 
the performance evaluation of the headquarters" They were asked to indicate their preference 
on a seven-point Likert-type response format (1 I would not like to see this report, 7 I would 
very much like to see this report) 
Like in expenment one, two measures were used percentage of people choosing confirming 
information per item and the total number of confirming items chosen per individual 
82 
EFFECT OF CHOICE & RESPONSIBILITY ON SELECTIVE EXPOSURE TO INFORMATION 
4.3.1.3 Other questions and post-experimental questionnaire 
After both investment decisions, the confidence of the respondents in the strategy as well as 
the responsibility they felt for the choice and results of the strategy were measured At the 
end of the expenment, a post-experimental questionnaire was administered with manipulation 
check and demographic questions The manipulation check for choice was done by asking to 
what extent the subjects felt that someone other than him or herself made the choice of the 
strategy (1 to no extent, 7 to a very large extent) The manipulation check for responsibility 
was done by asking whether the subjects thought that the headquarters held them responsible 
for the performance results of the strategy Moreover, two questions were asked to check 
whether the performance feedback was perceived as negative by the respondents Finally, 
demographic questions on date of birth, nationality, gender, and past educations were asked 
4.3.2 Results 
4.3.2.1 Manipulation checks 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the choice and responsibility manipulations, the responses of 
the subjects to the manipulation check questions were analyzed Manipulation check for 
choice showed that compared to the choice group, the subjects in the no-choice group lelt 
more that someone other than themselves made the choice of the strategy (Meanchoio. = ^ 70 
and Mean No choice = 5 28, t = 6518, ρ < 0001) The choice manipulation was the only 
significant main effect on this question For the responsibility manipulation, 83% of the high-
responsibihty subjects indicated that they felt they were held responsible whereas in the low-
responsibihty group, this percentage was 5% (t = -15 843, ρ < 0 001) Responsibility 
manipulation was the only significant main effect for this question However, choice 
manipulation had a marginally significant main effect (F (1, 158) = 2 865, ρ < 0 1) as well 
This means that choosing a strategy created differences in how responsible the subjects felt 
Further checks were done to see whether the choice or responsibility manipulations 
affected the way the subjects perceived the decision consequences ANOVA showed no 
significant results The overall mean was 3 368 (± 0 097) (1 very negative, 7 very positive) 
Whether a person was assigned to or chose strategy A or Β did not make any difference 
in terms of the commitment they had to the strategy 
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A preliminary analysis also showed that the choice subjects felt more confidence in the 
strategy and felt responsibility for both the choice and the results of the strategy 
Finally, the reliability of five items to measure the attitudinal commitment was 0 804 
(Cronbach's Alpha) The factor analysis run on the same items also indicated that all the 
items loaded on a single factor The factor loadings are given in table 4 4 
Table 4.4: Factor analysis results for the commitment measure 
Items in the commitment measure 
I will stick to the discounting strategy 
I do not feel any loyalty to the discounting strategy 
I am committed to the discounting strategy 
1 feel obligated to invest in the discounting strategy 
I feel attached to the discounting strategy 
Factor loadings 
0 732 
0 763 
0 744 
0 684 
0 822 
4.3.2.2 Analysis for commitment and escalation of commitment 
Analyses were performed for the initial commitment, final commitment, and the difference in 
commitment 
The initial commitment was measured right after the subjects were informed of their role in 
the company but before receiving the performance feedback with the decision consequences 
They were asked to indicate how much of the available lunds they would invest in the 
strategy and to answer live questions to measure their behavioral and attitudinal commitment 
levels, respectively 
With respect to behavioral commitment, there was no difference in the amount of the 
initial average investment between the choice and no-choice groups The overall average was 
3,914,688 (± 90,075) Responsibility did not have any effects on the commitment level 
With respect to attitudinal commitment, choice had a significant main elfect on the 
average felt-commitment (MeanNo <.hc>.<.L = 4 94 and Meanchoice = 5 57, (F (1, 159) = 13 894, ρ 
< 0 001 ) Responsibility did not have any eltects on the commitment level 
The choice manipulation led to a difference in the felt-commitment levels but not in the 
amount of money invested This shows that there is a difference between the attitudinal and 
behavioral commitments 
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Analysis for escalation of commitment was done in two ways First, as in previous work, 
final commitment was analyzed Second, for change in commitment, final commitment was 
analyzed while controlling for the initial commitment and the difference between the initial 
and final commitment levels was analyzed 
First, to investigate whether escalation took place, analysis on final commitment was 
performed Consistent with the prior work on escalation and experiment one, significant 
differences existed between the groups (see table 4 5 for the averages) 
ANOVA for behavioral commitment run on the amount of money invested indicated a 
significant main effect for the choice (F (1, 159) = 8 573, ρ < 0 005) manipulation People 
who chose a strategy (mean = 3,246,262) invested more than those on whom a strategy was 
imposed (mean = 2,391,941) This shows the existence of the escalation bias There were no 
significant effects for the responsibility manipulation Whether the subjects were held 
responsible for the consequences did not make any difference in terms ol further 
commitment 
ANOVA for attitudinal commitment showed similar results There was a significant 
main effect for the choice (F(l,159) =12 265, ρ < 0 005) manipulation People who could 
choose a strategy (mean = 4 839) invested more than those on whom a strategy was imposed 
(mean - 4 062) 
These results indicate the existence of escalation ol commitment to a failing course ol 
action, both at the attitudinal and behavioral levels Choice, on its own, was responsible for 
the escalation 
Table 4.5: Averages for the final commitment levels Standard deviations arc given in 
parentheses 
Commitment alter 
performance 
feedback 
Choice 
No-choice 
Choice 
Behavioral commitment 
(max 5 million) 
Attitudinal commitment 
(range 1-7) 
Responsibility 
Low-
responsibility 
2,531,250 
(294,173) 
3,178,571 
(287,083) 
High-
responsibility 
2,252,632 
(301,815) 
3,313,953 
(283,725) 
Low-
responsibility 
4 025 
(0 224) 
4,762 
(0218) 
High-
responsibihty 
4 100 
(0 229) 
4,916 
(0 216) 
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Additional analysis was done to see how commitment changed after the receipt of the 
negative decision consequences First, final commitment was analyzed while controlling for 
the initial commitment Second, the difference between the two commitment levels was 
analyzed Both analyses gave the same result regarding escalation 
ANOVA ιόν final commitment while controlling for the initial commitment (see table 4 6) for 
money invested returned a significant main effect for the choice manipulation (F(l, 158) = 
8 732, ρ < 0 005) and a significant effect for initial money invested (F(l,158) = 8 591, ρ < 
0.005) For felt-commitment, there was a marginally significant main effect for the choice 
manipulation (F (1,158) = 3 911, ρ < 0 1) and a significant effect for initial felt-commitment 
(F(l,158) = 38 290,p<0 001) 
Table 4.6: Averages for the final commitment level while controlling for the initial 
commitment Standard deviations are given in parentheses 
Final commitment 
while controlling for 
the initial 
commitment 
Choice 
No-choice 
Choice 
Behavioral commitment 
(max 5 million) 
AtlUudinal commitment 
(range 1-7) 
Responsibility 
Low 
responsibility 
2,507,684' 
(287,505) 
3,220,357' 
(280,828) 
High-
responsibilily 
2,289,923' 
(295, 133) 
3,262,107' 
(277,750) 
Low 
responsibility 
4 3 1 3 ' 
(0 207) 
4 634' 
(0 197) 
High-
responsibihty 
4 191-
(0 207) 
4 693 J 
(0 197) 
Evaluated at covanales appeared in the model initial money invested = 3,917,177, initial lell-
commitment = 5 217 
Further analysis was done on the difference between the initial and final commitment 
measures (see table 4 7) The results for behavioral and attiludinal commitments differed 
from one another For difference in the amount ot money invested, ANOVA showed a 
significant eflect for the choice manipulation (F(], 159) = 7210, p < 0 0 1 ) That is, subjects 
who did not choose a strategy decreased the amount ol money invested more than the 
subjects who chose On the other hand, for dillerence in lelt-commitment, there were no 
significant effects All the subjects decreased their felt-commitment with an overall average 
of0 756(±0 102) 
Based on these tests, it is possible to conclude that regardless ol the initial investment, 
choice leads to behavioral escalation This finding is consistent with the first experiment All 
the subjects decreased their commitment after the negative performance feedback but those 
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who chose the initial strategy decreased it less. As for attitudinal commitment, the results are 
less strong. Even while controlling for the initial commitment, final felt-commitment was 
higher for the choice subjects. However, choice had no effect on the change in commitment . 
Table 4.7: Average differences in the behavioral and attitudinal commitment levels. Standard 
deviations are given in parentheses. 
Difference between 
the initial and final 
commitments 
Choice 
No-choice 
Choice 
Behavioral commitment 
(max. 5 million) 
Attitudinal commitment 
(range: 1-7) 
Responsibility 
Low-
responsibility 
-1,450,000 
(308,641) 
-625,000 
(301,203) 
High-
responsibihty 
-1,563,158 
(316,659) 
-744,186 
(297,680) 
Low-
responsibility 
-0.770 
(0.206) 
-0 643 
(0.201) 
High-
rcsponsibilily 
-0.984 
(0.211) 
-0.628 
(0.198) 
Finally, in order to test the conceptual model for this experiment, a path regression analysis 
was performed. Choice, responsibility, and their interaction were regressed on the initial 
commitment while choice, responsibility, their interaction, and the initial commitment were 
regressed on the final commitment. The results are shown in figures 4.5a (for behavioral 
commitment) and 4.5b (for attitudinal commitment). 
For money invested (AdjR2 = -0.009, F(3, 159) = 0.493, ρ = 0.688 and AdjR2 = 0.030, 
F(4, 158) = 2,257 ρ < 0.1), neither of the manipulations had a significant effect on the initial 
investment. Choice manipulation was the only significant effect (t = 2.834 ρ < 0.05) on final 
money invested. 
For felt-commitment (AdjR2 = 0.077, F(3, 159) = 5.525, ρ < 0.005 and AdjR2 = 0.235, 
F(4, 158) = 13,473 ρ < 0.001), choice had a significant main effect on the initial investment (t 
= 3.727 ρ < 0.001). Even though choice also had a marginally significant effect (t = 1.978/7 < 
0.06), the main determinant for the final felt-commitment was the initial commitment level (t 
= 6.188p< 0.001). 
An additional analysis was performed for the difference measures in order to see whether the initial 
commitment affects the change in commitment. ANOVA for the difTerence in investment while controlling for 
the initial investment relumed significant effect for the choice manipulation (F (1, 158) = 8 732, ρ < 0 005) and 
initial money invested (F (I, 158) = 25.381, ρ < 0.001). ANOVA for the difference in felt-commilment while 
controlling for the initial commitment relumed marginally significant effect for choice (F (1, 158) = 3 91 \,p < 
0.1) and initial fell-commitment (F (1, 158) = 8.286, ρ < 0 01). The mean changes in all variables: behavioral 
commitment: Meantho,tl = -675,946 (197,171), Mean^,,,,^. = -1,518,375 (205,887) 
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Figure 4.5α: Results for path regression for the conceptual model of experiment two: 
behavioral commitment. 
Choice 
β = 0.142 
t = 1 978 p< 0 06 
p = U.ZÖI 
r » 
ι \ _ • 
Responsibility 
ι β = 0.113 
Initial attitudinal 
commitment 
β = 0.447 
i 
Final attitudinal 
commitment 
' 
\ 1 = 1.494 ρ = U 1.1/ t = 6. ! « « / ? < U.UU 1 
\ β = -0 1 1 
\ 
= -0 157p = 0 875 
i 1 
β = -0.039 
t = -0 522 ρ = 0 602 
β = 0031 
ι = 0 455 /) = 0 650 
Figure 4.5b: Results for path regression for the conceptual model of experiment two: 
attitudinal commitment. 
Summary for commitment: Both behavioral and attitudinal commitment levels were 
measured. Behavioral commitment was operationalized with the amount of money invested 
and attitudinal commitment with five items. Commitment was measured both before and after 
the receipt of negative decision consequences. Both final commitment and the difference 
between initial and final commitment levels were used to understand how escalation of 
commitment works at the behavioral and attitudinal levels. 
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At the behavioral level, the results were the same as in experiment one. The initial money 
invested did not differ between the choice and no-choice groups. However, those who chose 
their strategy decreased their investment level less than those who did not. Hence, after the 
failure feedback, the amount of money invested by the choice subjects was more than that 
invested by the no-choice subjects. This difference in final money invested is consistent with 
the previous research on escalation. At the attitudinal level, on the other hand, initial felt-
commitment differed between the choice and no-choice groups. The choice subjects reported 
that they felt more committed to the strategy initially than the no-choice subjects did. The 
decline in felt-commitment was the same for all the groups. Yet, due to their initial higher 
commitment, the choice subjects ended with higher final felt-commitment than the no-choice 
subjects did. The change in commitment levels and the final commitment levels can be seen 
in figure 4.6. Responsibility did not have any effect on either of the measures. 
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Figure 4.6: Mean initial and final behavioral and attitudinal commitment levels. Solid 
(dotted) line is for no-choice (choice) group 
It is interesting to see the difference between behavioral and attitudinal commitments. It 
appears that initially, the no-choice subjects invested money for reasons other than the 
commitment they felt for the strategy. This confirms the reasoning from the first experiment. 
Given the headquarters' desire to implement the strategy, the no-choice subjects must have 
felt obliged to invest in it even though they did not feel committed to it. Due to this difference 
in the initial felt-commitment, the choice and no-choice subjects reacted differently to the 
negative decision consequences. Even though the decline in felt-commitment was of the same 
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magnitude for both groups, the no-choice subjects decreased their investment significantly 
more than the choice subjects and ended with significantly less investment 
These higher final commitment levels of subjects in the choice group are consistent with the 
previous literature Given the escalation tendencies, it is important to understand why 
individuals remain committed to failing courses of action One of the possible explanations in 
the literature is based on the motives of internal and/or external justification of the initial 
choice In a strategic decision-making situation, people can have different causes for 
investing in seemingly failing courses of action, both rational and irrational They might 
indeed invest because they leel responsible and/or want to save face Yet, (ear of losing 
supervisor's support can be an equally likely motive In this expenment, participants, who 
invested money after the failure feedback, were given eight statements of possible reasons for 
reinvestment (see table 4 8) The analysis of the subjects' answers indicates that some of 
these reasons applied to the choice subjects but not to the no choice subjects Table 4 8 shows 
the correlations between the final commitment levels and the reasons as well as the results for 
ANOVA testing for the effects of choice and responsibility manipulations Correlations 
indicate that the more committed the subjects were after failure the more they felt that they 
had not invested enough initially (reason 3), the less they had the intention to save part of the 
money for another strategy (reason 4, no correlation with felt commitment), the more they 
felt that by reinvesting, they would like to show that their previous decision was correct 
(reason 5, no correlation with money invested), and the more they thought that the 
performance results were not bad (reason 8) Results from ANOVA, showed that choice led 
to increased will to show the correctness of the previous decision (reason 5) and decreased 
intention to keep part of the money for another strategy (reason 4) Responsibility, on the 
other hand, caused re-investment to save reputation as a consistent decision-maker (reason 2) 
and a will to collect additional data (through reinvesting) to understand the strategy's effects 
better (reason 7) Overall, people who made the initial choice or were held responsible 
explained the causes for their further investment with less rational reasons, such as will to 
save face Moreover, by judging the performance outcome less negative than the no-choice 
subjects, the choice subjects showed a tendency for biasing an objective information item, a 
tendency which constitutes the main claim ol this research 
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Table 4.8: Analysis of the reasons indicated for re-investment after failure feedback 
Correlations 
ANOVA 
Final 
behavioral 
commitment 
Final 
attitudinal 
commitment 
Choice 
Responsibility 
Interaction 
Reason 1 
-0 045 
-0 118 
Nothing 
significant 
Overall 
mean 3 538 
± 0 150 
Reason 2 
-0 027 
0 000 
F(l, 136) 
= 2.902 t 
Reason 3 
0.246" 
0.208' 
Nothing 
significant 
Overall 
mean 4 258 
+ 0 154 
Reason 4 
- 0 . 3 4 8 -
-0 139 
F(l, 136) = 
4.391* 
Reason 5 
0 135 
0.277" 
F(l, 136) = 
6.745* 
Reason 6 
-0 095 
-0 046 
Nothing 
significant 
Overall 
mean 3 674 
± 0 154 
Reason 7 
0 052 
0 041 
F(l, 136) = 
4.3721* 
Reason 8 
0.148 t 
0.291" 
Nothing 
significant 
Overall 
mean 3 500 
± 0 120 
V < 0.1; * ρ < 0.05; "ρ < 0.005; '"ρ < 0.001 
Reason 1 I decided to re-invest in the strategy so that I will not lose the headquarters' support 
Reason 2 I chose to invest in this strategy in the past Deciding to stop now would undermine my reputation as a manager who makes consistent 
decisions 
Reason 3 I thought the amount of money invested in 2005 was not enough to make this strategy work at its full potential Hence, I decided to invest more 
money to make sure that the strategy will work 
Reason 4 I think some aspects of this strategy are good So I decided to invest some of the available funds to strengthen these aspects and keep the rest 
for developing and implementing another strategy 
Reason 5 By re-investing in the strategy, I would like to show that my decision in 2005 was a correct one 
Reason 6 I want to keep on supporting this strategy because 1 have already invested so much time and money in it 
Reason 7 I do not think we have enough information to evaluate this strategy thoroughly By re-investing in this strategy, I would like to have collect 
additional information to understand its effects better 
Reason 8 I decided to re-invest in the strategy, because I did not think that the performance results were bad 
EFFECT OF CHOICE & RESPONSIBILITY ON SELECTIVE EXPOSURE TO INFORMATION 
Effect of indicating information request prior to the second investment decision: Alter the 
initial investment decision, but before receiving the decision consequences, half of the 
subjects was asked for their information preference on five information items predicted 
future performance, locus of causality, stability of causes, alternative strategies, and 
anecdotal information on similar companies In the analysis presented above, these, so-called 
prior information and no-prior information groups were merged together This is because 
indicating information preference prior to the second investment decision had marginal effect 
on subsequent commitment The effect ol choice as explained above remained unchanged 
But there was also an interaction effect of responsibility and inlormation (behavioral F( I, 
155) = 3 158, p<() 1, attitudinal F(l, 155) = 3 134,/? < 0 1) such that for high responsibility 
subjects, indicating the information prelerence led to higher escalation and for low-
responsibihty subjects, indicating the information preference led to lower escalation Given 
this curious result, the sample population was split in two and the analysis was re-done 
For subjects that indicated their information preference, choice and responsibility did 
not have any effects on either final behavioral commitment or change in commitment (both 
behavioral and attitudinal) On final attitudinal commitment, however, there was a significant 
effect of choice (F(l,69) = 7 235, ρ < 0 01) and a marginally significant effect of 
responsibility (F(l, 69) = 3 379, ρ < 0 1) Both choice and responsibility led to attitudinal 
commitment, the highest escalation was in the choice and high-responsibility subjects 
For subjects who were not asked tor their information preference, the results were 
similar to those explained in the above section For final behavioral and attitudinal 
commitment levels as well as the change in behavioral commitment, there was a significant 
effect of choice For change in attitudinal commitment, there was a marginally significant 
effect of choice 
From these results, it is possible to conclude that thinking over preferred information 
and indicating the preference prior to the second investment decision takes away the effect ol 
choice on escalation, at least, at the behavioral level This result is consistent with those that 
were reported by Gonion and Parks (1987) who found that indicating information preference 
decreased escalation tendencies 
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4.3.2.3 Analysis for information preference under escalating commitment 
In this experiment, half of the subjects identified their preference for inlormation both before 
and alter the second investment decision The analysis of the information preference prior to 
the second investment decision involved the following information items predicted future 
performance, locus of causality, stability ol causes, alternative strategies, and anecdotal 
information on similar companies ANOVA run on the percentage of people prelerring 
confirming information returned only one marginally significant effect lor responsibility 
(F(l, 150) = 3 439, ρ < 0 1) and this was for the information item alternative strategies 
18 4% of the high-responsibility subjects wanted the confirming inlormation, ic that the 
current strategy is better than the alternatives This percentage was 41 7% lor the low 
responsibility subjects It seems that being held responsible generates a tendency to look for 
the disLonfirming inlormation in this information category In neither of the other categories, 
confirmation or disconfirmation tendency was observed Overall, it can be said that selective 
exposure to inlormation did not exist prior to the escalation situation Hence any such 
tendency observed in the second round could be attributed to the occurrence ol escalation 
Analysis also showed that indicating their information prelcrence prior to the second 
investment decision did not have any effect on the inlormation preferences after the second 
investment decision Hence, for the remaining analysis prior and no-prior information groups 
were put together 
The hypotheses in chapter 3 stated the expectation regarding the ellect of choice and 
responsibility on information preference In hypotheses set a, it was indicated that people 
who chose the implemented strategy are expected to selectively search for confirming 
information In hypotheses set b, it was indicated that people that are held responsible (or the 
consequences of the implemented strategy will selectively search for confirming information 
To test these hypotheses, analyses were done on two dependent variables The first one was 
the percentage of people choosing the confirming information in each information category 
Each category was analyzed separately, hence, there was a dependent variable for each 
category Second, an overall dependent variable was created by counting the total number of 
confirming information items chosen by each subject For each dependent variable, the 
following three analyses were performed 
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1) Each experimental group was inspected to see whether there is a difference in terms of 
their prelerence tor confirming information The percentage of people asking for 
confirming information and the percentage asking lor disconfirming inlormation were 
compared with one another The purpose was to see whether in any of the groups there 
was a preference for confirming inlormation 
2) ANOVA was performed for each information item to check lor the eflecl of the 
experimental manipulations 
3) The correlations between the final commitment levels and the choice for confirming 
information was calculated in order to see whether commitment level was associated with 
choosing confirming information 
Below, the results will be given per information category Table 4 9 includes the results on 
the percentage of people per experimental group choosing for the confirming or 
disconfirming option and the significance level that indicates whether significantly more 
people chose for either of the options In each category, the confirming item is defined as the 
information that would confirm the goodness of the implemented strategy This item is shown 
bold and italic 
For the information category predicted future performance, the respondents could either 
choose for information on the likelihood of future success or likelihood of failure Looking at 
the percentages of people choosing for the confirming item, ι e success information, in the 
four experimental groups showed an interesting contrast between the groups 'no-choice and 
low-responsibility' and 'choice and high-responsibility' Whereas the majority in the former 
preferred information indicating that further implementation of the strategy will bring failure 
to the company the latter preferred the success information ANOVA run on the percentage 
of subjects choosing for an estimate of future success gave marginally significant main 
effects for both the choice (F(l, 159) = 3 250, ρ < 0 1) and responsibility (F(l, 159) = 3 135, 
ρ < 0 1) manipulations This indicates that the percentage of people favoring information on 
predicted future success was higher in the choice group than in the no-choice group and in the 
high-responsibility group than in the low-responsibility group Even though the difference is 
not significant, the highest percentage choosing confirming information was in the 'choice -
high-responsibility' Given these results, there is marginal support for the hypotheses la and 
lb 
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Table 4.9: Information preferences per experimental group in experiment two. 
Ν 
42 
43 
40 
38 
u 
'δ 
.e 
υ 
Choice 
Choice 
No-
choice 
No-
choice 
c 
g. 
tu 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Predicted future 
performance 
Success 
0.48 
0.63+ 
0.35 
0.47 
Failure 
0.52 
0.37 
0.65* 
0.53 
Two interesting 
results are the 
success 
information 
preference of the 
'choice - high-
responsibility' 
subjects and the 
failure 
information 
preference of the 
'no-choice - low-
responsibility' 
subjects. 
Locus of causality 
Internal 
0.62 
0.67* 
0.69* 
0.74" 
External 
0.38 
0.33 
0.31 
0.26 
In each group, the 
majority preferred 
to hear that the 
causes of failure 
were internal. 
Stability of causes 
Permanent 
0.86*" 
0.88"" 
0.97"* 
0.89*" 
Temporary 
0.14 
0.12 
0.03 
0.11 
In each group, the 
majority preferred to 
hear that the causes of 
failure were permanent. 
Alternative 
strategies are 
Worse 
0.31 
0.40 
0.23 
0.24 
Better 
0.69* 
0.60 
0.77*** 
0.76** 
In each group, 
the majority 
preferred 
information 
indicating that 
the alternative 
strategies were 
better. This 
preference was 
not significant 
in the 'choice -
high-
responsibility' 
group. 
Anecdotal 
information 
Success 
0.57 
0.63* 
0.60 
0.58 
Failure 
0.43 
0.37 
0.40 
0.42 
Only those in the 
'choice - high-
responsibihty' 
group showed 
significant 
results. They 
preferred to hear 
about success 
stories. 
Perceived 
correctness 
of the 
reported 
performance 
Better than 
reported 
(max. 7) 
5.67 
5.67 
5.43 
5.68 
No effect of 
choice or 
responsibility. 
V <O.IO,'p< 0.05, "p< 0.005, '" ρ < 0.001 
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For the information category lotus of causaht), percentages showed that the majority of 
the subjects preferred to hear that the failure was due to internal causes ANOVA run on the 
percentage of subjects choosing for internal causes did not return any significant results The 
majority of the subjects (Mean = 0 681 ± 0 037) in all the groups preferred to hear that the 
causes of failure were endogenous Overall, given these results, hypotheses 2a and 2b are 
rejected 
For the information category stabiliti of the tait'ie';, ANOVA returned no significant 
effects Almost all the subjects (mean 90 2% ± 2 4%) preferred to hear that the causes of 
failure were permanent Given this result, hypotheses 3a and 3b are rejected 
For the information category alternatne strategies, in all the groups, except for the 
'choice and high-responsibility' group, the majority prelerred the information that the 
alternative strategies are better In the 'choice and high-responsibility' group, even though in 
the same direction, this preference was not significant ANOVA returned a marginally 
significant main elfect for the choice (F(l, 158) = 3 090, ρ < 0 I) manipulation indicating that 
the more of the subjects who chose the strategy wanted to hear that their strategy was better 
than the alternatives Given these results, hypothesis 4b is rejected but there is marginal 
support for hypothesis 4a 
For the information category anecdotal information on similar companies, ANOVA 
showed that none of the manipulations had a significant influence on the preference of the 
subjects However, looking at the individual groups showed that the groups in which the 
subjects could choose their strategy and were held responsible, the majonty preferred to hear 
success stones (6Wc success vs 37% lailure, ρ < 0 1) Hence, even though hypotheses 5a and 
5b are not supported there is an indication that choice and responsibility are associated with 
the preference to hear success stories 
For the information category correctness of the reported performance, the subjects were 
not asked to make any choice but to indicate how much they would like to see a report 
showing that "the performance outcomes of the last five years are actually much better than 
they were staled in the performance evaluation of the headquarters" They had to indicate 
their preference on a seven-point Likert-type response lormat (1 I would not like to see the 
report, 7 I would very much like to see this report) ANOVA returned no significant results 
Hence, hypotheses 6a and 6b are rejected 
For the information category costs associated with implementing the strategy, the 
majority of the subjects (overall mean 84% (± 2 9%)) in all the four groups preferred to have 
information on the future costs ANOVA returned a significant main effect for the choice 
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manipulation (F(l, 158) = 4 090, ρ < 0 05) This means that significantly less of the subjects 
(mean 78% (±4%)) who chose the strategy asked for information on future costs Even 
though the choice subjects, as compared to no-choice subjects, showed less preference, it still 
remains that majonty of the choice subjects (78%) requested information on luture costs 
Given these results, hypothesis 7b is rejected but there is marginal support for hypothesis 7a 
Correlation analysis between the final commitment measures and the percentages 
choosing for confirming information for each report returned only once significant result 
Both final behavioral (Pearson = 0 168, ρ < 0 05) and attitudinal commitment (Pearson = 
0 213, ρ < 0 005) levels showed positive correlations with the information category 
alternative strategies indicating that the more committed people remained to a strategy the 
more they wanted to know that the strategy is better than the alternatives 
ANOVA run on the total number of confirming items gave a significant main ellect for 
the choice manipulation (F(l, 156) = 7 741, ρ < 0 01) indicating that the subjects who chose 
the strategy to be implemented favored more confirming items This result gives support lor 
hypothesis 8a However, it should be pointed out that, like in the first experiment, the 
subjects (including those in the choice group) preferred to have more disconfirming items 
than confirming (MeanchoRL = 2 2 vs MeanNo choice = I 67 out of a total of six items) 
Calculating confirmation bias as the difference between the number of chosen confirming and 
disconfirming pieces of information (Fischer et al 2005) indicates the existence of 
disconfirmation bias (Meanchoic = -1 595 vs MeanNl)choicc = -2 652, F(l,156) = 1 771, ρ < 
0 01) Given this situation, those who made the initial choice still lavored more confirmation 
or less disconfirmation, than those who did not Given this result, there is support tor 
hypothesis 8a, but hypothesis 8b is rejected 
Finally, through path regression, the total conceptual model was tested In figures 4 7a 
(behavioral) and 4 7b (attitudinal), only the significant effects are shown The effects 
significant at 5% (10%) are shown in thick (thin) lines 
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Figure 4.7a: Results for path regression for the conceptual model of experiment two: 
behavioral commitment. 
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Figure 4.7b: Results for path regression tor the conceptual model of experiment two: 
attitudinal commitment. 
Summary for information preference: As in experiment one, the subjects in this experiment 
had the tendency to search for more disconfirming information rather than confirming 
information. However, those who made the initial choice asked for more confirming 
information than others. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that choice leads to selective 
search for confirming information. Responsibility had no effect on selective exposure 
tendencies. 
As for the individual information items, information on predicted future performance, 
alternative strategies, and anecdotal information on similar companies were the items that 
triggered search for confirming information for the choice group. The majority in the "no-
choice and low-responsibility" group preferred to hear likelihood of future failure whereas 
the majority in the "choice and high-responsibility" group preferred to hear likelihood of 
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future success In the same way, whereas the majority, in general, preferred the inlormation 
that the alternative strategies were better than the current strategy those in the choice group 
preferred the information that their strategy was better than the alternatives Likewise, the 
majority in the 'choice and high-responsibility' group preferred success stories regarding 
similar restaurant chains that implemented the same strategy In the other information 
categories, there were no significant results In all the groups, the majonty wanted to hear that 
the causes of failure were internal and permanent and wanted to have information on the 
future costs rather than the sunk costs These were the expectations for the no-choice and 
low-responsibility groups but not for the choice and high-responsibility groups 
The overall conclusion from these findings can be that when information is related to the 
performance of the strategy, choice leads to selective exposure to confirming information On 
the other hand, when information is diagnostic, like lor instance the causes of the failure, or 
related the to costs, choice does not trigger confirming information search Being held 
responsible tor the consequences does not seem to have any effect on selective exposure 
tendencies 
4.4 Conclusions and discussion 
In this chapter, two expenments were reported Based on these experiments, hypotheses 
regarding the effects of choice and responsibility on selective exposure to information were 
tested The results from these experiments can be summanzed in three different domains ι 
commitment and escalation, n motives for escalation, and m information prelcrence Each 
of these will be looked at in turn 
Commitment and escalation: Regarding commitment and escalation, the results from both 
experiments support the results from previous escalation research Subjects who choose the 
strategy to be implemented teel more committed to it and invest more money in it even after 
facing negative consequences There were two main differences between this experiment and 
the prior experiments on escalation First, in both of the experiments, commitment was 
measured twice, once before and once after the performance feedback Second, commitment 
was operationalized in two different ways In the escalation literature, the measure of 
commitment has always been money invested in the chosen course of action This is a 
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measure of behavioral commitment In these expenments, alongside behavioral commitment, 
attitudinal commitment was also measured The subjects did not only decide on the amount to 
invest but also reported how committed they felt to the strategy The overall results showed 
differences between behavioral and attitudinal commitments as well as how commitment 
levels change due to negative consequences 
The results can be summarized as lollows Responsibility for decision consequences did not 
have any effect on escalation. Choosing a strategy was enough for generating escalation 
However, the way choice led to escalation was different with respect to the behavioral and 
attitudinal commitments At the behavioral level, choice did not affect the initial 
commitment, but the amount of change in the commitment Those who made the initial 
choice decreased their investment less than those who did not make the initial choice At the 
behavioral level, on the other hand, choice affected the initial commitment but not the change 
in the commitment level Those who made the initial choice (ell more committed at the 
beginning Even though the decrease in the lelt-commilment was the same in both groups, 
given their high initial commitment level, people who made the initial choice lelt more 
committed to the strategy after the negative decision consequences (see figure 4 6) 
These results show that looking at the change in commitment along with a single-time 
measure gives richer information on commitment and escalation The escalation of 
commitment literature has been pointing out that people who choose a strategy keep on being 
committed to it due to feelings of responsibility created by initial choice The findings from 
this research concur with this accepted wisdom and extend it by showing the difference 
between the choice and no-choice groups Choosing a strategy, people feel highly committed 
and make a high investment What is striking is that people who did not choose the strategy 
invest as much money initially as the choice group even though they do nol ieel as 
committed Upon hearing the negative consequences, the commitment levels decrease for 
everyone and the magnitude of the decrease in felt-commitment is the same for both groups 
However, even though the people who chose the strategy decrease their investment 
proportional to the decrease in the commitment they feel, those who did not choose decrease 
their investment drastically This means that decision-makers who invest in a strategy might 
do so without feeling committed to it The danger is that these decision-makers might not put 
enough effort into enabling a good implementation or might pull the plug too soon at the first 
sign ot negative leedback As such, in real life, the initial lack of felt-commitment towards 
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the strategy might actually be a reason tor failure Even though investing in a failing strategy 
is not always the rational course of action, in certain circumstances, sticking out with a course 
of action a little longer could pay back 
Motives for escalation: In the second experiment, reasons lor continued investment to a 
failing course of action were studied Choosing the strategy and being held responsible for its 
consequences trigger motives useful for rationalizing the continued investment Overall, due 
to initial choice and higher final commitment, decision-makers want to show to others that 
their previous decision was correct Moreover, they perceive that the performance outcomes 
were not all that bad and they do not want to save money for other strategics Those who 
continue to invest also rationalize their investment by perceiving their initial investment as 
not being enough Responsibility for consequences, on the other hand, stimulates face saving 
motives Decision-makers who are held responsible want to be seen as consistent decision­
makers They also rationalize by indicating that by re-investment, they can understand the 
strategy better Overall, these results show that factors that lead to escalation and escalating 
commitment itself trigger motives useful for the justification ol the initial and continued 
investments These results give further support for the justification explanation of escalation 
Selective exposure to information: The overall expectation of antecedents of escalation 
inducing confirming information search was met In both experiments, the subjects who 
chose the initial strategy asked for more confirming inlormation than those who did not 
choose However, the total number of confirming items requested remained very low It is 
possible that with these tew items, the decision-makers have enough to decrease dissonance 
and justify their actions This reasoning is strengthened by the realization that the preference 
for confirming information was in the Hems related to the performance of the strategy For 
the information items predicted future performance, alternative strategies, and anecdotal 
information, choice triggered selective exposure to information This information can be used 
to back-up the reasoning that 'everything is going to work out, further investment will lead to 
success' On the other hand, when the information was diagnostic or related to costs, no 
tendencies tor selective exposure were observed It is possible that the two items with a 
diagnostic nature, ι e locus of causality and stability of causes, and the information on costs, 
are used for purposes other than justification For instance, if a decision-maker knows that the 
causes of failure are endogenous and permanent then he or she can use this information to 
eliminate these causes and improve the strategy This is also consistent with Festinger's 
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(1964) claim that in situations where information is seen useful for future decisions, dissonant 
information is not avoided As for the cost information, it is possible that given the 
experimental setting, the subjects felt that they already knew what the sunk costs were and 
hence, requested information on the future costs It is also possible that sunk cost is only a 
tool for self-justification and that individuals do not use sunk cost to justify their choice to 
other people 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the results of two experiments were discussed The effect of two antecedents 
of commitment, choice and responsibility for decision consequences, on escalation and 
selective exposure to information was shown Whereas no effects could be found for 
responsibility, choice was shown to lead to escalation in commitment as well as selective 
exposure to information Different information categones were discussed and amongst these, 
the selective exposure tendencies were seen in categones related to the performance of the 
strategy For diagnostic and cost-related information, no such tendency was observed 
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Chapter 5 
Effect of initial commitment on 
selective exposure to information 
In chapter 3, four antecedents of escalation and dissonance arousal were identified as the 
factors to be studied in this thesis Two of these, namely choice and responsibility lor the 
decision consequences, were studied in chapter 4 In this chapter, the focus will be on the 
other two variables, namely initial commitment and decision consequences Even though 
initial commitment is an antecedent of dissonance arousal it has not received attention in the 
escalation literature This is mainly because making the initial choice has generally been seen 
as the initial commitment to an action The reader might realize that the expenments 
discussed in chapter 4 also included initial commitment, but this was not as an independent 
variable The analysis indeed showed that the initial commitment level is important in 
determining the final commitment level The analysis also showed that only initial attitudinal 
commitment was induced by choice but not the behavioral commitment This finding gives 
further support for studying the effect of initial commitment on escalation and selective 
exposure to information as pointed out in chapter 3 The second variable that will be studied 
is the decision consequences, a variable that is important for both dissonance arousal and 
escalation of commitment It is commonly accepted that negative decision consequences is 
what leads to dissonance and escalation However, Schoorman and Holahan (1996) showed 
the importance of the consistency between choice and consequences (rather than negative 
consequences) in generating escalation (see chapter 2 for further discussion) Therefore, 
decision consequences will be studied alongside initial commitment 
First, the general experimental design and operationahzation of the independent and 
dependent variables will be explained Then, the results will be discussed Finally, the 
conclusions and discussions will be presented 
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5.1 General experimental design 
5.1.1 Case information and general design 
The case used in this experiment was developed by the author and was about a supermarket 
chain that is in need of a new strategy to implement. The general design of the experiment 
was similar to the previous two experiments. 
Upon arriving at the room where the experiment took place, the participants were asked to 
take a seat. The material they would work on was set ready on the tables. The first page of the 
experimental questionnaire included written general instructions on how they should proceed. 
In these instructions, the importance of getting into the role to which they were assigned was 
stressed. First, the respondents were asked to read one-and-a-hall page information on the 
company and their role. The company in the case was a large, successful, nation-wide, high-
quality supermarket chain that was facing some problems regarding profits and market share. 
Hence, there was a need for a new strategy. The subjects were told that they were a long-term 
member of the board of directors of this chain and the board was going to decide on the new 
strategy. The new strategy, i.e. the discounting strategy, was presented to them in the case 
description. The manipulation of commitment was embedded in this description. Half of the 
subjects were informed that they were strongly supporting the discounting strategy and 
thought it would lead to an improvement in the situation of the chain. The other half was 
informed that they were strongly against this strategy and thought that implementing the 
strategy would lead to the demise of the company. The full text of the manipulation can be 
seen in appendix II. 
After this, the subjects in the committed (not-committed) group were asked to write a short 
paragraph on why they thought the discounting strategy is (not) a good strategy. This exercise 
was meant to strengthen the commitment manipulation (Schwarz et al., 1980). Then, all the 
subjects answered the experimental questionnaire that included the questions intended to 
measure the initial commitment of the respondents. Consecutively, they all received the 
decision consequences. This is where the second manipulation took place. Half of the 
subjects were given success feedback and the other half failure feedback. While giving the 
consequences, care was taken not to present the subjects with loo positive or too negative 
feedback. Following the decision consequences, the participants were informed that it was 
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time for the next board meeting where a decision was to be taken on whether to go on with 
the implementation of the discounting strategy They once again filled in the experimental 
questionnaire with questions to measure their commitment They were then told that they 
were to wnle a report to explain their point of view better and were asked to indicate the 
content of the information they would like to include in this report Finally, the participants 
answered questions designed to check the effectiveness of the manipulations and to gather 
demographic information on the subjects 
The experiment took place in February 2006 with 143 HBO students at Nijmegen School of 
Management Ten subjects who did not fully fill in the questionnaire were excluded from the 
analysis The experiment was part of a methodology course and participation was on a 
voluntary basis The full text of the experimental questionnaire, manipulation, and the 
dependent variables can be seen in appendix III 
5.1.2 Independent variables: Experimental manipulations 
The expenment had a 2 X 2 design with the manipulations of commitment (committed vs 
not-committed) and of the decision consequences (positive vs negative) The conceptual 
model tested in this experiment is given in figure 5 1 
Decision 
Selective exposure 
to information 
z 
Figure 5.1: Conceptual model tested in the expenment The manipulations are given in 
italics 
Manipulation of commitment: All the subjects were first informed that there have recently 
been difficulties in the business and the board of directors, of which the subjects were a 
member, was to decide on a new strategy to be implemented in the upcoming challenging 
times Following this information, the subject population was randomly assigned to one of 
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the two experimental groups: committed and not-committed to the strategy. The committed 
subjects were told that they, themselves, proposed the so-called discounting strategy: 
"One of the strategies you proposed is something you proposed so many times in the past: 
discounting. Every time there have been similar problems, you promoted that (he prices 
should be lowered to be able to cope with the competition and not to lose the customers lo 
the competitors. However, a senior board member always fiercely opposed the idea, 
advocated the shortcomings of the strategy, and pointed out that the implementation of this 
strategy would lead to the downfall of the company. To your dislike, he has been successful 
and this strategy never got implemented. However, now, the situation seems to be different. 
At every board meeting, the discounting idea comes up and the number of supporters seems 
to be increasing." 
The participants were then told, 
"As usual, you strongly favor the idea and argue why it is a very good strategy". 
The description listed the advantages as being pointed out by the subject to the board and 
finally read, 
"After long discussions, the majority of the board of directors voted, in agreement with your 
efforts and advice, in favor of your discounting strategy and hence, the decision was taken 
to start the implementation as of next month. The board decided lo allocate a lotal of 1 
million euros for the implementation of the strategy (commercials, promotions, subsidizing 
the price discounts etc.) in the coming 6 months. It was also decided that in 6 months lime, 
the performance of the discounting strategy will be evaluated and the board will then decide 
whether the strategy will be continued with a further allocation of I million euros". 
The not-committed subjects, on the other hand, were told that another board member 
proposed the discounting strategy. They were informed that they had fiercely opposed this 
strategy and advocated its shortcomings many times in the past when it was proposed and had 
always been successful in not getting it implemented. However, now, the situation was 
different and the board was favoring the idea. The participants were told, 
"As usual, you strongly oppose the idea and argue why it is noi a good strategy". 
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The description listed the penis the strategy could cause (such as the downfall of the 
company) as being pointed out by the subject to the board and finally, read. 
After long discussions, the majority of the board ot directors voted, contrary to your efforts 
and advice, in favor of the discounting strategy and hence, the decision was taken to start 
the implemenldtion as of next month The board decided to allocate a total ot 1 million 
euros lor the implementation ot the strategy (commercials promotions subsidizing the 
price discounts etc ) in the coming 6 months It was also decided that in 6 monlhs time, the 
performance of the discounling strategy will be evaluated and ihe board will then decide 
whether the strategy will be continued with a further allocation of 1 million Euros 
At the end of the description, the committed subjects were asked to write a paragraph 
explaining why they thought the discounting was a good strategy whereas the not-committed 
subjects were asked to write a paragraph explaining why they thought the discounting was 
not a good strategy 
Manipulation of decision consequences: Half ot the subjects received positive decision 
consequences whereas the other half received negative consequences The success feedback 
informed the subjects that the discounting strategy worked very well, that the old customers 
were now satisfied with the quality and price levels, and that by decreasing the prices, a 
larger segment was reached They were also told that the resulting price war did not allect the 
business badly The overall result was summarized as, 
' Even though you decreased prices the sales earnings increased due to the increase in the 
number of customers" 
The failure feedback informed the subjects that during the first month of the implementation, 
the strategy worked but later on, the competitors responded to the decrease in price starting a 
furious pnee war Moreover, the problems with the producers (will to reduce costs caused 
difficult negotiations) and with introducing new products (less willingness of customers to 
pay for new, higher-pneed products) were highlighted The overall conclusion was, 
"The expected customer increase in customer numbers did not take place This coupled with 
lower prices there was a decline in the sales earnings" 
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5.1.3 Dependent variables 
As in the previous expenments, there were two dependent variables in this experiment First, 
commitment was measured to identify whether the subjects escalated in their commitment 
Second, information preference was measured to see whether selective exposure to 
information took place 
Measurement of commitment: Behavioral and dttitudinal commitments were measured in the 
same way as in experiment two of chapter 4 To measure behavioral commitment, the 
subjects were asked to indicate the amount of money they would like to invest in the 
discounting strategy To measure the attitudinal commitment, they were asked to answer five 
questions on their felt-commitment to the strategy The statements were "I will stick to the 
discounting strategy", "I do not feel any loyalty to the discounting strategy", "I am committed 
to the discounting strategy", "I feel obligated to invest in the discounting strategy", and "I 
feel attached to the discounting strategy" The subjects were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they agree with each of them using a seven-point Likert-type response format (I 
strongly disagree, 7 strongly agree) To be able to investigate the change in commitment, 
both commitment levels were measured twice, once before and once after receiving the 
decision consequences 
Measurement for information preference: confirmation bias: Information preference was 
measured in the same way as in the previous two experiments Following the measurement of 
final commitment, the subjects were told that in order to facilitate discussions in the next 
board meeting and explain their point of view better, they would like to write a report to 
present to the board members during the meeting They were told that they identified seven 
categories on which they would like to report on and that they asked a consulting company to 
collect the information for them They were then asked to indicate the content of the 
information, per category, they would prefer to include in their report Table 5 1 gives the 
explanation and the contents of each information category The dependent variable was the 
percentage of people choosing the confirming information per category and the total number 
of confirming items chosen per subject 
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The way the question was posed to the subjects was different from the previous two 
experiments Whereas in experiments one and two of chapter 4, the subjects were asked to 
indicate the type of information they would like to collect, in expenment three, they were 
asked for the type of inlormation they would like to report on Another difference was that 
the content of the inlormation items was better explained in the questions The style of the 
questions was as lollows (here, only one example is given, the rest of the information 
categones can be seen in appendix III) 
Information category 1: This category contains information on the predicted Juture 
performance of the discounting strategy in case the strategy is continued 
Which of the following information items would you like to include in your report7 Please 
indicate your choice by circling the letter corresponding to the item of your choice 
a) An estimation of the likelihood ihat the further implementation ol the discounting 
strategy will bring succea (ic increase in customer numbers and sustained high 
quality) to the company and the reasons for this possible success 
b) An estimation of the likelihood that the further implementation ol the discounting 
strategy will bring failure (i e decrease in customer numbers and lower quality) to 
the company and the reasons for this possible failure 
5.1.4 Other questions and the post-experimental questionnaire 
Alter both investment decisions, the confidence of the respondents in the strategy as well as 
the responsibility they felt lor the choice and results of the strategy and for the idea behind 
the strategy were measured At the end of the experiment, a post-experimental questionnaire 
was administered with manipulation check and demographic questions The manipulation 
check for commitment was done through three questions ι 'to what extent do you feel that 
you supported the discounting strategy at the beginning of the 6 months period ' ' ( I = / did 
not support it at all, 7-1 supported it to a large extent) n 'whose idea was the discounting 
strategy initially9' (a it was m\ idea as a member of the board, b it was the idea of someone 
else in the board of directors) m 'To what extent did you agree with the discounting strategy 
at the beginning of the 6 months period'' (1 = I did not agree with it at all, 7 = I agreed with 
it completely) The manipulation check lor performance was done by asking 'How did you 
perceive the performance ol the discounting strategy9' (1 = very negative, 1 = very positive) 
For all these questions, a seven-point Likert-type response format was used 
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Table 5.1: Information categories for the experiment (the confirming items are shown in bold in the last column). 
Information type 
Predicted future performance 
Factors that 
contributed to 
the 
performance 
ot strategy 
Locus of 
causality" 
Stability of 
causes 
Alternative strategies 
Anecdotal information on similar 
companies 
Perceived 
correctness of 
the reported 
performance 
Costs 
associated 
with 
implementing 
the strategy 
Detailed 
information on 
the actual 
performance 
Evaluation 
criteria for 
judging the 
performance 
Relative 
amount of sunk 
vs. future costs 
Absolute 
amount of sunk 
and future costs 
Explanation 
Information on the predicted future performance in 
case the strategy is continued. 
Information on whether the causes of the 
performance of the strategy were internal or 
external. 
Information on whether the causes of the setback 
were temporary or permanent. 
Whether the alternative strategies are better or 
worse than the implemented strategy and the 
reasons for this. 
Information on the performance of similar 
companies that implemented the same strategy. 
Information on whether the reported performance 
was accurate. 
Information on whether the criteria used for 
evaluating the strategy were correct. 
Information on what proportion of costs necessary 
for success has already been implemented. 
Information on the costs associated with 
implementing the strategy 
The content of the reports 
Likelihood of future success 
Likelihood of future failure 
Internal: intrinsic to the strategy (e.g. the way the strategy is 
implemented, the appropriateness of the strategy) and under the 
control of the decision-maker. 
External: extrinsic to the strategy (e.g. the economic 
developments, market structure) and out of the control of 
the decision-maker. 
Permanent and are likely to occur again in the future. 
Temporary and not likely to occur again in the future 
Current strategy has advantages over alternative strategies. 
Alternative strategies have advantages over the current strategy 
Strategy brought success to the company 
Strategy brought failure to the company 
Actual performance is much better than it was reported 
Actual performance is much worse than it was reported 
Actual performance is correctly reflected in the report. 
Criteria were correctly set. 
Criteria were incorrectly set: Reported performance seems better 
than it really is. 
Criteria were incorrectly set: Reported performance seems 
worse than it really is. 
70-80% already spent 
30-40% already spent 
Sunk costs 
Future costs 
The confirming items in these categories refer to the confirming item under negative consequences. Under positive consequences, the confirming item would 
be internal causes and permanent causes for locus and stability of causes, respectively. 
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5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Manipulation checks 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the commitment manipulation, the responses of the subjects 
to the three manipulation check questions were analyzed. Comparisons of the means showed 
that as compared to the not-committed group, subjects in the committed group indicated 
higher initial support lor the strategy (Meancommmed = 5 58 and MeanNm commmed = 2 42, t( 131 ) 
= -14 147, ρ < 0 001), felt that they chose the strategy (Meancommmed = 73% and MeanNoi 
Lomnmiui = 4%, t( 131 ) = -11 346, ρ < 0 001 ), and indicated higher agreement with the strategy 
(Meancommmed = 5 67 and MeanNot commmed = 2.30, t ( 131 ) = -15 755, ρ < 0 001 ) 
Decision consequences manipulation was also successful ANOVA performed on the 
manipulation check question on consequences (see table 5 2 for the averages) returned main 
effects for both the decision consequences (F(l, 129) = 60 846, ρ < 0 001) and the 
commitment (F(l, 129) = 34 835, ρ < 0 001) manipulations Subjects in the positive 
consequences condition indicated that they found the results ol the strategy more positive 
than the subjects in the negative consequences condition (means 5 102 vs 3 363) At the 
same time, however, the committed subjects indicated that they perceived the results of the 
strategy more positive than the not-committed subjects (means 4 891 vs 3 574) Being 
committed, people's perception was biased This is a first indication of the effect of initial 
commitment on biasing an objective inlormation item 
Table 5.2: Averages for the perception of performance 
Perceived per ormance of the 
strategy (scale 1 -7) 
Commitment Not-committed Committed 
Decision consequences 
Negative 
2 694 
4 031 
Positive 
4 455 
5 750 
A preliminary analysis showed that at the beginning, subjects in the committed group felt 
more confidence in the strategy and felt more responsibility for the choice and the results of 
the strategy and for the idea behind the strategy After receiving the decision consequences, 
initial commitment as well as the performance of the strategy had effect on the confidence 
and responsibility feelings of the respondents Finally, the reliability of five items to measure 
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the attitudinal commitment was 0 91 (Cronbach's Alpha) The factor analysis run on the same 
items also indicated that all the items loaded on a single factor The factor loadings are given 
in table 5 3 
Table 5.3: Factor analysis results for the commitment measure 
Items in the commitment measure 
I will stick to the discounting strategy 
I do not feel any loyalty to the discounting strategy 
I am committed to the discounting strategy 
I feel obligated to invest in the discounting strategy 
I feel attached to the discounting strategy 
Factor loadings 
0916 
0 849 
0 939 
0717 
0 856 
5.2.2 Analysis for commitment and escalation of commitment 
Analyses were performed for the initial commitment, final commitment, and the difference 
between initial and final commitment levels 
The initial commitment was measured right after the subjects were informed of their role in 
the company, but before receiving the decision consequences They were asked to indicate 
how much of the available funds they would like to invest in the strategy and to answer five 
questions to measure their behavioral and attitudinal commitment levels, respectively Given 
the commitment manipulation, the expectation was a difference in the commitment levels 
between the two experimental groups The results were consistent with the expectations 
For behavioral commitment, the not-committed group indicated an average investment 
of 371,323 whereas the committed group indicated an average investment of 786,718 (t (130) 
= -7 606,/5<0 0()l) 
For attitudinal commitment, the not-committed group indicated an average commitment 
of 2 922 whereas the committed group indicated an average commitment of 5 175 (t ( 131 ) = 
10 985,p<0 001) 
These differences indicate that both at the behavioral and the attitudinal levels, the 
manipulation caused a higher initial commitment for the committed group 
Analysis for escalation of commitment was done in two ways First, as in past research, the 
final commitment level was analyzed Second, for the change in commitment, the final 
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commitment level was analyzed while controlling for the initial commitment and the 
difference between the initial and the final commitment levels was analyzed 
First, to investigate whether escalation took place, analysis on final commitment was 
performed Consistent with the prior work on escalation, significant differences existed 
between the groups (see table 5 3 for the averages) 
ANOVA for behavioral commitment run on the amount of money invested indicated 
significant main effects for the commitment (F(l, 129) = 32 928, ρ < 0 001) and the decision 
consequences (F(l, 129) = 5 547, ρ < 0 05) manipulations Commitment manipulation led to 
a higher investment and at the same time, subjects receiving positive consequences invested 
more than those receiving negative consequences In the first experimental work on 
escalation, Staw (1976) had shown that committed subjects receiving negative consequences 
invested more than committed subjects receiving positive consequences The results, here, 
did not replicate this finding This is in line with prior research that also tailed to replicate it 
(Schwenk, 1988) However, even though in the not-committed group, subjects receiving 
positive and negative consequences differed significantly from one another (p < 0 05), such a 
significant difference did not exist in the committed group (see table 5 4) That is, within the 
committed group, even though subjects receiving negative consequences invested less than 
those receiving positive consequences, this difference was not significant (p = 0 339) What is 
more interesting is that the average investment of the committed subjects receiving negative 
consequences was more than the average investment of the not-committed subjects receiving 
positive consequences This result, though not as strong as Staw's (1976), shows the 
existence of the escalation bias 
ANOVA for attitudinal commitment showed similar results There were significant 
main effects for the commitment (F(l, 129) = 50 069, ρ < 0 001) and the decision 
consequences (F(l, 129) = 8 724, ρ < 0 005) manipulations (table 5 3) The subjects in the 
committed group felt more commitment than the subjects in the not-committed group The 
subjects receiving positive consequences felt more commitment than the subjects receiving 
negative consequences As with money invested, even though not-committed subjects 
receiving negative consequences felt significantly less committed than not-committed 
subjects receiving positive consequences, consequences did not make a significant difference 
for the final felt-commitment levels of the committed subjects 
These results indicate that initial commitment coupled with negative consequences 
leads to escalation of commitment 
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Table 5.4: Averages for the final commitment levels. Standard deviations are given in 
parentheses. 
rumi Luiiiniiiiiitm 
Commitment 
Not-
committed 
Committed 
Behavioral commitment 
(range: 0-1 million) 
Attitudinal commitment 
(range: 1-7 ) 
Decision consequences 
Negative 
255,833' ' 
(54,718) 
643,750' 
(58,037) 
Positive 
450,909 ' 2 
(57,151) 
717,1872 
(58,037) 
Negative 
2.928') ' 
(0.226) 
4.806' 
(0.240) 
Positive 
3.8364" 
(0.236) 
5.287" 
(0.240) 
1
 significarli difference from one another at 5%, t(67) = 2 321 ; " significant difference from one another 
at 0 1%, t(63) = 3.367; significant difference from one another at 0.1%, 1(66) = 4.736, ^ .significant 
difference from one another at 5%, t(67) = 2.546, ' sigmficanl difference from one another at 0 1%, 
1(66) = 5.660; 6 significant difference from one another al 0 1%, 1(63) = 4 354 
Additional analysis was done to see how commitment changed after the receipt of the 
negative decision consequences. First, final commitment was analyzed while controlling for 
the initial commitment. Second, the difference between the two commitment levels was 
analyzed. Both analyses gave the same result regarding escalation. 
ANOVA for the final commitment while controlling for the initial commitment (see table 5.5 
for the averages) for the amount of money invested returned a significant main effect for the 
decision consequences manipulation (F(l, 127) = 12.561, ρ < 0.005), a marginally significant 
main effect for the commitment manipulation (F(l, 127) = 3.008, ρ < 0.1), and a significant 
effect for the initial money invested (F(l, 127) = 46.579, ρ < 0.001). For felt-commitment, 
there was a significant main effect for the decision consequences manipulation (F(l,128) = 
15.980, ρ < 0.001), a marginally significant interaction effect (F(l, 128) = 3.403, ρ < 0.1), 
and a significant effect for initial felt-commitment (F(l, 128) = 53.573, ρ < 0.001). The 
interaction effect means that for positive consequences, the not-committed indicated a higher 
felt-commitment whereas for negative consequences, the committed indicated a higher felt-
commitment. 
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Table 5.5: Averages for the final commitment levels while controlling for the initial 
commitment Standard deviations are given in parentheses 
Final commitment while controlling for 
the initial commitment 
Commitment 
Not-committed 
Committed 
Behavioral commitment 
(range 0-1 million) 
Attitudinal 
commitment 
(range 1 -7 ) 
Decision consequences 
Negative 
357,449' 
(49,461) 
493,040' 
(54,685) 
Positive 
566,380' 
(52,884) 
636,573' 
(51,403) 
Negative 
3 4S22 
(0 205) 
4 1052 
(0 223) 
Positive 
4 644' 
(0 227) 
4 532" 
(0 227) 
Evaluated al covanates appeared in the model initial money invested = S72 727 
Evaluated al covanates appeared in the model initial felt commitment = 4 006 
Further analysis was done on the difference between the initial and final commitment levels 
(see table 5 6 and figure 5 2) The results for behavioral and attitudinal commitment measures 
differed from one another For difference in money invested, ANOVA showed a significant 
main effect only for the decision consequences manipulation (F(l, 128) = 14 794, ρ < 0 001) 
Summed over the commitment conditions, positive consequences led to an increase in money 
invested whereas negative consequences led to a decrease Contrary to the expectations, the 
highest decline was in the committed group that received the negative consequences Overall, 
change in money invested was affected only by the decision consequences and the committed 
subjects did not show escalating behavior 
On the other hand, for difference in felt-commitment, ANOVA showed significant main 
effects for both the commitment (F(l, 129) = 7 929, ρ < 0 01) and the decision consequences 
(F(l, 129) = 16 243, ρ < 0 001) manipulations as well as a significant interaction effect (F(l, 
129) = 4 727, ρ < 0 05) Upon receiving positive consequences, all the subjects increased 
their commitment The not-committed increased more than the committed (p < 0 1) and the 
increase in the committed condition was almost zero Upon receiving negative consequences, 
all the subjects decreased their commitment Contrary to the expectations, the average 
decrease in the committed group was more than the not-committed even though the 
difference was not significant 
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Table 5.6: Average differences in the behavioral and attitudinal commitment levels. Standard 
deviations are given in parentheses. 
Difference between the initial and 
final commitments 
Commitment 
Not-
committed 
Committed 
Behavioral commitment 
(range: 0-1 million) 
Attitudinal commitment 
(range- 1-7 ) 
Decision consequences 
Negative 
-128,889' 
(52,844) 
-207,812 : 
(56,049) 
Positive 
93,125' 
(56,049) 
-4,687J 
(56,049) 
Negative 
-0.1891 
(0.204) 
-0.325 
(0.216) 
Positive 
1.127' 
(0.213) 
O.OÓS-1 
(0.216) 
significant difference from one another at 0.1%, t(67) = 4.663; " significant difference from 
one another at 1%, t(62) = 2.735; ' significant difference from one another at 1%, 1(66) = 
2.730;4 significant difference from one another at 0.1 %, t(63) = 3.585 
Overall, upon receiving negative consequences, even though the committed subjects decrease 
their commitment more than the not-committed subjects, their final commitment is 
significantly higher (both behavioral and attitudinal). In the same way, upon receiving 
positive consequences, even though the committed increase their commitment much less than 
the not-committed subjects, their final commitment level remains higher15. The change in 
commitment levels and the final commitment levels can be seen in figures 5.2a (behavioral) 
and 5.2 b (attitudinal). 
An additional analysis was performed for the difference measures in order to see whether the initial 
commitment level affects the change in commitment. ANOVA for the difference in investmenl while controlling 
for the initial investment returned a significant main effect for the consequences mampulalion (F (1. 127) = 
12.561, ρ < 0.005), a marginally significant effect for the commitment manipulation (F (I. 127) = 3 008, ρ < 
0 I), and a significant effect for initial money invested (F (I, 127) = 33 666, ρ < 0.001). ANOVA for the 
difference in felt-commitment while controlling for the initial commitment returned a significant main effect for 
consequences manipulation (F (I, 128) = 15 980, ρ < 0 001), a marginally significant interaction effeel (F (1, 
128) = 3.403, p<0 1), and a significant effect tor initial felt-commitment (F (1, 128)= 19.607, ρ < 0.01). The 
changes in commitment levels concur with the cxpccied changes from an escalation situation. The committed 
decision-makers decrease their commitment much less than the not-committed upon receiving negative 
consequences 
Change in commitment controlling 
for the initial commitment 
Not-committed 
Commuted 
Behavioral commitment 
Negative 
-215.278' 
(49,461) 
-79.686' 
(54,685) 
Positive 
-6,347' 
(52.884) 
63.846' 
(51.403) 
Attitudinal commitment 
Negative 
-0 524" 
(0.205) 
0 099" 
(0.223) 
Positive 
0.638" 
(0.227) 
0.526" 
(0 227) 
Evaluated at covanale initial investment = 572.727 "Evaluated at covanate initial felt-
commitment = 4.006 
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Figure 5.2b: Change in attitudinal commitment levels. Dotted (solid) line represents the 
committed (not-committed) group. 
Finally, in order to test the conceptual model for this experiment, a path regression analysis 
was performed. Commitment manipulation was regressed on the initial commitment level 
while commitment and decision consequences manipulations, their interaction, and the initial 
commitment level were regressed on the final commitment level. The results are shown in 
figures 5.3a (for behavioral commitment) and 5.3b (for attitudinal commitment). 
For money invested (AdjR2 = 0.298, F(l, 130) = 56.660, ρ < 0.001 and AdjR2 = 0.426, 
F(4, 127) = 25.345, ρ < 0.001), the commitment manipulation had a significant effect on the 
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initial investment level (t = 7.527, ρ < 0.001). The final investment level was determined by 
the initial investment level (t = 6.825, ρ < 0.001) and the decision consequences manipulation 
(t = -3.544, ρ < 0.005). The commitment manipulation had a marginal effect (t = 1.734, ρ < 
0.1). 
For felt-commitment (AdjR2 = 0.475, F(l, 131) = 120.664, ρ < 0.001 and AdjR2 = 
0.507, F(4, 128) = 34.882, ρ < 0.001), the commitment manipulation had a significant main 
effect on the initial felt-commitment level (t = 10.985, ρ < 0.001). The final felt-commitment 
level was determined by the initial felt-commitment level (t = 7.319, ρ < 0.001) and the 
decision consequences manipulation (t = -3.998, ρ < 0.001). The interaction of commitment 
and consequences manipulations had a marginal effect (l = 1.845,/> < 0.1). 
ß = -0.237 
ι = 0 661 ρ = O.SIOV. t = -3 544 ρ < 0.005 
Commitment 
manipulation 
β = 0.551 
1 = 7.527 p < 0 0 0 
Initial 
Money invested 
1 
β = 0.547 
t = 6 825 ρ < 0 00 
Final 
Money invested 
1 
β = 0.138 
l= 1 734/xO.l 
Figure 5.3a: Results for path regression for the conceptual model: behavioral commitment. 
Performance 
feedback 
β = 0.114 
t = 1.845 ρ < 0 1 
i = -0.245 
t = -3.998 ρ<0001 
Comm itment 
manipulation 
β = 0.692 
1= 10.985 ρ <0.0 
Initial Felt-
commitment 
01 
β = 0.625 
t = 7 3 l 9 p 
* 
< 0 0 0 
Final Felt 
commitment 
1 
L 
β = 0 079 
t = 0.924 ρ = 0 357 
Figure 5.3b: Results for path regression for the conceptual model: attitudinal commitment. 
Summary for commitment: In this experiment, initial commitment was manipulated and its 
effect on escalation was studied. Two types of commitment were measured: behavioral and 
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atlitudinal. The final commitment levels were as expected: i. The subjects in the committed 
group invested more and felt more commitment than those in the not-committed group and li. 
the subjects receiving positive decision consequences invested more and felt more 
commitment than those receiving negative consequences. These findings support the 
existence of the escalation bias. Further support came from the committed condition. The 
nature of the consequences did not have any effect on the final commitment level of those in 
the committed condition. Those receiving negative consequences did not invest significantly 
less than those receiving positive consequences. The same results were seen for attitudinal 
commitment as well. 
Looking at the commitments at two different points in time and analyzing the difference, the 
behavior patterns did not match with what would be expected from an escalation prototype. 
Upon receiving positive consequences, the not-committed increased their commitment more 
than the committed whereas upon receiving negative consequences, the committed decreased 
their commitment more than the not-committed. These seem to constitute rational behavior 
patterns. 
5.2.3 Analysis for information preference under escalating commitment 
The hypotheses in chapter 3 stated the expectation regarding the effect of initial commitment 
on information preference. In hypotheses set c·, it was indicated that people initially 
committed to a strategy are expected to selectively search for confirming information. 
In this experiment, after the subjects identified their final commitment level they were asked 
to indicate the information they would prefer to include in a report they would write to the 
board to explain their viewpoint. They were provided with seven information categories. 
Table 5.1 includes all the information categories and specific information items per category. 
Analysis was similar to that of chapter 4. Two dependent variables were created. First, the 
percentage of people choosing for option a16 in each information category was calculated and 
Dependent variable was chosen as the percenlage choosing opuon a rather than percentage choosing the 
confirming information due lo the mampulalion of the decision consequences For some of the information 
categories, confirming information differs depending on the nature of the consequences For instance, for the 
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each category was analyzed separately Second, the total number of confirming information 
items chosen by each subject was calculated Three analyses were performed 
1) Within each experimental group, the percentage of people choosing option a was 
compared to the percentage of people choosing option b The purpose was to see whether 
in any of the groups there was a preference for confirming inlormation 
2) ANOVA was performed tor each information item to check for the effect ol the 
experimental manipulations 
3) The correlations between the final commitment levels and the choice for confirming 
information was calculated in order to see whether commitment level was associated with 
choosing confirming information 
Below, the results will be given per information category Table 5 7 includes results on the 
percentage of people per experimental group choosing for option a or b and the significance 
level that indicates whether significantly more people chose for either of the options 
For the item predicted future performance, looking at the percentages of people choosing for 
the success information showed that significantly more subjects in the committed group 
preferred the success information No pattern was seen for the subjects in the not-committed 
condition ANOVA run on the percentage of subjects choosing for an estimate of future 
success gave a significant main effect for the commitment manipulation (F(l, 129) = 19 351, 
ρ < 0 001) 75% of the committed subjects preferred to report future success as opposed to 
39% of the not-committed subjects This gives support to hypothesis 1c that initial 
commitment leads to preference for information that indicates that the strategy will be 
successful in the future Correlation analysis also gave support for the hypothesis Final 
commitment levels and percentage choosing for success information were highly correlated 
indicating that the higher the commitment to the strategy was the higher was the will to use 
information that confirms the strategy (behavior commitment Pearson = 0 464, ρ < 0 001 and 
attitudinal commitment Pearson = 0 442, ρ < 0 001) Given these results, there is support for 
hypothesis 1c 
For the item locus of causality, none of the analyses gave significant results Even 
though the percentage of subjects pretemng internal causes was slightly more than those 
preferring external causes, these diflerences were not significant ANOVA did not return any 
category locus of causality positive consequences would lead to internal causes to be seen as confirming 
information whereas negative consequences would make the external causes confirming intormation 
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significant effects for either of the manipulations The final commitment levels and the 
percentage choosing for external causes were not correlated. Given the results, hypothesis 2c 
is rejected 
For the Hem stabilii of the causes of failure, the majonty of the subjects in the 
'committed - positive feedback' and the 'not-committed - negative feedback' groups 
preferred to hear that the causes were permanent No pattern was detected in the other two 
groups ANOVA on percentage of people choosing for the permanent causes gave consistent 
results a significant interaction effect (F(l, 129) = 12 487, ρ < 0 005) Correlation analysis 
showed that there was a negative correlation between the final behavioral commitment level 
and preference for the information on permanent causes (Pearson = -0 183, ρ < 0 05) This 
means that the more money people invested the less they wanted to hear that the causes were 
permanent Given these results, hypothesis 3c is rejected 
For the information category alternative strategies, the majority of the subjects in the 
committed groups (68%) wanted to report that the alternative strategies were worse than the 
current strategy whereas majority of subjects in the not-committed groups (82%) prefer to 
report that the alternative strategies are belter than the current strategy ANOVA perlormed 
on percentage of people who wanted to report that the current strategy is better than the 
alternative strategies returned a significant main effect for the commitment manipulation 
(F(l, 129) = 47,718, ρ < 0 001) Correlation analysis also returned highly significant 
correlations between final commitment levels and percentage preferring to report that the 
current strategy is belter (behavioral commitment Pearson = 0 430, ρ < 0 001 and attiludinal 
commitment Pearson = 0 591, ρ < 0 001) The higher the commitment was, the higher was 
the percentage of people choosing for information confirming the goodness of the 
implemented strategy Given these results, there is support for hypothesis 4c 
For the information category anecdotal information, the majority of the subjects in the 
committed group wanted to report success stories whereas the majority in not-committed 
groups preferred failure stories ANOVA run on the percentage of people who chose for 
success stories returned a significant main effect for the commitment manipulation (F(l, 129) 
= 27 774, ρ < 0 001) Correlation analysis also returned highly significant correlations 
between the final commitment levels and the percentage choosing for confirming information 
(behavioral commitment Pearson = 0 355,/? < 0 001 and attiludinal commitment Pearson -
0 450, ρ < 0 001) Given these results, there is support for hypothesis 5c 
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Table 5.7: Information preferences per expenmental group Confirming information (for the committed-negative consequences group) is given 
m bold 
η 
M 
η 
33 
36 
C 
«J 
i l 
ο 
υ Committed 
Committed 
Not-
committed 
Not-
committed 
υ 
e 
cd 
1 
CL, 
Positive 
Negative 
Positive 
Negative 
Predicted future 
performance 
Success 
0.75" 
0.75" 
0 39 
0 39 
Failure 
0 25 
0 25 
0 6 1 
0 6 1 
Initially 
committed 
people preferred 
success 
information 
whereas the 
initially not-
committed 
preferred failure 
information 
Decision 
consequences did 
not make a 
difference 
Locus of causality 
Internal 
0 63 
0 53 
0 52 
0 53 
External 
0 37 
0 47 
0 48 
0 47 
No general pattern 
was observed 
Stability of causes 
Permanent 
0.75" 
0 4 4 
0 52 
0.78*" 
Temporary 
0 25 
0 56 
0 48 
0 22 
Subjects in the 
'committed - positive 
feedback' and 'not-
committed - negative 
feedback' groups 
preferred permanent 
causes The rest was 
indifferent 
Alternative 
strategies are 
Worse 
0.72* 
0.66* 
0 2 1 
0 14 
Better 
0 28 
0 34 
0.79"* 
0.86"* 
Initially 
committed 
people 
preferred to 
hear that the 
alternatives 
were worse 
than the 
discounting 
strategy 
whereas the 
initially not-
committed 
preferred to 
hear that the 
alternatives 
were better 
Anecdotal 
information 
Success 
0 63 
0 . 8 4 -
0 30 
0 33 
Failure 
0 37 
0 16 
0.70" 
0 67* 
Initially 
committed 
groups wanted to 
hear success 
stories and the 
not-committed 
groups wanted to 
heal failure 
stones 
P<0I0, p<0 05, p<0 005, ρ < 0001 
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Table 5.7 (continued): Information preferences per experimental group. 
η 
32 
32 
33 
36 
C 
•a ë 
l ' I 
ο 
υ 
Committed 
Committed 
Not-
committed 
Not-
committed 
ο 
c 
1 
Positive 
Negative 
Positive 
Negative 
Perceived correctness of the reported performance 
The reported performance 
is 
Worse 
than 
the 
actual 
0.26 
0.34 
0.12 
0.08 
Better 
than 
the 
actual 
0.06 
0.06 
0.36 
0.42 
Accurate 
0.68 
0.59 
0.52 
0.50 
All groups prefer mostly 
accurate. However, the 
second preferred is for the 
committed people better 
than the report and for the 
noncommitted people 
worse than the report. 
Criteria used forjudging the 
performance is 
Correct 
0.78 
0.69 
0.58 
0.61 
Incorrect: 
actual 
performance 
is better 
0.19 
0.16 
0.39 
0.25 
Incorrect: 
actual 
performance 
is worse 
0.03 
0.16 
0.03 
0.14 
They all want to hear that the criteria 
are correct. 
Costs associated with 
implementing the strategy 
Proportion 
sunk/future costs 
70-80% 
is 
already 
invested 
0.50 
0.38 
0.67* 
0.67* 
30-40% 
is 
already 
invested 
0.50 
0.62 
0.33 
0.33 
Sunk costs vs. 
future costs 
Sunk 
0.22" 
0.09'" 
0.2 Ι ­
Ο. 14*" 
Future 
0.78 
0.91 
0.79 
0.86 
In each group, 
majority 
prefers 
information on 
future costs. 
τ
ρ<0.10, ρ < 0.05, ρ < 0.005, ρ < 0.001 
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For the information category correctness of the reported performance, two separate 
questions were asked For the first question, the subjects could choose amongst three options 
information indicating that the actual performance a) was correctly reflected in the reported 
performance, b) was better than the reported performance, c) was worse than the reported 
performance The majority of the subjects in all the experimental groups preferred to report 
that the reported performance was a correct reflection of the actual performance (Mcommmed = 
63% and MeanNo,
 Lommiiied = 51%, ρ = 0.141) The second preferred option differed between 
the groups For the committed group, it was 'the actual performance is better than reported' 
(Mcommmed = 30% and MeantMoi (.ommmui = '0%, ρ < 0 005) and for the not-committed group, it 
was 'the actual performance is worse than reported' (Mcommiuai = 0 06% and MeanN()| (.„mm,»«! 
= 39%, ρ < 0 001 ) As a second question, the subjects were asked to judge the correctness of 
the criteria used to evaluate the pertormance They could choose amongst three options the 
criteria were a) correct b) incorrect such that the reported pertormance was better than the 
actual, c) incorrect such that the reported performance was worse than the actual The 
majority of the subjects in all the experimental groups preferred to report that the criteria used 
were correct (Mcommmed = 73% and MeanNoi commmed = 59%, ρ < 0 1) The second preferred 
option was "incorrect criteria the actual perlormance was better than reported" lor both 
groups (Mcoinimucd = 17% and MeanNoi loninmiui = 32%, ρ < 0 05) The option "incorrect 
criteria the actual performance was worse than reported" was the least preferred at 9% m 
both groups Given these results, there is marginal support for hypothesis 6c Subjects seemed 
to doubt the correctness of the performance feedback rather than the evaluation criteria 
Finally, for the intormation category COWJ associated mth implementing the strategy, 
two questions were asked The first one was on the relative amount of sunk costs in 
proportion to the total costs necessary for achieving success The subjects could choose 
between reporting either that the 70-to-80% or 30-to-40% of the costs required for a 
successful implementation was already invested So whereas one option indicated that sunk 
costs were larger than the future costs and that the successful project completion was near (in 
monetary terms), the other indicated that the future costs were larger than the sunk costs and 
that still a lot had to be invested to reach success ANOVA performed on the percentage of 
people choosing the first option (sunk cost > future costs) gave a significant main effect for 
the commitment manipulation (F(l, 129) = 7 289, ρ < 0 01) Even though this significance 
was expected, it was in the opposite direction to what was hypothesized The not-committed 
subjects, rather than the committed, showed a higher preference lor the '70-to-80% of the 
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cost invested' alternative (MN0I commiiied= 67% and Mcommiued = 44%) A closer look at the lour 
experimental groups indicated that regardless of the decision consequences, the majority in 
the not-committed group (67%) chose for the low future cost information. In the committed 
group, however, no preference was observed Corrélation analysis returned a significant 
negative correlation between final attitudinal commitment level and percentage choosing for 
high sunk cost information (Pearson - -0 177, ρ < 0 05) This means that /evs ot the more 
committed subjects preferred to report that the required future costs were low For the second 
question in this category, the subjects could choose to report the amount of sunk costs or 
future costs ANOVA returned no significant results and there were no correlations between 
the final commitment levels and the preference in this category Looking at the individual 
experimental groups showed that all the subjects preferred to report future costs Given all 
these results, hypothesis 7c is rejected 
The analysis tor the total number of confirming items requested was done separately for 
the positive and negative decision consequences groups Both in the positive and negative 
consequences conditions, the commitment manipulation had a significant effect on the 
amount confirming items requested (out of a total ol nine items positive consequences 
condition. Meancommmed = 6 58 and MeanN o l LOmn„ULÜ = 4 39, t(62) = -3 828, ρ < 0 001, 
negative consequences condition Meancommmed = 4 69 and MeanNm Lommmui = 2 58, t(66) = -
4 623, ρ < 0 001) Calculating confirmation bias as the difference between the number of 
chosen confirming and disconfirming pieces of information (Fischer et a l , 2005) indicates 
the existence of confirmation bias in the positive consequences condition (Meancoinmiiii.d = 
4 1613 and MeanNm commm«! = -0 2121, t(62) = -3 828, ρ < 0 001) and disconfirmation bias in 
the negative consequences condition (Meancommnied = 0 3750 and MeanN o l c o m m i, l c i | - -3 8333, 
t(66) = -4 623, ρ < 0 001) Overall, given the fact that committed subjects showed more 
confirmation (or less disconfirmation) tendencies, there is support tor hypothesis 8c 
Finally, through path regression, the total conceptual model was tested In figures 5 4a 
(behavioral) and 5 4b (attitudinal), only the significant effects are shown The effects 
significant at 5% (10%) are shown in thick (thin) lines. 
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-0.282 
Dec n ion 
consequences 
Stability of 
r-Miisps 
Initial 
( oinimtment 
β = 0.551 
Initial 
behavioral 
commitment β = 0.547 
Final 
behavioral 
commitment 
= 0.242 
β = 0.138 
Anecdotal 
information 
β = 0.310 
A — 
Predicted 
future 
= 0.187 
Alternative 
strategies 
β = 0.41 
* 
Figure 5.4a: Results for path regression for the conceptual model: behavioral commitment. 
β = -0.296 
I = 0.205 
Initial 
commitment 
β = 0.692 
Stability ol 
causes 
Anecdotal 
information 
g = 0.224 
Initial 
attitudinal 
commitment = 0.625 
I = 0.224 
Predicted 
future 
^ 169 
Alternative 
strategics 
β = 0.287 
Figure 5.4b: Results for path regression for the conceptual model: attitudinal commitment. 
Summary for information preference: Initially committed subjects preferred to report more 
confirming information than the not-committed subjects. The selective exposure tendencies 
mainly occurred in items related to the future performance. As compared to the not-
committed group, subjects in the committed group preferred information that indicated high 
probability for future success (hypothesis 1c), information on the similar companies to whom 
the same strategy brought success (hypothesis 5c), information that indicates that their 
strategy is better than the alternative strategies (hypothesis 4c), and that the actual 
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performance is better than the reported (as a second preferred alternative, hypothesis 6c) 
Regarding the causes of failure (locus and stability) and the costs of implementation (sunk 
versus future costs), there was no bias in the type of information subjects prefer to hear and 
use in their own report 
5.3 Conclusions and discussion 
In this chapter, one experiment was reported Based on this experiment, hypotheses regarding 
the effect of initial commitment on selective exposure to information were tested The results 
from this experiment can be summarized in two different domains ι commitment and 
escalation and n information preference Each of these will be looked at in tum 
Commitment and escalation: The results support the findings from the previous two 
expenments and previous escalation research After negative decision consequences, people 
who are initially committed to a strategy feel more committed and invest more money than 
people who are not initially committed In this experiment, escalation was also studied by 
analyzing the change in commitment, ι e difference between the initial and final commitment 
levels This was done for both behavioral and attitudmal commitments There are a couple of 
interesting findings from this analysis 
First, the change in the commitment levels was contrary to what was expected Given that the 
word escalation carries in itself a connotation of increase, the expectation was an increase or 
at least a smaller decrease in the commitment levels of the committed individuals in 
comparison to the not-committed The results from this study showed that the largest 
decrease in both behavioral and attitudmal commitment was in the committed group 
receiving negative consequences Another counter-intuitive result was that after receiving 
positive consequences the committed subjects practically did not change their commitment at 
all 
Second, the final commitment levels were consistent with the existence of the escalation bias 
Upon receiving negative consequences, even though the committed subjects decreased their 
commitment more, their final commitment level was still significantly higher than that of the 
not-committed subjects In the same way, upon receiving positive consequences, even though 
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the committed increased their commitment much less than the not-committed subjects, their 
final commitment level remained higher than that of the not-committed One possible cause 
lor this result is the limits set by the questionnaire The subjects in the committed group 
indicated high initial commitment As a result, when they received positive consequences and 
wanted to increase their commitment they did not have much degrees of freedom as 
compared to the subjects in the not-committed condition In the same way, when they 
received the negative consequences, as compared to the not-committed condition, subjects in 
the committed condition had much more room to move down the scale and decrease their 
commitment 
Even though this could explain the results regarding the difference scores, it does not explain 
why the final commitment levels concur with the general escalation findings Upon receiving 
negative consequences, the committed subjects did not use the full degrees of freedom 
available to decrease their commitment and remained at a relatively high commitment level 
Similarly, the not-committed subjects, upon receiving positive consequences, did not use the 
full degrees ol treedom to the higher end of the scale and remained at a relatively low 
commitment level This means that committed subjects remain conservative in decreasing 
their commitment upon receiving negative consequences whereas the not-committed subjects 
remain conservative in increasing their commitment upon receiving positive consequences 
This, in itself, indicates an irrational pattern of behavior Such behavior can be seen as being 
consistent with the well-known anchonng and adjustment heuristic People make estimates or 
form judgments by starting from a known initial value, called an anchor, and to determine the 
final value, they make adjustments to the anchor Often the adjustments are insufficient and 
the final estimates are biased towards the initial value (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971, 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, Beach and Connolly, 2005). Anchoring and adjustment is a 
robust phenomenon that has been observed in many domains (Whyte and Sebemus, 1997) 
Also in the current case, the respondents seem to take their initial commitment or investment 
level as an anchor and adjust it The adjustments are in the correct direction but are not 
sufficient Hence, initially-committed people end up with high final commitment even after 
negative consequences whereas initially not-committed people end up with low final 
commitment even in the face of positive consequences17 
One could question whether the reason tor the observed situation is due to the regression to the mean (RTM) 
effect If RTM effect were to be taken into account and the movement up (for not-committed) and down 
(committed) the scale towards the mean due to RTM were to be eliminated then the decrease in the committed 
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The results from the analysis of the difference scores while controlling for the initial 
commitment level gives support for this reasoning The change in commitment is mainly 
determined by the level of the initial commitment and the decision consequences If the initial 
commitment is controlled for, the change in commitment levels follow the pattern expected 
from an escalation situation 
Third, it is interesting to realize that, statistically, difference in money invested and difference 
in felt-commitment have different determinants Whereas the commitment manipulation docs 
not have any effect on the change in behavioral commitment, it has a significant effect on the 
change in attitudinal commitment However, qualitatively, there is no major difference 
between the two measures Upon receiving negative consequences, both not-committed and 
committed subjects decrease money invested and felt-commitment and committed subjects 
decrease both commitment levels more than the not-committed Upon receiving positive 
consequences, on the other hand, the not-committed subjects increase both commitment 
levels Committed subjects, on the other hand, have very minor changes in both commitment 
levels that practically, there is no change in their commitment (money invested -4687 in a 
scale of 0 to 1 million and felt-commitment 0 068 in a scale of 1 to 7) 
Overall, these results give support for the escalation claims Moreover, the result that an 
antecedent of dissonance arousal, namely initial commitment, leads to escalation gives 
further support for self-justification explanation of escalation 
Selective exposure to information: The expectation that initial commitment, as an antecedent 
of dissonance arousal, would lead to selective exposure to inlormation under escalation 
conditions was met The total number of confirming items requested was higher in the 
committed condition than in the non-committed and it was higher in the positive 
consequences condition than in the negative In terms of the number of confirming items 
requested, the amount was higher than in expenment two of chapter 4 On the average, the 
initially-committed subjects requested confirming information from 52% of all the items 
(4 69 out of 9 items) whereas the not-committed requested confirming information only from 
29% of the items (2 58 out of 9 items) (In experiment two, these percentages were 37% (2 2 
group and the increase in ihe not committed group would have been even smaller As a result the adjustments 
would have been even smaller and the gap belween the committed and not committed would have been larger 
giving indication for Ihe escalation bias as well as (more) insufficient adjustments to the initial commitment 
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out of 6 items) for the choice groups and 29% (1 67 out of 6 items) for the no-choice groups) 
These results gave support to the hypothesis that people who are initial committed to a 
strategy prefer to use more confirming information than people who are not initially 
committed 
Consistent with expenment two, preference for confirming information mainly occurred in 
items related to the future performance As compared to the not-committed subjects, the 
committed subjects preferred information that indicated high probability for future success, 
that their strategy is better than the alternatives, that the same strategy brought success to 
similar companies, and that the actual performance is better than the reported (as a second 
preferred alternative) Regarding diagnostic information (i e information on the causes of 
failure) and the costs of implementation (absolute or proportional sunk-future costs), there 
was no bias in the type of information subjects prefer to hear and use in their own report It is 
possible that since diagnostic information is useful for future decisions, such dissonant 
information is not rejected (Festinger, 1964) 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the results ol an experiment testing the effects of initial commitment and 
decision consequences on escalation and selective exposure to information were discussed 
Initial commitment was shown to lead to escalation in commitment as well as selective 
exposure to information Different information categones were discussed and amongst these, 
the selective exposure tendencies were seen in categories related to the performance of the 
strategy For diagnostic and cost-related information, no such tendency was observed 
In chapters 4 and 5, the existence of selective exposure under escalation conditions was 
shown In the next chapter, the focus will be on a tool that can help diminish these tendencies 
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Chapter 6 
System dynamics as a de-escalation tool 
As explained in chapter two, the main focus of past research on escalation ol commitment has 
been on identifying the determinants of escalation by means of experimental research (see 
Staw and Ross, 1987) and showing the real life existence of escalation through cases study 
research (e g , Staw and Ross, 1986, Ross and Staw, 1993, Keil, 1995a, Drummond, 1996, 
Newman and Sabherwal, 1996) Even though the different causes of escalation ol 
commitment are well understood, strategies for how people can avoid escalation did not 
receive much attention Yet, understanding how de-escalation can be achieved could be very 
useful in identifying policy recommendations (Simonson and Staw, 1992) Lately, 
researchers tried to understand de-escalation by examining cases in which de-escalation took 
place (E g , Keil, 1995b, Montealegre and Keil, 2000, Pan, 2005, Pan et al, 2006) However, 
prior research has not identified many effective or feasible solutions to the escalation problem 
The focus of this research has so tar been on the link between the escalation bias and 
selective exposure to inlormation Based on experiments, it was shown that people who 
escalate in their commitment to a strategy have the tendency to use conlirming inlormation to 
support their re-allocation decision The confirmatory information search was mainly in the 
domains related to the (future) performance ol the strategy but not in the use of diagnostic 
information such as the causes of failure Having pinpointed the problem in the previous 
chapters, this chapter will tum the attention to how escalation and selective exposure 
tendencies can be mitigated More specifically, the focus will be on System Dynamics (SD) 
modeling as a possible de-biasing method The hypothesis is that using an SD model 
representing the feedback structure of the problem situation will lead to de-escalation and less 
confirmation tendencies 
This chapter is arranged as follows First, the past research findings on de-escalation will be 
summarized Second, hypotheses on the role of SD in reducing escalation of commitment and 
selective exposure tendencies will be presented Third, the experimental design and the 
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results will be descnbed Finally, in the conclusions, the implications of the results will be 
discussed 
6.1 Past research on De-escalation of commitment 
De-escalation ol commitment occurs when there is "reduced commitment to a lailing course 
of action" (Monlcalegre and Keil, 2000) Based on previous research, Montealegrc and Keil 
(2000 420) listed "various triggering activities and conditions that can promote de-
escalation" In this dissertation, these factors will be grouped under headings i) situational 
factors, n) objective information on the project and its progress, and in) specific techniques or 
procedures Table 6 1 gives a summary of these three groups of factors 
Situational factors are those that are related to the conditions within which escalation is 
occurring For instance, it has been shown that change in top management support or project 
leader (Keil 1995b, Ross and Staw 1993), external pressures on the organization (Keil 1995b, 
Ross and Staw 1993), stakeholder interest, and increased organizational tolerance for failure 
lead to de-escalation 
Research findings also showed that highlighting certain values of project information to de-
escalation For instance, providing decision-makers with alternative strategies (McCain, 
1986, Northcraft and Neale, 1986), highlighting endogenous causes of failure (Staw and 
Ross, 1978), giving repeated, more frequent failure feedback (Staw and Fox, 1977, McCain, 
1986, Garland et al, 1990, Keil and Robey, 1999), providing unambiguous negative feedback 
(Garland et al, 1990), setting explicit goals at the beginning of the project (Kernan and Lord, 
1989), making the project costs visible (Brockner et al, 1979), and providing information on 
high efficacy of resources (Staw and Fox, 1977, Bateman, 1986) decrease investments This 
effect of information could be due to the concreteness of the given information For instance, 
decision-makers might not be able to ignore this information anymore and as a result, 
behavior change might become a more likely means of dissonance reduction 
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Table 6.1: Factors stimulating de-escalation. 
Groups of factors 
stimulating de-
escalation 
Situational factors 
Objective 
information on the 
project and its 
progress 
Specific techniques 
or procedures 
Factors 
Change in top management support or 
project leader 
External pressures on the organization 
Stakeholder interest 
Increased organizational tolerance for 
failure lead to de-escalation 
Availability of alternative strategies; 
opportunity costs 
Repeated, more frequent negative 
performance feedback 
Unambiguous negative feedback 
Setting explicit goals at the beginning of 
the project 
Visibility of project costs 
Information on high efficacy of resources 
Thorough 
decision-making 
Minimum goal setting 
Threat reduction 
Self-diagnosticity 
Accountability for decision process 
Accountability for decision outcome 
Highlighting environmental uncertainty & 
possible negative outcomes prior to the 
initial investment decision 
Pre-commilment to a predetermined 
slopping rule 
Sequential decision de-coupling 
Devil's advocacy 
Setting clear criteria for success and 
failure 
Papers 
Keil, 1995b; Ross and Staw. 
1993 
Keil, 1995b; Ross and Staw 
1993 
Staw and Ross, 1978; Boulding 
Morgan, and Staelin, 1997 
Staw and Fox, 1977; McCain, 
1986; Garland, Sandefur, and 
Rogers, 1990; Keil and Robey, 
1999 
Garland et al., 1990 
Kernan and Lord. 1989 
Brockner, Shaw, and Rubin, 
1979 
Staw and Fox. 1977: Baleman, 
1986 
Simonson and Staw, 1992 
Simonson and Staw, 1992; 
Boulding el al., 1997; Keil and 
Robey, 1999 
Simonson and Staw, 1992; Keil 
and Robey, 1999 (conflicting 
findings) 
Simonson and Staw, 1992 
Simonson and Staw, 1992 
Simonson and Staw, 1992; Keil 
and Robey, 1999 (conflicting 
findings) 
Boulding et al., 1997 
Boulding et al., 1997 
Boulding et al., 1997; Keil and 
Robey, 1999 
Schwenk, 1988 
Keil and Robey, 1999 
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Even though these findings are interesting, there are problems with using them as general 
policies For instance, it might be difficult to generalize the situational factors to apply to a 
wide range of situations It may not always be possible to fire the project leader or generate 
external pressures on the organization The research on providing decision-makers with 
objective information on the project and its progress is more informative because it generates 
insight into how different values ol information affect escalation decision But providing 
decision-makers with a list of objective information is not enough As Boulding et al (1997 
166) stated "unfortunately, simply providing information may not be sufficient to overcome 
forces that bias managers in favor of a losing course of action Instead, like other people, 
managers may ignore or distort this information" Individuals are not good information 
processors and resort to vanous biases and heuristics to simplify their environment It is 
interesting that while studying the effects of information on escalation, a single "objective" 
information item was presented to the subjects rather then letting the subjects make an effort 
to collect, and hence choose, information For example, in the experiment on internal vs 
external causes of failure (Staw and Ross, 1978), the subjects were presented with either 
internal causes or external causes, but not both at the same time In reality, however, 
decision-makers would be confronted with both types of information simultaneously and 
would have to choose which one to pay attention to Given confirmation tendencies, the 
decision-makers can disregard or bias the disconfirming information Chapters 4 and 5 of this 
dissertation as well as some cases on escalation (e g Staw and Ross, 1986) give evidence to 
such avoidance of disconfirming information 
De-escalation techniques should go further than just giving the decision-makers the 
readily available information The techniques should aim at making the decision-makers 
actively and purposefully identify the information items that can generate de-escalation Only 
that way the negative consequences of biases can be reduced 
The third group of de-escalation research focuses on developing de-escalation techniques but 
such research has been scarce And unfortunately, many of the identified techniques do not 
focus on eliminating the underlying causes of escalation 
Simonson and Staw (1992) were the first ones to develop and compare different procedures 
for de-escalation They proposed 6 different techniques (thorough decision-making, 
minimum goal setting, threat reduction, self-diagnosticity, accountability for decision 
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process, and accountability for decision outcome, see table 6 2 for further explanation) These 
techniques were thought to either reduce self-justification motives and/or stimulate more 
accurate decision-making Through expérimental research, Simonson and Staw (1992) 
showed that minimum goal setting, threat reduction, and accountability for the decision 
process reduced the amount of investment after negative consequences The escalation-
stimulating effect of 'accountability for decision outcomes' coupled with the de-escalation 
effect of 'threat reduction' gives support to self-justification motives as a cause of escalation 
These effects indicate that reducing justification motives leads to de-escalation This is also 
evident in the fact that when individuals are held responsible for how they make decisions 
rather than the achieved consequences de-escalation is achieved A cunous finding is that 
thorough decision-making (identifying pros and cons) does not seem to reduce escalation 
tendencies Simonson and Staw indicated that individuals might need to be pointed to the 
right elements of a decision rather than being given general instructions However, one could 
argue that identifying pros and cons is not a method o( thorough decision-making Moreover, 
the technique itself can foster justification motives since decision-makers can identity pros or 
cons that can help them in justifying their decision 
Following Simonson and Staw (1992), Boulding et al (1997) devised and tested decision-
making procedures that might reduce escalating commitment tendencies to lading new 
products They proposed five procedures (highlighting environmental uncertainly and 
possible negative outcomes prior to the initial investment decision, highlighting the 
opportunity costs of continued investment18, pre-commitment to a predetermined stopping 
rule, pre-commitment to a self-specified stopping rule, sequential decision decoupling, see 
table 6 2 for further explanation) Based on the results ol experimental work, Boulding et al 
(1997) came up with three main conclusions First, giving decision-makers improved 
information does not reduce escalation since managers distort information to justify 
commitment Second, procedures such as decision decoupling and predetermined stopping 
rule that decrease reliance on information are most effective in generating de-escalation And 
finally, if managers believe that they can control the uncertainties then tendency to escalate 
persists 
Highlighting the opportunity costs is not really a technique but rather providing an objective piece of 
informalion to the decision maker Hence it ihould be classified under the second group of de escalation 
studies 
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Table 6.2: De-escalation techniques tested by Simonson and Staw (1992) and Boulding et al. 
(1997). 
Technique 
Thorough 
Decision-making 
Minimum goal setting 
Threat reduction 
Self-diagnoslicily 
Accountability 
for decision process 
Accountability 
for decision outcome 
Technique 
Highlighting 
environmental 
uncertainty & possible 
negative outcomes 
prior to the initial 
investment decision 
Pre-commilmcnt to a 
predetermined 
stopping rule 
Pre-commitment to a 
self-specified stopping 
rule 
Sequential decision 
de-coupling 
Explanation (Simonson and Staw, 1992: 421) 
"Instructing decision-makers to prepare a detailed 
outline of the advantages and disadvantages of each 
action alternative pnor to reaching a decision" 
"Instructing decision-makers to outline minimum 
target levels which if not achieved will lead to a 
change in policy" 
"Reducing concerns about self- and external 
lustification" 
"Informing decision-makers that their decisions are 
reliable indicators of their abilities" 
"Informing decision-makers that their decisions will 
be evaluated on the basis of the effectiveness of their 
decision process" 
"Informing individuals that they will be evaluated on 
the effectiveness of their initial investment decisions" 
Explanation (Boulding et al., 1997) 
Subjects were given "distributional information about 
the key uncertainties" and "simulation results of risk 
analysis", (pi70) 
Managers are offered "the use of a stopping rule 
devised by an expert analyst and then ask them to 
commit to this rule at the time of the product launch" 
(Pl66) 
Subjects were asked to specify an own stopping rule 
and precommit to it. (pl71) 
Subjects were "asked to assume that a go decision 
was made by another employee of the company. They 
were then asked to serve as an independent evaluator 
of the stop/no stop decision" (pi71). 
Purpose 
Stimulating more 
accurate decision-
making 
Reducing self-
justification motives 
Mixed· Have 
potential for 
stimulating more 
accurate decision-
making but they can 
heighten self-
justificalion 
motives. 
Purpose 
Decreasing self-
juslificaiion worries 
and decreasing the 
possibility of being 
blamed for failure 
Restricting the 
manager's tendency 
to use nonnormalive 
decision rules when 
making the stop/no 
stop decision 
Takes away 
justification worries 
Based on a field survey of information system auditors, Keil and Robey (1999) also indicated 
that publicly stated limits and minimum goal setting are associated with de-escalation. 
However, interestingly, their survey identified that de-escalation called for significantly less 
tolerance for failure and more outcome-oriented evaluations which are in conflict with 
Simonson and Staw's (1992) conclusion regarding threat reduction and accountability for 
decision process, respectively. This conflict could be due to the fact that in the Keil and 
Robey's (1999) work, it is not clear whether the identified factors are a cause or a 
consequence of dc-cscalation. Keil and Robey also found that separation of responsibility for 
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initiating and evaluating projects and identifying clear catena for success and failure are 
associated with de-escalation 
Another study on de-escalation took a different approach Based on case research, 
Montealegre and Keil (2000) developed a process model of de-escalation compnsed ol four 
phases ι Problem recognition, n re-examination of pnor course of action, m search lor 
alternative course of action, and iv implementing an exit strategy For phase one to occur, 
there needs to be "a clear understanding of what is wrong with the present course of action" 
(Montealegre and Keil, 2000 432) Decision-makers need to accept the negative feedback 
Case evidence shows that decision-makers either ignore or downplay the negative feedback 
for significant penods (e g DAI case by Montealegre and Keil, 2000, IT project CONFIG by 
Keil, 1995a; Expo86 by Ross and Staw, 1986) Once the problem is recognized, the current 
course of action and the causes of failure should be understood and a new course of action 
should be determined and implemented Even though identification of these phases gives 
more structure to the de-escalation process, we need to realize that there can be various 
problems with activities in each ol in these stages For instance. Schwenk (1984) identified 
various biases and heuristics that can take place in different stages ol a strategic decision­
making process These stages (goal and problem formulation, alternatives generation, 
evaluation and selection) identified by Schwenk (1984) arc very similar to those identified by 
Montealegre and Keil (2000) Tools that can help decision-makers to go through these stages 
in a more structured, objective way could stimulate the effectiveness ol the process 
The de-escalation research involving specific techniques and procedures shows that taking 
away justification womes and identifying a stopping condition beforehand seem to lead to 
de-escalation Given that justification motive is one of the main causes of commitment, 
identifying techniques taking away such womes is a just strategy However, identifying a 
stopping condition beforehand may hinder any diagnostic approach that the decision-maker 
can take during the process Boulding et al 's (1997) conclusions also point out that giving 
improved information, on its own, does not solve the problem If the decision-makers do not 
identify the information to pay attention to and its content themselves, they are likely to lall 
prey for vanous information processing biases. For instance, the results from the previous 
chapter of this dissertation indicate that decision-makers are likely to selectively pay attention 
to confirming information when committed to a strategy 
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Overall, the de-escalation techniques developed should gel the decision-makers to actively 
think about the problem and its causes and get them involved in the alternative generation 
and the decision-making process, as all decision support tools should For instance, the 
techniques should go further than just presenting decision-makers with lists of information or 
stopping conditions They should stimulate the decision-makers to identify these information 
items or stopping rules themselves This could make ignoring disconfirming information 
more difficult A technique that enables the decision-makers to go through all the phases of a 
de-escalation process as pointed out by Montealegre and Keil (2000) would be a very uselul 
tool lor decreasing both escalation and selective exposure tendencies Such a technique 
should get the decision-makers to actively think about the problem and its causes and help 
identify ι what type ol indicators to pay attention to, n why a certain strategy is failing, m 
the consequences of re-investment, iv alternative courses of action, and iv the consequences 
of alternatives if implemented Going through thorough stages ol problem analysis and 
solution generation would make the pitfalls ol the current action and the advantages of the 
potential alternatives more vivid and hence, make justification based on flawed or biased 
analysis less possible In the next section. System Dynamics modeling will be proposed as 
such a technique 
6.2 System dynamics method 
Before explaining how System Dynamics (SD) can be used as a de-escalation tool, a short 
overview of the SD approach will be given The purpose of this explanation19 is neither to 
give a complete overview of the methodology nor to explain the details of how SD models 
can be built and analyzed It is rather to familiarize the reader with the underlying 
assumptions of the methodology Those who are interested in knowing more are referred to 
Forrester (1961, 1968), Richardson and Pugh (1981), and Sterman (2000) 
6.2.1 History of system dynamics 
System dynamics was developed during the 1950s by Forrester at MIT (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology in Boston) as a response to the problems with the problem-solving 
Past ot this explanalion has been adapted from Pala Vnens and Vennix (2004) 
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methods used in practive Forrester (1975) found methods of operations 
research/management science (OR/MS) limited in their ability to tackle managerial issues 
because they ignored non-linear phenomena, dealt with simple situations, concentrated on 
isolated business functions instead of on the relationships between these functions, and most 
importantly, focused on the 'open-loop' approach, where decisions are considered as 
independent from the decisions themselves He found that these methods were not dealing 
with major problems that "made the difference between the companies that succeed and those 
that stagnate and fail" (Forrester, 1968 399) 
First article on System Dynamics method was published in 1958 in the Harvard Business 
Review (Forrester, 1958) In 1961, his book Industrial Dynamics was published in which the 
theory and methodology of System Dynamics was described almost in its entirety In the 
1960s, Forrester began to apply the method to areas other than industrial companies This led 
to the publication of the books Urban Dynamics (Forrester, 1969) and World D\namiis 
(Forrester, 1971 ) World Dynamics was the predecessor of a study carried out for the Club of 
Rome which eventually, resulted in the renowned report The Limits to Gronth (Meadows. 
Meadows, Randers, and Behrens, 1972, Meadows, Behrens, Meadows, Naill, Randcrs, and 
Zahn, 1974). Since then SD has been applied to a variety ol issues such as project 
management (Cooper, 1980), dynamics of worker burnout (Homer, 1985), analysis of the 
causes of business cycles (Sterman, 1986), new product diffusion (Homer, 1987, Maier. 
1998), organizational change (Sastry, 1997), environmental dynamics (Ford, 1999), 
innovation implementation (Repennmg, 2002) For a variety of SD applications, see Sterman 
(2000) 
6.2.2 Core assumptions of the system dynamics approach 
System dynamics has four core assumptions The first is that social systems are information 
feedback systems SD problem-solving practices see organisations as " a complex 
interlocking network of information channels" and realize that every action taken depends on 
"information sources in other parts of the organization and the surrounding environment" 
(Forrester, 1992. 43) By doing so, it rejects the 'open-loop' thinking many other problem-
solving methods use SD approach realizes the dependencies amongst different parts of the 
organization as well as the dependencies amongst past, present, and future It recognizes that 
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our actions cause changes which would feed back to influence future decisions System 
dynamics approach closes the open loops in thinking by using the notion oi feedback and 
feedback loops which are "a closed sequence of causes and effect, a closed path of action and 
information" (Richardson and Pugh, 1981 4) The interconnected feedback loops form the 
feedback system 
By focusing on the feedback relationships between an organization and its environment, 
system dynamics maintains an endogenous viewpoint organizations arc seen as part of the 
structure of a system, which creates its own dynamics The dynamic behavior is not a 
consequence of exogenous factors but a result of the feedback structure of the system This 
understanding leads to the second core assumption 'structure drives behavior' This 
assumption implies that the system's behavior is a consequence of the underlying feedback 
structure of a system Understanding this behavior is the main goal ot the system dynamics 
approach (Richardson and Pugh, 1981) 
Every feedback loop represents a dynamic process and there are two types of feedback loops 
positive (reinlorcing) and negative (balancing) Positive loops are destabilizing They amplify 
change and generate exponential growth Negative loops, on the other hand, are stabilizing 
They counteract change and desenbe processes that bring the system to equilibrium 
(Sterman, 2000) 
Mobile phone \?) N^w asers ^ P o t e n t i a l 
users / ν Market users 
Woid of mouth 
+ 
Figure 6.1: An example of a feedback system with one positive (shown with the + sign) and 
one negative (shown with the - sign) loop 
One ol the diagramming tools used to capture the structure of a system is causal loop 
diagrams (CLD) which show the totality of the interconnected feedback loops (For further 
information, see chapter 5 of Sterman, 2000) The CLD in figure 6 1 represents two 
interacting processes to explain the generation of new mobile phone users It is assumed that 
the higher the number of mobile phone users, the higher the number of new users will be 
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This represents the word of mouth process which leads to the diffusion ol the mobile phones 
in a population This is a positive loop and would, on its own, generate an exponential growth 
in the number of mobile phone users However, no quantity can grow forever Given, a finite 
population, an increase in the number of new users will simultaneously lead to a decrease in 
the number of potential users A smaller group of potential users will, in tum, limit the 
number of new users This second process represents the market saturation and will slowly 
halt the growth dictated by the positive word of mouth loop As such, through tracing the 
loops, the behavior that would be generated by this structure becomes apparent Figure 6 2 
shows the behavior corresponding to the feedback structure of Figure 6 1 At the beginning 
(the first 3 5 years), the number ol users increases at an exponential rate the reinlorcing loop 
(word of mouth) is dominant After some time (shown by the dashed line), however, the 
balancing loop (saturation) takes over and the growth levels ofl As a result of the shilt in 
dominance from reinlorcing to balancing loop, the behavior of the system changes from 
exponential growth to goal seeking 
This is what 'structure drives behavior' refers to "All dynamics arise from the 
interaction of positive and negative loops" (Sterman, 2000 12) which make up the structure 
of the system The behavior is determined by the dominant feedback loop, namely "a loop 
that is primarily responsible for model behavior over some time inlerval" (Richardson and 
Pugh, 1981 285) As the dominance shifts from one feedback loop to anolher, the dynamic 
behavior of the system unfolds 
I M 
T M ) (MM) 
MM) «MM) 
"•MKMM) 
I) 
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Figure 6.2: Dynamic behavior of mobile phone users 
The third and fourth assumptions of SD are that using mathematical models and simulation 
are necessary to trace the dynamics of complex structures Due to the complexity of real 
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problems in social systems, understanding their behavior without an did is very difficult (if 
not impossible) for the human mind Research has repeatedly demonstrated that people are 
not able to infer the dynamics ol complex systems correctly (cf Sterman, 1994, 2000) 
Hence, in SD, quantified simulation models are used to trace the dynamics 
6.2.3 Model building process in System Dynamics 
The SD modeling process is generally composed of the following steps ι Problem statement 
or definition, n Conceptual model, m Formulation of a simulation model, iv Testing and 
validating, and ν Policy design and evaluation 
The starting point, which is the most important step in model building, is identifying the 
problem This phase is crucial because problem definition defines the purpose of the 
modeling study and sets the boundary of the model System dynamics modelers develop 
reference modes of behavior to capture the problem definition (Richardson & Pugh, 1981 21-
25) This is because they would "see to characteoze the problem dynamically, that is, as a 
pattern of behavior, unfolding over time, which shows how the problem arose and how it 
might evolve in the future" (Sterman, 2000 90) Figure 6 3 shows a hypothetical example ol 
the behavior of workload in a company In this particular example, the discrepancy between 
the actual and the desired behavior shows that there exists a problem, which is actually 
worsening over time 
Workload 
Actual development 
Desired development 
Time 
Figure 6.3: Example of a reference mode of behavior 
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Following problem definition, the process of model construction starts with a conceptual 
model The conceptual model shows the causal (feedback) structure This can either take the 
form of a causal loop diagram (maps showing the feedback structure of the system, see figure 
6 1) or a stock and flow diagram (maps showing the feedback structure and the underlying 
physical structure of the system, see figure 6 4) Forrester (1968) differentiates four levels of 
structure ι closed boundary, u feedback loops (the basic elements ol system structure), m 
slocks and flows, and iv goal, actual conditions, perceived conditions, the discrepancy 
between goals and perceived conditions, and action resulting from the discrepancy (see figure 
6 4) The boundary of the model sets the limits of the model All the components that are 
necessary to understand the causes ot the problem should be within the model boundary In 
the diagramming style, the boundary is set by the clouds (see figure 6 4) These clouds 
represent the source and sink of the material that flow through the system 
Stocks and flows are the fundamental variables in system dynamics modeling 
(Forrester, 1968) and are very important to understand the dynamics ot a system Stocks 
represent the stale of the system and provide the information on which decisions can be 
taken Flows, on the other hand, represent the decisions, actions which change the state ot the 
system (Slerman, 2000) An important distinction between stocks and flows is that the stocks 
represent the amount of accumulation and the flow represents the rate of change in that 
accumulation Hence, whereas a slock is 'measured' at some point in time, a flow is 
'measured' over a particular time penod In the modeling language, stocks are represented by 
rectangles, and flows by valves In figure 6 4, the variable mventon is a slock variable The 
variables production (inflow) and shipments (outflow) are the flow variables 
SD models represent the decision-making structure in a system The actual conditions 
(i e the values of stocks) which are needed lo make decisions are rarely known to the 
decision-makers Based on the available information, decision-makers have a perception of 
the actual conditions which "may be either close to or far removed from the actual present 
state, depending on the information flow that are being used and the amount of time lags and 
distortion in links from information sources" (Forrester, 1992 45) Decision-makers would 
compare the perceived state of the system to the goals they have and take actions to correct 
the discrepancy that exists between the goal (i e the desired state) and the perceived state of 
the system In the example given in figure 6 4, the desired mventon represents the goal, and 
the actual and perceived conditions are represented by the current value of the inventory and 
perceived inventory, respectively The action is production and it is based on the discrepancy 
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between the inventor) and desired inventory This action changes the value of the current 
state of the system, inventory 
O 
Production 
Χ • ο 
' + 
Average \ Perceived 
production time Discrepancy inventory 
Χ 
Average delivery 
time 
Desired inventory 
Figure 6.4: Representation ol a stock-flow diagram 
After identifying the feedback structure of the model, the next step is the formulation of the 
simulation model This basically involves the formulation of mathematical equations for the 
relationships between variables and estimation of parameters Elaborate inlormation on 
equation formulation and parameter estimation is beyond the scope of the chapter The 
interested reader may consult Forrester (1961, 1968), Richardson and Pugh (1981), Roberts et 
al (1983), Sterman (2000) for further information 
Once model formulation is completed, the validity of the model should be established 
Vanous tests have been developed to check the validity of and increase confidence in the 
model (Forrester and Senge, 1980, Barlas, 1996) There are mainly two groups of tests 
structure and behavior validity tests Behavior validity tests involve comparing the model 
behavior with the reference mode of behavior However, given that the main focus of SD is 
understanding the underlying feedback structure of the system, structure validity is accepted 
as being more important than behavior validity Amongst others, structure validity tests 
involve checking every equation, checking that every variable has a real-world equivalent, 
questioning the model boundary, and testing the model in extreme conditions 
A model whose validity is established can be used for policy experimentation 
Sensitivity analyses and scenano runs can be conducted to understand the behavior of the 
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model under a variety of conditions These scenario runs provide more insight into the 
dominant feedback processes, that is, the causes, underlying the problem Based on such 
insight, new policies can be devised and tested 
In this section, basics of system dynamics modeling have been explained More information 
is available through other sources (ao Forrester, 1961, 1968, Richardson and Pugh, 1981, 
Roberts, Andersen, Deal, Garet, and Schaffer, 1983, Sterman, 2000, Venmx, 1996) In the 
next section, how SD can be used to counter escalation and selective exposure tendencies will 
be explained 
6.3 Role of system dynamics in escalating commitment and selective 
exposure to information 
The system dynamics method can be used to help decision-makers reduce irrational 
escalation and confirmation tendencies Each ol these will be looked at separately 
6.3.1 System dynamics for de-escalation of commitment 
Irrational escalation takes place when decision-makers hope to "turn the situation around" by 
continued investment and when they invest to justify their previous decisions Research 
showed that objective information has the possibility of stimulating dc escalation However, 
previous research and case evidence also showed that objective information (e g on projects 
economics and failure reasons), especially when disconfirming, is downplayed The 
responsibility feeling and need for justification weighs more as a decisive factor in making 
the re-investment decision Thus, simply presenting the decision-makers with information is 
not enough Montealegre and Keil (2000) proposed that for de-escalation to occur, decision-
makers should accept the failure information as genuine, understand the causes of the 
problem, and devise alternative courses of action SD modeling can help decision-makers go 
through these phases As explained previously, the main purpose of modeling is 
understanding u/!\ a certain situation has occurred (e g the failure of the strategy) and use 
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this information to design robust strategies to improve the situation (e g either adjustments to 
the existing strategy or design of a new strategy to solve the problem) 
If used in its qualitative form, namely, causal loop diagrams, the focus on the feedback 
structure would make the variables of interest in the problematic situation and the (leedback) 
relationships amongst them explicit This would give the decision-makers the opportunity to 
lormahze their hidden cognitive processes and question any existing inconsistency (in their 
mental models and/or reasoning process) Through the analysis of this model, decision­
makers can identify the variables on which information should be collected, understand why 
the chosen strategy is failing, the nature of the failure causes, and what the consequences 
would be if the strategy were continued By making assumptions and analysis more explicit 
and giving the decision-making more formal grounds, using CLDs would make it more 
difficult for decision-makers to ignore information both on the (present and future) project 
performance and alternatives This would, in tum, facilitate de-escalation 
If used in its quantitative lorm, namely, stock-flow models, simulation would enable the 
decision-makers to see the link between structure and behavior, test various assumptions, see 
the dynamic consequences of not only re-investment in the current strategy, but also of 
possible alternative courses of action, and test the robustness of alternative actions 
Moreover, a simulation model has the advantage of providing a safe environment in which 
various strategies or scenarios could be tned out prior to selection and implementation 
In this chapter, the focus will be on testing the effectiveness of a qualitative SD model, ι e 
the causal loop diagram (CLD), in reducing escalation and selective exposure tendencies For 
the reasons explained above, the expectation is that decision-makers who use a CLD while 
making a re-investment decision after receiving negative decision consequences will ι feel 
less committed to the strategy and π invest less money in it than those who do not use any 
decision aid 
Hypothesis 1. After subjects have made the initial investment decision and received 
negative consequences, those using a causal loop diagram util a) invest less nwne\ 
and b) feel less committed in the second investment decision than those not using any 
decision aids 
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A CLD is essentially made of variables and the causal relationships between these variables 
In order to understand more about the role of CLDs, a second decision-aid that lists the 
variables of the CLD will be used Such a list of variables can be seen as a proxy to a typical 
result of methods such as market research or critical success factors that organizations 
routinely use to understand their organization and its environment (cf, Kahaner, 1997) 
Given that the strength of a CLD comes from illustrating the feedback relations, analysis ol 
which can generate insight into the dynamic consequences of actions, it is proposed that a 
CLD will be more effective than a list of variables in reducing escalation and selective 
exposure tendencies 
Hypothesis 2. Afier subject1) have made the initial investment decmon and received 
negative consequences, those using a causal loop diagram will a) invest less money 
and b) feel less committed in the second investment decision than those using a list of 
variables 
For the effect of a list of variables as compared to using no decision-aid, on the other hand, 
no expectations will be given Following the results of Gonion and Parks ( 1987), who showed 
that choosing amongst a list of five information items leads to lower commitment, one could 
propose that seeing a list of variables can lead to de-escalation Similar results were seen in 
experiment two in chapter lour However, the information items they used (a 5-year forecast, 
an R&D prospectus, an R&D report, a set of justification memos, and a CEO report) are 
different in nature than typical variables in a CLD (e g price of a product, the amount of 
customer base) On the other hand, considering the assertions indicated in section 6 1 on how 
individuals can bias and hence, ignore information, one could expect that expectation that 
acquiring a simple list of variables will not lead to de-escalation Given these mixed 
possibilities, no hypothesis will be given on the effect of a list of variables as compared to not 
using a decision aid 
6.3.2 System dynamics for overcoming selective exposure to 
information 
The usage of the SD method could also counter the confirmation tendencies In the previous 
chapter, it was shown that people responsible for the choice of a strategy do not only escalate 
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after failure feedback but also selectively use confirming information on (future) 
performance More specifically they prefer information that indicates high probability for 
future success, information on similar companies that were successful with the same strategy, 
information that indicates that their strategy is better than the alternative strategies, and that 
the actual performance is better than the reported The motive behind such selective exposure 
is to decrease dissonance and show that the chosen strategy has the potential to be successful 
II CLDs arc used the investment decision would receive more objective, lormal grounds The 
consequences of re-investment can be identified and based on this information, the 
(dis)advantages of the current strategy can be made explicit Such a formal process could 
eliminate the need for confirmation Moreover through model analysis, the important 
variables that should be monitored and their implications for the performance can be 
identified This could make it more difficult for the decision-makers to avoid the relevant 
information even though it might be disconfirming Hence it is expected that a CLD will 
decrease selective exposure tendencies in those items for which selective tendencies were 
shown in the previous chapters 
Hypothesis 3. As compared lo <,ubjeLti w/io do not use a decision aid those using a 
causal loop diagram before the second investment decision Hill he less hkeh to 
prefer information that indicates that a) the strateg\ will be successful m the future 
b) the implemented strategy is better than the alternatne c) similar companies ha\e 
been successful with the same strategy and d) the actual performance is better than 
the reported 
Since the strength of the CLDs is believed to be in the feedback relationships, it is 
hypothesized that CLDs will decrease selective exposure tendency more than the list of 
variables 
Hypothesis 4. As compared to subjects who use a list of \ariables those using a 
causal loop diagram before the second imestment decision will be less likely to 
prefer information that indicates that a) the strategy will be successful in the future 
b) the implemented strateg\ is better than the alternatne c) similar companies lune 
been successful with the same strategy and d) the attuai performance is better than 
the reported 
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6.4 Method 
As in the majonty of the (de-)escalation literature, the present study used an experimental 
approach, using business students as subjects The aim of this study is to test the hypothesis 
that a CLD will be an effective tool in decreasing escalation of commitment To be able to 
attribute the observed effects to the object of this study, namely the use of a CLD, it is 
important to test its effectiveness in a controlled setting Therefore, an experiment using a 
decision-making simulation was designed to test the hypotheses developed in section 6 3 
6.4.1 Overall Design 
The subjects were 168 undergraduate students The experiment was part of a methodology 
course and participation was on a voluntary basis Subjects were randomly assigned into one 
of the three conditions (a 1x3 design) receiving no decision-aid, a list of variables or a CLD 
The experiment was paper-based and took about 50 minutes 
6.4.2 Experimental Task 
All the subjects were asked to work on a supermarket case that was also used in experiment 3 
(see appendix III and chapter 5) Here, a short description of the task will be given For more 
information, please refer to section 5 I 1 The case desenbed a successful high quality 
supermarket chain that was lacing some problems regarding profits and market share Hence, 
there was a need for a new strategy The subjects were told that they were a long-term 
member of the board of directors and were strongly supporting the so-called discounting 
strategy that was proposed as a solution to the problems faced Hence, all the subjects were in 
the committed situation After writing a short paragraph (as part of the commitment 
inducement) on why they thought the discounting strategy is a good strategy the subjects 
answered the expenmental questionnaire which included questions to measure their 
commitment The subjects were asked to indicate how much they would invest in the 
discounting strategy and the extent to which they felt committed to it Consecutively, they all 
received negative decision consequences that stressed that the strategy was not performing 
well Before the decision on whether to go on with the strategy or not, the experimental 
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manipulation took place Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental 
conditions (see figure 6 5 for the experimental design) Following the manipulation, the 
subjects were asked to make a decision on how much they would re-invest in the discounting 
strategy again They were then told that they were to write a report to the board explaining 
their point of view and were asked to indicate the type ol information they would like to 
include in this report 
6.4.3 Independent variables: experimental manipulations 
There was only one independent variable in this study availability of a decision aid (see 
figure 6 5 for the design) The groups differed from one another with respect to the extra 
information they received before making their second investment decision Altogether, there 
were three groups one control (baseline) and two experimental groups 
Baseline The baseline condition was identical to the 'committed/negative consequences' 
condition in the third experiment explained in chapter 5 The subjects in this group received 
only the negative decision consequences and no decision aid prior to the second investment 
decision 
Negative decision 
consequences 
Case All subjects 
initially committed 
• None 
• Lisi of \anableo 
• Causal loop diagram 
Figure 6.5: Experimental design The manipulation is shown in italics 
The subjects in the two experimental conditions were told 
During the last 6 months your supermarket did research to understand the compeiitive 
environment The purpose of this research was to gain more insights into important lactors 
that affect your business 
Initial 
Commitmenl 
\ 
Final 
Commitment 
Dei 
/ 
ision aid 
Selective exposure 
lo information 
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Consecutively, both experimental groups were given the results of this research. 
Lis! of variables. In this condition, alongside the negative decision consequences, the subjects 
were presented with a list of important factors. They were told that the result of the research 
done was, 
"a list of important factors that the company should monitor". 
Causal loop diagram. In this condition, alongside the negative decision consequences, the 
subjects were presented with a causal loop diagram. They were told that the result of the 
research included 
"a causal model which shows ihe relations amongst important faciors that affect the 
company's business." 
The list and the model can be found in exhibits 6. la and 6. lb, respectively. 
Exhibit 6.1a: Experimental manipulation: List of variables 
During ihe last 6 months, your supermarket did research to understand the competitive environment. The 
purpose of this research was to gain more insights into important taclors thai affect your business The result 
was a list ot important factors lhat your company should monilor Below you can see this list 
Important Factors 
Price: The average amount of money the customers pay to buy goods at your supermarket. 
Market share The percentage of the total market lhat shops at your supermarket. 
Revenue The amount of money that your supermarket receives from sales of products to customers 
Profit· This is the money left after the deduction of costs It is calculated as revenue - costs. 
Costs Total money spent tor operations of your supermarket 
Qualily of assortment This is the quality level of the total assortment at your supermarket. 
Competitor's market share The percentage ot the total market lhat prefers to shop at ihe competitor 
supermarket. 
Competitor's pnee: The average amount of money ihe customers pay to buy goods at ihe competitor's 
supermarket 
Competitor's revenue: The amount of money that the compelilor supermarket receives from sales of 
products to customers. 
Compctilor's profit: This is the money left after the deduction of cosls It is calculated as competitor's 
revenue - compelilor's costs 
Competilor's costs Total money spent for operations of competitor's supermarkel. 
Compctilor's Quality of assortmenl This is the quality level of the total assortment al compelilor 
supermarket 
Price sensitivity of customers- measures how strongly customers react to a change in price. 
Quality sensitivity of customers measures how strongly customers react to a change in quality 
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Exhibit 6.1b: Experimental mampulalion Causal loop diagram 
During the last 6 months, your supermarket did research to understand the competitive environment The 
purpose of this research was to gain more insights into important factors that affect your business The 
result was a causal model which shows the relations amongst these important factors Below you can see 
this model with a short explanation 
The causal model 
In the following, an explanation amongst the above listed variables will be given The explanation will 
eventually lead to a full model showing all the relations 
+ 
The price decrease of your supermarket was triggered due to a 
decrease in your market share With a decrease in prices, you can 
enable an increase in your market share 
Price 
Your market share 
If the prices are decreased this will lead to an increase in your supermarket's market share The increase 
in share will lead to an increase in revenues and profit 
The increase in profit will make a further decrease in 
prices possible which can enable further market share 
increase 
Your mnrkct share 
At the same time, however, a decrease in prices will lead to a decrease in both revenues and profit which 
will make further pnee decrease difficult 
Pro lit Your niirkct share 
If the profits are increased this would give your supermarket the ability to offer high quality assortment 
which will increase the quality of your assortment and hence your market share 
The explained effect of price and quality on 
market share depends on the pnee sensitivity 
and quality sensitivity of the customers 
Abihlv lo offer high 
qudlny issortmeni 
Pnee sci»linl> of Qujll) sensurty c 
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Exhibit 6.1b (continued): Experimental manipulation: Causal loop diagram 
A similar set of relationships also exisls for ihe 
competitor: 
Competitor's profit 
Compcmor's Α Λ
 C o n l p e l l I o r . s p n c c 
markel share ^—' ^ 
" Conpetnor's quality 
of assortment 
The modeling efforts also indicated the link between your supermarket and the competitor. An increase in 
your market share leads to a decrease in the competitor's market share. This decrease can make the 
competitor decrease his prices and hence, gam market share leading to a decrease in markel share tor 
your supermarket 
Price C I Your market share 1 + ) Competitor's Α ~ Λ Compelrtor's pnee v
—s ^ m^ —— market share χ — / ^ ^ 
All these relationships pul together creates the following model 
+ 
Revenue·· 
Profil 
Competitor's prohl 
(à 
— Quality ol 
+
 "Abilily lo offer high + assorlmenl 
quably ussorlmenl , , „ , 
Pncc sensitivity ol QL1'llll>' «nsmvity of 
custorrers cuslomen, 
Conpetnor's quabty^+ 
of assortment 
6.4.4 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables were measured in the same way as in the previous experiments. 
Here, a short description will be given. Please refer to chapters 4 and 5 for detailed 
information. 
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Measurement of commitment: Two different measures of commitment were used First, 
subjects were asked to indicate the amount ol money they would like to invest in the 
discounting strategy This represents the (reported) behavioral commitment Second, to 
measure their dttitudinal commitment, they were asked to answer five questions on their felt-
commitment to the strategy Both measurements were taken twice, once before and once after 
the feedback with decision consequences, to be able to investigate the change in commitment 
as a result of using the decision aid 
Measurement of information preference: confirmation bias: The subjects were given the 
same information items as in experiment 3 (see table 5 1) For each item, they were asked to 
indicate their preferred information to include in a report they would like to write to the board 
explaining their point ol view The percentage of people choosing the confirming information 
per category was used as the dependent variable The categories were kept the same to 
achieve consistency with the previous experiment, however, only the results for the 
categones for which selective exposure tendencies were shown in chapter 5 (predicted luture 
performance, alternative strategies, anecdotal information on similar companies, and 
correctness of the reported performance) will be presented in this chapter 
6.5 Results 
In this section, results for both commitment and information search will be presented First, 
the results of the effect ol a decision aid on commitment and escalation of commitment will 
be presented and next, the ctlects on information preference 
The reliability ol five items to measure the dttitudinal commitment was 0 83 (Cronbach's 
Alpha) The factor analysis run on the same items also indicated that all the items loaded on a 
single factor The factor loadings are given in table 6 3 
Table 6.3: Factor analysis results for the commitment measure 
Items in the commitment measure 
I will slick to the discounting strategy 
1 do not feel any loyalty to the discounting strategy 
I am committed lo the discounting strategy 
I feel obligated to invest in the discounting strategy 
I feel attached to the discounting strategy 
Factor loadings 
0 807 
0 790 
0 881 
0 658 
0 728 
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6.5.1 Analysis for commitment and escalation of commitment 
Analyses were performed for the initial commitment, final commitment, and the difference 
between initial and final commitment levels 
Initial commiiment was measured after the subjects read the case information and before the 
decision consequences and the manipulation Given that all the subjects were in the 
committed condition, there should be no differences in the commitment levels of the subjects 
in different groups Analysis of the results showed that there were indeed no significant 
differences between the groups (see table 6 4 for the averages) The commitment levels were 
also in agreement with the subjects from experiment 3 As would be expected, there were no 
significant differences from the committed group of experiment 3 (experiment 3 average 
initial behavioral commitment 786,718, ρ = 0 550, average initial altiludinal commitment 
5 175, ρ = 0 140) but the differences from the not-committed group were significant 
(experiment 3 average initial behavioral commitment 371,323, ρ < 0 001), average initial 
attitudinal commitment 2 922, ρ < 0 001)) This indicates that the inducement of the initial 
commitment in the case description was successful 
Table 6.4: Mean initial investment and initial attitudinal commitment 
Decision aid 
No decision aid (control group) 
List of important factors 
Causal loop diagram 
Total 
Ν 
38 
40 
31 
109 
Initial 
Behavioral commitment 
Mean 
774,473 68 
756,250 00 
759,677 42 
763,577 98 
Std Dev 
197,082 743 
232,651 247 
254,106 065 
225,509 805 
Initial 
Allitudinal commitment 
Mean 
5 505 
5 350 
5 381 
5 413 
Std Dev 
1 0121 
0 9224 
1 0849 
0 9949 
Analysis for escalation of commitment was done in two ways First, as in previous work, 
final commitment was analyzed Second, for the change in commitment, final commitment 
was analyzed while controlling for the initial commitment and the difference between initial 
and final commitment levels was analyzed 
First, to investigate the effect of the decision aid on escalation, one-way ANOVA was 
conducted on both final commitment measures (see table 6 5 for the averages) The 1 x3 
analysis of vanance for behavioral commitment run on money invested yielded a marginally 
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significant effect for the manipulation (F(2, 105) = 2 703, ρ < 0 1) Examination of planned 
Helmert contrast showed that the experimental conditions differed significantly from the 
control condition, that is, groups who received a decision aid (list or CLD) invested less than 
the group who did not receive anything (t(105) = -2 266, ρ < 0 05) However, there was no 
significant difference in money invested between the two experimental groups (t(105) = -
0 715, ρ = 0 476) Even though the CLD group invested less than the list group this 
difference was not significant A further analysis with post-hoc tests showed that the 
difference between the control group and the experimental groups was mainly due to the 
CLD group The difference in investment between the control and list groups was not 
significant (Games-Howell, ρ = 0 198) whereas the difference between control and CLD 
group was marginally significant (Games-Howell, ρ < 0 1) Difference between the list and 
CLD groups remains non-significant (Games-Howell, ρ = 0 783) 
The 1x3 analysis of vanance for attitudinal commitment yielded a significant effect 
for the manipulation (Welsch F(2, 70 596) = 6 472, ρ < 0 005) Examination of the planned 
contrasts revealed similar results as in behavioral commitment The two experimental 
conditions differed significantly from the control condition (t(73 801) = -3 013, ρ < 0 005) 
but there was no significant difference between the experimental conditions (1(68 528) = -
1 610, ρ = 0 112) The post-hoc tests also indicated that the difference between the list and 
control group was not significant (Games-Howell, ρ - 0 209) whereas the difference between 
CLD and control group was (Games-Howell, ρ < 0 005) 
Overall, these results indicate that as compared to not using a decision aid, using a 
CLD pnor to the second investment decision leads to a lower commitment whereas using a 
list of variables does not (see figure 6 6) Given these results, there is support for hypothesis 
lb, a marginal support for hypothesis la, but no support for hypothesis 2 
Table 6.5: Averages for the final commitment levels 
Final commilment 
No decision aid (control group) 
List of important factors 
Causal loop diagram 
Ν 
38 
40 
31 
Behavioral commitment 
Mean 
623 947 37 
493,750 00 
433,333 33 
Std Dev 
313 709 622 
348 290 238 
393 773 376 
Aunudindl commitment 
Mean 
49 
4 375 
3 903 
Std Dev 
1 2681 
1 4431 
1 0236 
156 
SYSTEM DYNAMICS AS A DE-ESCALATION TOOL 
1 * 6 0 0 0 0 0 -
8 1 550000-
C β 
— y >>C 
c | 500000-
S α 450000-
z 
Q 
\ 
\ 
\ 
1 
No aid 
\ 
\ 
\ 
N . 
^ v 
^ 
1 1 
Lisi CLD 
Decision Aid 
•.
 5
·
0
" 
« 
! t j 4 · 8 -
CXI 
I ] 4,6-
Ì 8 4,4-
1 1 4,2-
* l 
S&4,0-
\ 
\ 
1 
No aid 
V 
\ 
\ 
^ \ 
\ 
I 
List 
Decision Aid 
\ 
\ 
α 
I 
CLD 
Figure 6.6: Mean final behavioral and attitudinal commitment. 
Additional analysis was done to test how the use of a decision aid affected the change in 
commitment. As in chapters 4 and 5, first, final commitment was analyzed while controlling 
for the initial commitment. Second, the difference between the two commitment levels was 
analyzed. Both analyses gave the same result regarding escalation. 
ANOVA for final commitment while controlling for the initial commitment (see table 6.6) for 
money invested returned a marginally significant main effect for the manipulation (F(2, 104) 
= 2.799, ρ < 0.1) and a significant effect for initial money invested (F (1, 104) = 26.386, ρ < 
0.001). Planned Helmert contrast showed that the subjects in the experimental groups 
invested less than the subjects in the control group Q) < 0.05). There was no significant 
difference between the two experimental groups (p = 0.452). 
The results were similar for attitudinal commitment. There was a significant main 
effect for the manipulation (F(2, 105) = 6.296, ρ < 0.005), and the initial felt-commitment 
(F(l, 112) = 49.751, ρ < 0.001). Planned Helmert contrasts performed indicate that the 
subjects in the experimental groups felt less committed than the subjects in the control group 
(p < 0.005) and the subjects receiving the CLD felt less committed (marginally significant) 
than the subjects receiving a list (p < 0.06). 
These results indicate that receiving a decision-aid leads to decreased levels of 
commitment independent of the initial commitment level. 
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Table 6.6: Averages for the final commitment levels while controlling for the initial 
commitment. 
Final commitment while 
controlling for the initial 
commitment 
No decision aid (control group) 
List of important factors 
Causal loop diagram 
Ν 
38 
40 
31 
Behavioral commitmenl 
Mean' 
614,881.9 
497,310.4 
440,069.1 
Std. Dev 
50,994.510 
49,678.361 
57,373.034 
Attitudinal commitment 
Mean 
4.833 
4.420 
3 926 
Std. Dev 
0.171 
0.167 
0.189 
1
 Covanatcs appeared in the model are evaluated at: initial money invested = 761,388.89 
2 Covanates appeared in the model arc evaluated af initial fell commitment = 5.413 
Further analysis was done on the difference between the initial and final commitment 
measures (see table 6.7 and figure 6.7). For difference in money invested, ANOVA showed a 
marginally significant main effect for the manipulation (F(2,105) = 2.474, ρ < 0.1). The 
planned Hclmert contrasts indicated a significant difference between the two experimental 
groups and the control group (t(105) = -2.167, ρ < 0.05) but no difference between the 
experimental groups (t(105) = -0.686, ρ = 0.495). The post-hoc tests showed that there was 
no difference between the commitment levels of no-decision aid group and the list group 
(Games-Howell, ρ = 0.237) and between the CLD and list groups (Game.s-Howell, ρ = 0.800) 
but a marginally significant difference between the no-decision aid group and the CLD group 
(Game.s-Howell, ρ < 0.1 ). 
For difference in felt-commitment, ANOVA showed a significant main effect for the 
manipulation (Wclsch F(2, 65.325) = 6.701, ρ < 0.005). The planned Helmert contrasts 
indicated that the subjects in the experimental conditions decreased their commitment 
significantly more than the subjects in the control group (t( 100.533) = -3.222, ρ < 0.005). 
Moreover, the subjects receiving a CLD decreased their commitmenl more than those who 
received a list of important factors (t(67.939) = -1.762, ρ < 0.1). Once again, the post-hoc 
tests showed that there was no difference between the no-decision aid and the list groups 
(Games-Howell, ρ = 0.280) whereas the difference between the control and the CLD groups 
was significant (Games-Howell, ρ <0.0()5). There were no differences between the CLD and 
list groups (Games-Howell, ρ = 0.190). 
These results indicate that as compared to not using a decision-aid, using a CLD leads 
to de-escalation, but using a list of variables does not. However, when compared to one 
another, there are no significant differences between the CLD group and the list of variables 
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group. Overall, the results from the analysis of the change in commitment levels also give 
support for the hypothesis 1, but not for hypothesis 2. 
Table 6.7: Average differences in behavioral and attitudinal commitment levels. 
Difference between the initial 
and final commitments 
No decision aid (control group) 
List of important factors 
Causal loop diagram 
Ν 
38 
40 
31 
Difference in 
Behavioral commitment 
Mean 
-150,526 
-265,000 
-318,333 
Std. Dev 
275,356.745 
340,851.122 
350,242.117 
Difference in 
Attitudinal commitment 
Mean 
-0.605 
-0.975 
-1.477 
Std. Dev 
0.7993 
1.2796 
1.1191 
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Figure 6.7: Mean changes in the behavioral and attitudinal commitment levels. 
Summary for commitment: In this experiment, the effect of a decision aid on escalation was 
studied. The results show that as compared to the people not receiving a decision aid, people 
who receive a CLD prior to the second investment have lower final commitment levels and 
they decrease their commitment more upon receiving negative consequences. Receiving a list 
of variables, on the other hand, did not have any effect on the final or change in commitment 
level. It should, however, be noted that even though CLDs lead to de-escalation and list of 
variables did not, there was no significant difference between the commitment levels of the 
people using a CLD and those using a list of variables. These results give support for 
hypothesis 1 but not for hypothesis 2. 
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6.5.2 Analysis for information preference under escalating commitment 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 predicted that as compared to using no decision-aid or a list of variables, 
using a CLD will lead to a decrease in tendencies for confirmatory inlormation search 
Below, analysis results per information item will be given (see table 6 8) 
For the information category future predicted performance, ANOVA yielded a 
significant main ellcct for the decision aid manipulation (Welsh F(2, 67 316) = 3 645 , ρ < 
0 05) Examination of the planned Hclmert contrast showed that the experimental conditions 
differed significantly from the control condition, that is, as compared to the group that did not 
receive a decision aid, less people in the groups that received a decision aid (list or CLD) 
asked for the confirming information indicating the future success of the strategy (1(88 028) = 
-2 703, ρ < 0 01) However, there was no significant difference between the two 
experimental groups (t(64 186) = -0 487, ρ = 0 628) A further analysis with the post-hoc 
tests showed that the only significant dilference was between the no decision aid group and 
the CLD group (Gamcs-Howcll, ρ < 0 05)"° Given these results, there is support lor 
hypotheses 3a but not for 4a 
For the information category alternative strategies, ANOVA yielded a significant main 
elfect for the decision aid manipulation (Welsh F(2, 68 236) = 3 655, ρ < 0 05) Examination 
of the planned Helmert contrast showed that the experimental conditions differed 
significantly from the control condition (t(81 416) = -2 706, ρ < 0 01) with no significant 
difference between the two experimental groups (t(64 502) = 0 013, ρ = 0 989) A lurther 
analysis with the post-hoc tests showed consistent results with the planned contrasts Both 
experimental conditions differed significantly from the control condition (List Games-
Howell, ρ < 006, CLD Games-Howell, ρ < 0 1) whereas there was no difference between 
the experimental groups Given these results, there is support for hypothesis 3b but not for 4b 
For the information category anecdotal information on similar companies, ANOVA 
yielded a significant main effect lor the decision aid manipulation (Welsh F(2, 63 951) = 
5 788 . ρ < 0 01) Examination ol the planned Helmert contrast showed that the experimental 
conditions differed significantly from the control condition (t(95 358) = -3 221, ρ < 0 05) and 
there was a marginally significant difference between the two experimental groups (t(59 575) 
= -1 764, ρ < 0 1) A further analysis with the post-hoc tests showed that the only significant 
Dilicrcnce between the control and list groups μ = 0 104 and difference beiwcen the list and the CLD groups 
ρ = 0 878 
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difference was between the no decision aid group and the CLD group (Games-Howell, ρ < 
0 01)'' Given these results, there is support for hypotheses 3c but not for 4c 
Table 6.8: Mean preferences for different information items 
No decision aid (control group) 
List of important factors 
Causal loop diagram 
Total 
Ν 
38 
40 
31 
109 
Information items 
Future predicted 
performance 
Mean 
0 79 
0 58 
0^2 
0 63 
Std 
Dev 
0 413 
0 501 
0 508 
0 484 
Alternative 
strategies 
Mean 
071 
0 45 
0 45 
0 54 
Std 
Dev 
0 460 
0 504 
0 506 
0 501 
Anecdotal 
information on 
similar 
companies 
Mean 
0 89 
0 75 
0 55 
0 74 
Std 
Dev 
0311 
0 439 
0 506 
0 439 
For the information item correctness of the reported performance, the subjects received 
three possible choices a) the actual performance is better than it was reported, b) the actual 
performance is worse than it was reported, and c) the actual performance is correctly 
reflected in the report (see table 6 9 for the averages per category) ANOVA on these three 
answer categories reflected that the decision aid manipulation significantly affected the 
choice in categories a (Welsh F(2, 69 970) = 7 383, ρ < 0 005) and c (Welsh F(2, 70 124) = 
3 054, ρ < 0 06) Significantly less people in the CLD group wanted information indicating 
that the actual performance is better than reported Post-hoc tests showed that the preference 
for option a was significantly less for the subjects that received a CLD (CLD < control ρ < 
0 01 (Games-Howell), CLD < list ρ < 0 01 (Games-Howell)) At the same lime, significantly 
more people in the CLD group preferred information indicating that the actual performance is 
correctly reflected in the report (option c) Post-hoc tests showed that the prelerence in the 
CLD group was significantly more than in the list group (CLD > control Games-Howell ρ = 
0 125 (Games-Howell), CLD > list ρ < 0 07 (Games-Howell)) Given these results, there is 
support for hypotheses 3d and a marginal support for hypothesis 4d 
1
 Difference between the control and list groups ρ = 0 217 and difference between the list and the CLD groups 
p = 0 191 
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Table 6.9: Mean preferences for the answer categories of the information item on actual 
performance 
No decision 
aid (control 
group) 
List of 
important 
factors 
Causal loop 
diagram 
Total 
Ν 
38 
40 
31 
109 
Information item correctness of the reported performance 
Actual perlormance is 
better than reported 
Mean 
0 39 
0 40 
0 10 
0 31 
Std Dev 
0 495 
0 496 
0 301 
0 465 
Actual performance is 
worse than reported 
Mean 
0 03 
0 08 
0 13 
0 07 
Std Dev 
0 162 
0 267 
0 341 
0 262 
Actual performance is 
correctly reflected 
Mean 
0 55 
0 53 
0 77 
061 
Std Dev 
0 504 
0 506 
0 425 
0 491 
Summary for information preference: These findings suggest that in escalation of 
commitment situations, using a CLD before the second investment decision decreases the 
selective exposure tendencies of the respondents in most of the information categones As 
compared to people without a decision aid, less of the people receiving a CLD deny the 
existence of negative leedback and show less preference for confirming information 
indicating future success of the strategy and its superiority over the alternatives 
6.6 Conclusion and Discussion 
This research examined the effect of a causal loop diagram in decreasing escalation of 
commitment and selective exposure tendencies Overall, there is support that CLDs can be 
used lor generating de-escalation as well as decreasing selective exposure tendencies 
The findings from the analysis on final commitment clearly showed that the escalation elfect 
was significantly decreased in subjects receiving a CLD These results support the initial 
hypothesis A result that was contrary to the expectations was that when compared to one 
another commitment levels for those using a CLD did not differ significantly trom those 
using a list of variables Even though the list group invested and felt more committed than the 
CLD group, these differences were not significant Analysis on change in commitment gave 
the same results On the other hand, the results also indicated that as compared to not using 
any decision aids, receiving a list of variables did not lead to a decrease in commitment So, 
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overall, it can be concluded that using a list ot important variables prior to the second 
investment decision does not lead to de-escalation whereas having a CLD showing the 
feedback relationships between these variables does 
The analysis in the effectiveness ol a decision aid in decreasing confirmatory information 
preference also gave support for using CLDs For all four inlormation items, namely, future 
predicted performance, alternative strategies, anecdotal information on similar companies 
and correctness of the reported performance, less people using a CLD asked for confirming 
information as compared to people using no decision aid Hence, it can be concluded that 
CLDs are helpful in decreasing the confirmation tendencies There were, however, no 
significant differences between using a CLD and using a list As compared to not using a 
decision aid, using a list of variables was effective in decreasing confirmation tendencies only 
for the information item alternative strategies 
These results should be seen as the first indication that CLDs can be used to avoid escalation 
of commitment and selective exposure to information Given that a list of variables did not 
lead to de-escalation and decrease in confirmation tendencies but a CLD did this effect could 
be attributed to the explicitncss of the feedback structure CLDs offer above a list of variables 
Yet, it is not clear whether it is just seeing these relationships or understanding the dynamic 
consequences that arc implied by these relationships that generates de-escalation and 
decrease in confirmation tendencies Given that the latter requires structuie analysis that 
necessitates a complex cognitive task and more time, it would be more probable to assume 
that such deep understanding ol the dynamics did not occur However, the way the subjects 
used the CLDs and whether they analyzed it (appropriately) were not measured and hence, a 
conclusive answer to w/n CLDs Mere effectne cannot be given 
It should also be realized that the subjects did not build the model themselves They received 
a two page document explaining the causal structure behind the problematic situation The 
next step in researching the effectiveness of CLDs should be investigating whether going 
through a model building session decreases escalation further There is evidence that being 
involved in model building increases the benefits from using SD models (Rouwette, 2003) 
Similarly, model building itself could stimulate further de-escalation 
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Even though CLDs are very useful for representing the feedback structure of systems 
(Slerman, 2000), they can be insufficient for understanding the dynamic implications of 
actions. This problem gets more pressing as the problem situation and the model get more 
complex. Hence, to sec the full effect of System Dynamics as a de-escalation tool, the 
effectiveness of a quantitative system dynamics model in generating de-escalation should be 
tested. 
6.7 Summary 
In this chapter, the results of an experiment studying the effect of using a decision aid on de-
escalation and selective exposure tendencies were discussed. As decision aids causal loop 
diagram and list of variables were used. A causal loop diagram is an end product of 
qualitative System Dynamics study whereas a list ol variables can be seen as the end product 
of methods such as market research or critical success factors that organizations routinely use 
to understand their organization and its environment. The results showed that while a CLD 
stimulates de-escalation and decreases selective exposure to information, a list of variables is 
not effective in either of the accounts. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and future research 
The purpose of this dissertation was to accomplish two goals: 
1) Studying selective exposure to information under escalation situations; 
2) Introducing and testing System Dynamics modeling as a tool to decrease escalation of 
commitment and selective exposure tendencies under escalation situations. 
In this chapter, the Undings will be discussed, conclusions and tentative conclusions will be 
presented, the relevance and the limitations of the research will be discussed, and 
recommendations for luture research will be proposed. The tentative conclusions do not 
follow directly from the experimental results but they provide an interpretation consistent 
with these results. Further research is required to validate them. 
7.1 Summary of the experimental findings and conclusions 
In this section, the findings of the experimental results for both goals identihed above will be 
discussed separately and conclusions as well as tentative conclusions will be drawn. To 
support the summary of the findings, an overview ol all the experiments is given in table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1: Overview of all the experiments. 
Case 
Subjects 
Manipulation 
Decision 
consequences 
Information 
items 
Measurement 
of 
commitment 
Measurement 
of 
confirmation 
bias 
Experiment 1 
(Chapter 4) 
Beefeater 
restaurant 
Wageningen 
University -
undergraduates 
Choice 
Negative 
Experiment 2 
(Chapter 4) 
Beefeater restaurant 
Nijmegen School of 
Management -
HBO students 
• Choice 
• Responsibility for 
decision 
consequences 
Negative 
Experiment 3 
(Chapter 5) 
Supermarket chain 
Nijmegen School 
of Management -
HBO students 
• Initial 
commitment 
• Decision 
consequences 
Negative and 
Positive 
Experiment 4 
(Chapter 6) 
Supermarket 
chain 
Nijmegen School 
of Management -
undergraduates 
Decision aid 
Negative 
• Perceived future performance 
• Locus of causality 
• Stability of causes 
• Alternative strategies 
• Anecdotal information on similar companies 
• Correctness of the reported performances (not in experiment I) 
• Correctness of the criteria used to judge the performance (only in experiment 3 
and 4) 
• Costs: sunk vs. future 
Behavioral 
commitment 
• Behavioral commitment 
• Attitudinal commitment 
• Percentage of people requesting confirming information per experimental group 
per information ilem. 
• Total number of confirming items requested. 
7.1.1 Escalation of commitment and selective exposure to information 
Three experiments were presented in chapters 4 and 5 to test the hypotheses regarding the 
effect of the (behavioral) determinants of escalation and dissonance arousal on selective 
exposure to information under escalation situations. 
Regarding information preferences, the expectation was that factors that lead to escalation 
and dissonance arousal would also lead to confirmatory information search. In this 
dissertation, four pre-requisites for dissonance arousal were studied: choice (also a 
psychological determinant of escalation), responsibility for decision consequences (also a 
social determinant of escalation), initial commitment, and decision consequences were 
studied. The experimental findings showed that responsibility did not have an effect on 
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information search Choice and initial commitment, on the other hand, stimulated the 
preference for confirming information People who made the choice of the strategy requested 
significantly more confirming items than people on whom the strategy was imposed In the 
same way, people who were initially committed to the implemented strategy showed a 
preference for more confirming information than those who were not initially committed 
Given the initial choice and initial commitment, people do not only remain committed to a 
strategy regardless of the negative consequences but also selectively expose themselves to 
confirming information Hence, the first conclusion of this research is 
Conclusion 1: Wherea<s responsibilin for detiswn tonsequentes docs not lead lo 
selettive exposure to information, both choice of and initial commitment to a failing 
itrategy lead to selective exposure to information 
These findings give support lor the self-justification motives as an underlying explanation of 
escalation Considering that responsibility for decision consequences did not have an effect 
on escalation of commitment either, it seems as if choice and initial commitment play a 
stronger role in escalation of commitment situations than responsibility lor decision 
consequences 
Regarding selective exposure to information, it needs to be indicated that the overall tendency 
of people seems to be to search for disconfirming information rather than confirming Even 
though people who chose a strategy and were initially committed asked for more confirming 
information than people who did not choose and were not initially committed, overall, they 
requested more disconfirming items than confirming items It seems as it contrary to what is 
generally believed, the bias that occurs in decision-making situations is that of 
disconfirmation rather than confirmation"" 
Conclusion 2: The general tendency during information search is for disconfirming 
information rather than confirming 
" The only situation under which a clear confirmation bias existed was for committed decision-makers who 
received positive decision consequences 
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This result, however, should be considered with care In line with Festinger's (1964) 
reasoning, one could argue that information that is seen as useful for luture decisions, e g 
diagnostic inlormation, is not ignored even though it might be disconfirming Decision-
makers can use such information to improve their strategy for luture implementations 
Moreover, it has been previously suggested that a relatively little amount of information 
might be necessary for confirmation (Ditto and Lopez, 1992, Beyer et al, 1997) It is possible 
that with a little amount of confirming information, the decision-makers are able to reduce 
dissonance and justify their choice and commitment This reasoning, however, should be 
tested in luture research Therelore, a tentative conclusion is proposed 
Tentative conclusion 1: Relativeh little confirming information tan be enough to 
decrease dissonante and achieve confirmation for a itrategi to which a decision-
maker is committed 
While identifying the information preferences of decision-makers, various information items 
were used The experiments yielded consistent results These results are summarized in table 
7 2 People who made the initial choice and were initially committed to the strategy wanted 
to report inlormation on the likelihood for future success, superiority of the implemented 
strategy over the alternatives They lavored anecdotal information that the strategy brought 
success to other companies and seemed to doubt the correctness of the reported performance 
For causes of the achieved performance and the costs associated with the implementation, the 
confirmation tendencies were not found 
These results are rather intriguing The items on which confirmation was sought were all 
related to the (luture) performance of the strategy It is possible that performance-related 
information can more easily be used to reduce dissonance and justify choice Regarding the 
dissonance reduction methods, seeking confirmation in these items can theoretically enable 
the decision-maker to deny the setback, exaggerate the attractiveness of the chosen 
alternative, and exaggerate the unattractivencss of the rejected alternative(s) Through these 
mechanisms, the decision-makers can reduce the dissonance aroused upon hearing negative 
consequences and use this information to show to him/herself and the others the expectation 
of success Irom the strategy The fact that no confirmation was sought in the category 'causes 
ol the achieved performance' might indicate that, within the frame of this study, denying 
responsibility was not a preferred method ol dissonance reduction This finding is again 
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consistent with Fcstinger's (1964) expectation that disconfirming inlormation that is seen as 
relevant for future decisions is not ignored Indeed, diagnostic information, ι e information 
on the causes of failure, can be used to improve the strategy before the next implementation 
Understanding the causes of the setback and knowing whether these causes are likely to occur 
again are very important aspects of sound decision-making Hence, it is plausible to think that 
for a committed decision-maker, confirming information on the (past and future) performance 
of the strategy is enough to decrease dissonance And once dissonance is reduced and choice 
is justified, the decision-maker would like to use the (disconfirming) diagnostic information 
to improve the strategy and make further implementation a success This reasoning suggests 
that performance information is mainly used for impression management and diagnostic 
information for strategy improvement It also points out to the importance ol considering the 
content of the information while studying confirmation bias and selective exposure to 
information and understanding how the content of different information items contributes to 
confirmation and justification motives of decision-makers Given these results, the following 
conclusion and tentative conclusion are drawn 
Conclusion 3: Confirming information is preferred when the information i\ ι elated 
to the past and future performance of the strategy When the information is of a 
diagnostic nature or related to costs, no selective exposure tendencies are found 
Tentative conclusion 2: Confirming information related to the performant e of a 
strategy (absolute or relative to the alternatives) is enough to decrease dissonaiue 
and achieve confirmation for a strategs to which a decision-maker is committed 
Disconfirming diagnostic information, on the other hand, is not cnoided since it is 
useful for future decision-making 
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Table 7.2: Summary of the results on selective exposure to information under escalation conditions. 
Information item 
Future performance 
Factors that 
contributed to 
the 
performance of 
strategy 
Locus of 
causality. 
Internal vs. 
External 
Stability of 
causes. 
Temporary vs. 
Permanent 
Alternative strategies 
Anecdotal information on 
similar companies 
Correctness of 
the actual 
performance 
Correctness of 
the actual 
performance 
Correctness of 
the evaluation 
criteria 
Costs associated with 
implementing the strategy 
Total amount of confirming 
information selected 
Experiment 1 
No support 
Marginal 
support 
No support 
Support 
Support 
NA 
NA 
No support 
Support 
Experiment 2 
Marginal 
support 
No support 
No support 
Marginal 
support 
Marginal 
support 
No Support 
NA 
Marginal 
support 
Support 
Experiment 3 
Support 
No support 
No Support 
Support 
Support 
Marginal 
support 
No support 
No support 
Support 
Overall conclusions 
Initial commitment leads to a preference for information 
indicating future success. Choice and responsibility lead to 
marginal preference for such confirming information. 
Regardless of their choice, responsibility or initial commitments, the 
preference of individuals goes for information that indicates that the 
causes for the achieved performance are internal. 
The overall preference of individuals goes for information indicating 
permanent causes. However, when the commitment level and the 
performance results are inconsistent then this preference disappears 
and it becomes equally likely for individuals to choose permanent or 
temporary causes. 
Choice and initial commitment lead to preference for 
information that indicates that the implemented strategy is 
better than alternative strategies. 
Choice and initial commitment lead to preference for 
information that indicates that similar companies had success 
with the same strategy. 
Overall, people prefer to report that the reported performance is 
accurate. As a second preference however, initial commitment 
induces search for information that indicates that actual performance 
is better than reported. 
People prefer to report that the criteria used for judging the 
performance are accurate. 
The overall preference of individuals goes for information on future 
costs required However, more of the subjects who made the initial 
choice search for sunk cost information. 
Choice and initial commitment lead to search for more 
confirming information. 
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7.1.2 System dynamics as a de-escalation tool 
The second goal of this research was to test System Dynamics modeling as a tool that could 
enable de-escalation and decrease selective exposure tendencies The effectiveness of 
receiving a causal loop diagram (CLD) was compared to two situations receiving no decision 
aid and receiving a list ol factors 
When compared to the people who did not receive any decision aid, the escalation effect was 
significantly decreased in subjects receiving a CLD Those who received a CLD invested less 
money and indicated feeling less committed to the failing strategy People who received a list 
did not show any significant differences from the people who did not receive a decision aid 
The same results applied to change in commitment levels People receiving a CLD decreased 
their commitment significantly more than those who did not receive any decision aid whereas 
this significant difference did not exist lor people who received a list Receiving a CLD also 
decreased the selective exposure tendencies As compared to people without a decision aid, 
less of the people receiving a CLD denied the existence ol negative feedback and showed less 
prelerence for confirming intormalion indicating future success ol the strategy and its 
superiority over the alternatives 
Conclusion 4: Using a causal loop diagram stimulate!, de-esialation 
Conclusion 5: Using a causal loop diagram stimulates a decrease in selectne 
exposure tendencies in information items related to the (future) performance of the 
course of action 
Why was using a CLD effective9 Given that a list of variables did not generate de-escalation 
and a decrease in confirmatory information search, the effectiveness of a CLD can be 
attributed to the exphcitness of the system structure, namely, the relationships amongst 
variables and the feedback loops Knowledge on the system structure may have enabled a 
decrease in escalation and selective exposure tendencies in one ol the lollowing ways First, 
being aware ol the system structure and eltecls of various factors on one another might have 
facilitated the objective analysis of the strategy possible This might have given the subjects 
the opportunity to formalize their reasoning process and hence, stimulate better understanding 
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of the situation Second, the analysis of the relationships might have generated insight into 
lactors such as the causes of failure, possible reactions from the competitors, customers etc 
Third, focus on the feedback loops might have prompted the subjects to the dynamic 
implications, that is, consequences, ol re-investment 
The reader may have realized that the three possible effects ol CLDs offered are given 
in the order of increasing cognitive complexity While the first one is the least complex one, 
the last one requires the highest amount of cognitive analysis Given the time limitations, it 
would be more probable to attribute the observed elfectiveness of the CLDs mainly to being 
aware of the relationships and to a lesser extent, to the insight generated from the analysis of 
these relationships Yet, given that the way the subjects used the CLD and whether they 
analyzed it (appropriately) were not measured, no conclusive answer can be given to the 
question why CLDs were effective 
7.1.3 A new measure of commitment and escalation 
Even though it was not one of the main goals of this research, this study also has a 
contribution regarding the operationahzation of (escalation of) commitment In the escalation 
research, commitment has been operationahzed as the amount of money invested to a failing 
course of action In this research, a new measure of commitment and escalation were 
developed To measure commitment, alongside money invested, which measures (stated) 
behavioral commitment, felt commitment was measured as a proxy for (stated) attitudinal 
commitment To do so, a ^-item scale was developed (see chapter 4, experiment 2) To 
measure escalation, the change in commitment, calculated as the dillercnce between 
commitment levels before and after the feedback with decision consequences, was used 
Table 7 1 summarizes the results on the effects of choice, responsibility, and initial 
commitment on both operationahzations of escalation of commitment 
Regarding attitudinal versus behavioral commitment, it is interesting to see that choice affects 
the initial attitudinal commitment level but not the behavioral commitment level People who 
do not make the choice of the implemented strategy invest as much money as those who 
make the initial choice However, at the same time, they indicate feeling much less 
committed than those who make the choice Thus, those who do not choose the strategy 
invest money even though they do not feel committed Consecutively, upon receiving 
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negative decision consequences, they decrease their commitment much more than those who 
make the initial choice. This indicates that while those who initially choose have a 
consistency between their behavior and attitude, those who do not make the initial choice 
lack this consistency. They initially show a high behavioral commitment that is not consistent 
with their attitudinal commitment towards the action. As a result, at the first sign of negative 
consequences, they pull the plug immediately. These results lead to the following conclusion: 
Conclusion 6: Two different operationaìizatiom, of commitment, mimeh money 
invested and felt-commitment, give different results. Therefore, to understand 
escalation situations better, measures for both behavioral and attitudinal 
commitment might be necessary. 
Table 7.3: Summary of the results on (escalation of) commitment. 
Independent 
Variable 
Choice 
Responsibility 
for decision 
consequences 
Initial 
commitment 
Expectation 
Choice leads to 
initial commitment 
Choice leads to 
escalation of 
commitment (i.e., 
higher final 
commitment) 
Choice leads to 
increase (or less 
decrease)in 
commitment 
Money 
invested 
Felt-
commitment 
Not controlling 
for initial 
commitment 
Controlling for 
initial 
commitment 
Money 
invested 
Felt-
commitment 
Responsibility leads to initial 
commitment 
Responsibility leads to escalation of 
commitment (i.e., higher final 
commitment) 
Responsibility leads to increase (or 
less decrease) in commitment 
Initial commitment 
leads to escalation 
of commitment 
(i.e., higher final 
commitment) 
Initial commitment 
leads to increase 
(or less decrease) in 
commitment 
Not controlling 
initial 
commitment 
Controlling for 
initial 
commitment 
Money 
invested 
Felt-
commitment 
Experiment 
1 
No support 
Support 
Support 
Support 
Support 
Support 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Experiment 
2 
No support 
Support 
Support 
Support 
Support 
No Support 
No Support 
No Support 
No Support 
NA 
NA 
Experiment 
3 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Support 
Support 
No Support 
No Support 
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Previous research focused on the fact that responsibility for the choice ol a course of action 
can induce (irrational) escalation behavior and decision-makers should be aware of this 
While the results of this research concur with this accepted wisdom, they also emphasize the 
other side of the story As explained above, not being responsible for the choice of a course 
of action can cause the exhibition of a seemingly committed behavior pattern and at the same 
time, lead to early withdrawal due to the lack of initial felt-commitment Like escalation, 
early withdrawal can also be a disruptive behavior pattern for the success of an organization 
Thus, reasons for withdrawal should also be monitored closely 
Another issue that was considered in this thesis was the definition ol escalation Is a one-time 
measure of commitment enough to understand escalation situations or should one look at the 
change in commitment9 In this thesis, both the final commitment level and the change in the 
commitment level were measured The expectation was that lor escalation to occur there 
should be either an increase or at least, a smaller decrease in commitment The effect of 
choosing the implemented strategy was consistent with this expectation whereas the effect ol 
initial commitment was not Upon receiving negative consequences, the initially-committed 
subjects decreased their commitment level more than the imtially-not-committed subjects 
However, given the higher level of initial commitment, the final commitment level of the 
initially-committed subjects was still higher than the imtially-not-committed subjects This 
means that the final commitment level, on its own, indicates an escalation bias whereas the 
amount of change in commitment does not 
Conclusion 7: Meamnng eualation of commitment as change in commitment 
rather than commitment after performante feedback gnes a different result 
regarding escalation of commitment Therefore, to understand escalation situations 
better, measures for both final commitment and change in commitment might be 
necessan 
Further analysis of the change in commitment levels gave rise to an interesting tentative 
conclusion It turns out that the adjustments people make to their initial commitment levels 
are not enough to reflect the performance of the strategy they are implementing That is, 
initially-committed people do not decrease their commitment enough upon receiving negative 
consequences while initially-not-committed people do not increase their commitment enough 
upon receiving positive consequences This pattern ol behavior seems to be consistent with 
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the well-known anchonng-and-adjustment heuristic which may explain why people do not 
adjust their commitments in accordance with the performance outcomes and escalate This 
finding leads to the following tentative conclusion 
Tentative conclusion 3: The adjustments made to the initial commitment levels after 
the decision consequences are not proportional with the nature of the consequences 
These insufficient adjustments can be explained using the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic 
To understand why decision-makers show escalation ot commitment to losing courses of 
action, the participants were asked to rate various reasons tor their escalating commitment 
The results showed that as the final commitment level increased so did the leeling of not 
having invested enough initially, the will to show the correctness ol initial decision and the 
optimism with which the consequences were perceived At the same time, increased 
commitment was associated with decreased intention to save money lor alternatives 
Likewise, choosing the implemented strategy stimulated reasons such as the will to show the 
correctness of the initial decision and decreased intention to save money for alternatives 
Being held responsibility for the decision consequences, on the other hand, stimulated 
reasons such as saving reputation as a consistent decision-maker and a will to collect 
additional data (through reinvesting) to understand the strategy's effects better Overall, even 
though not all the reasons indicated were ol an irrational nature, making the initial choice, 
being responsible for decision consequences, and escalating in commitment were associated 
with less rational reasons, such as face-saving Moreover, by judging the decision 
consequences as not negative, people who chose the implemented strategy show a tendency 
for biasing an objective inlormation item, a tendency that supports conclusions 1 and 3 
Based on these results, the following conclusion can be derived 
Conclusion 8: Choice responsibilit\ and final commitment le\els of decision 
makers are associated with higher likelihood of using irrational teasons for 
explaining commitment to a failing course of action 
Based on the experimental findings, eight conclusions and three tentative conclusions were 
denved In the next sections, implications of these findings as well as limitations ol this 
research will be discussed 
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7.2 Theoretical contributions and implications for practice 
7.2.1 Theoretical contributions 
This research has three main theoretical contributions The first one relates to the occurrence 
of selective exposure in escalation situations, the second one to the use ot a modeling 
technique for de-escalation, and the third one to the measurement of (escalation of) 
commitment m escalation research 
The most important finding of this research is showing that antecedents ol escalation 
stimulate selective exposure to information This finding has five implications lor research 
First, this finding can be seen as another test of the self-justification explanation ol 
escalation As explained previously, the self-justification explanation is based on dissonance 
theory If dissonance mechanisms were at work in escalation situations then one would 
expect committed decision-makers to decrease dissonance once faced with negative decision 
consequences, lor instance, by selectively exposing themselves to information as predicted by 
dissonance theory This research, by showing that selective exposure to information occurs 
under escalation situations, gives further support to the self-justification motives as an 
underlying cause of escalation 
Second, the findings present support for the aggregate model of escalation as proposed 
by Staw (1997) In that model (see figure 2 2), Staw presented three relationships ι the effect 
of behavioral factors on escalation, u the effect of project factors on escalation, and m the 
effect ol behavioral factors on the perception ol the project factors Prior escalation research 
has already provided empirical support for the first and second effects The third one, 
however, had not yet been researched By showing that choice (as a psychological factor) 
affects the perception of the project factors, this research gives support for this aggregate 
model 
Third, this research shows that inlormation processing biases are not only a cause of 
escalation but also one of its consequences 
A fourth theoretical implication of this research is showing the fruilfulness of studying 
the link amongst different biases or the co-occurrence of biases Recently other researchers 
showed the link between biases (Keil et al, 2007, Fischer et al, in press) This dissertation 
should be seen as contributing to this line ot research by showing ι confirmatory information 
search and escalation of commitment biases co-exist and n the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic seems to explain changes in commitment levels in escalation situations The finding 
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related to anchoring and adjustment shows that yet another behavioral factor might need to be 
added to the list of determinants ol escalation 
The fifth implication relates to mechanisms for dissonance reduction The results 
indicate for dissonance reduction, some information items (e g performance-related 
information) might be preferred over others (e g diagnostic information) and at the same 
time, some dissonance reduction mechanisms (e g denying setback or exaggerating the 
attractiveness of the chosen alternative) might be preferred over others (e g responsibility 
denial) The results of this research show the necessity for further research into dissonance 
reduction 
The second main contribution is to the research on de-escalation oi commitment Prior 
research on de-escalation had not locused on techniques that can improve the quality of 
decision-making and hence, have a de-escalation effect This research introduced the first test 
of such a technique, causal loop diagramming and showed that it does not only lead lo de 
escalation but also decreases selective exposure tendencies This shows the usefulness of 
decision-support tools such as causal loop diagramming lor enabling de-escalation of 
commitment 
Finally, the third main contribution relates to the operalionahzalion of commitment and 
escalation of commitment This research showed that studying both attitudinal commitment 
(alongside behavioral commitment) and change in commitment could add to our 
understanding of escalation situations 
7.2.2 Implications for practice 
Given the findings of this research, managers should be mindful about the inlormation 
biasing tendencies, especially under escalation situations In particular, managers should be 
careful about how they use performance information and check whether any information is 
left out of consideration Given the fact that the performance of a course of action can be 
measured in various ways, organizations should focus on establishing accurate and objective 
ways of measuring performance Moreover, objective criteria for estimating future 
performance and generating and evaluating alternative courses of action are very important in 
avoiding biased information use 
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Like escalation situations, early withdrawal from a course of action is an issue to which 
organizations should pay attention Especially, in those situations in which the higher 
management or board of directors requires a certain course of action to be implemented, a 
manager responsible lor the implementation (but not the development of the action) could 
pull the plug loo soon at the early signs ol negative leedback 
In order to prevent cases of escalation or premature withdrawal, organizations should 
monitor re-investment and withdrawal decisions of managers closely and understand the 
reasons for these decisions Being aware of different cognitive biases that can cause 
escalation or withdrawal for the wrong reasons and implementing safeguards against such 
effects could help organizations save money and time In both cases, decoupling action 
development and choice stages from action evaluation might be a good idea (also suggested 
by Boulding et al, 1997, Keil and Robey, 1999) Assigning the inlormation processing and 
action-evaluation responsibilities to someone who is impartial to the implemented strategy 
could help eliminate information biasing, irrational escalation or early withdrawal 
Last but not the least, the findings from this research shows the importance of thorough 
decision-making for organizations Establishing decision-making techniques that help 
evaluate the implemented strategies and stimulate understanding of both intended and 
unintended consequences of these strategics would improve the quality of decisions made and 
decrease the possibility of both escalation and premature withdrawal 
One such technique that was introduced and tested in this research is one that 
organizations tould benefit from causal loop diagramming Through modeling techniques, 
decision-makers would have the opportunity to formalize hidden assumptions and question 
inconsistencies in their mental models and their reasoning processes Formalized simulation 
methods could help decision-makers understand what the intended and unintended 
consequences of a strategy are, why a strategy is failing (or succeeding), and what the causes 
for the expenenced performance are Moreover, these models can be used to identify possible 
alternative courses of actions and their implications By providing a safe environment in 
which various strategies or scenarios can be tried out pnor to selection and implementation, 
such formalized techniques can contribute to increasing the quality of decision-making 
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7.3 Limitations 
The most important limitation of this research is related to the generalizability of the findings. 
External validity of laboratory experiments using students poses a threat to generalizability. 
There are two issues here. The first one is the use of laboratory experiments. It can be argued 
that an experimental setting does not enable the creation of a real-world decision-making 
situation. Not all the relevant elements of decision-making situations in organizations can 
indeed be replicated in an experiment. Yet, this weakness gives the researcher the opportunity 
to study the main factors of interest in a more controlled setting. Nevertheless, study of 
selective exposure in the field through case studies could yield additional insights. The 
second issue regarding the generalizability is the use of students as surrogates for managers. 
As discussed in chapter 3, use of students instead of managers poses a danger for external 
validity. However, there is evidence showing that students and managers make similar 
decisions (e.g. Ashton and Kramer, 1980; Mowen and Mowen, 1986; Yavas, 1994). 
Moreover, while developing the cases, care was taken to choose topics in which students 
could make sound judgments. Yet, while generalizing the results of this research these 
limitations should be taken into consideration and replication of the Findings using managers 
would be desirable. 
In terms of operationalization, two issues can be identified as potential limitations. First, 
while measuring the information preference, the subjects were not given the real information 
items. That is, they were not presented with the content of the information but just a sentence 
explaining the content. If more detailed information content was given, the real-life 
information selection processes would have been replicated more truly. Moreover, the 
subjects were not asked to write the reports but just indicate the information they would like 
to use. If they were actually made to write a report, the information preference and use could 
have been measured more directly. Second, while measuring commitment, reported behavior 
was used rather than actual behavior. The same applies to the attitudinal commitment. The 
subjects were asked to indicate how committed they felt. It can be argued that reported 
behavior or altitude may not be the same as the actual behavior or attitude. However, given 
that the cases involved large sums of money, it would have been difficult to use actual money 
such as in entrapment research. It could have been possible to use simulation games where 
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people are more involved in a continuous decision-making situation Use of simulation games 
in escalation research would be an interesting line of luture research 
7.4 Future research 
In the summary and conclusions section, three tentative conclusions were presented for future 
research In this section, some other possible interesting luture research directions will be 
named These will be grouped into three main topics selective exposure to inlormation, 
escalation of commitment, and use of System Dynamics for de-escalation 
Selective exposure to information: In this research, the inlormation prelerence of decision-
makers was measured The assumption was that information would exist in various lorms and 
decision-makers can choose either confirming or disconfirming information depending on 
their preference Future research should focus more on the role of information in dissonance 
reduction Questions such as 'which inlormation items arc preferred confirmation sources 
under which conditions' and ' are some dissonance-reduction mechanisms preferred over 
others' should be researched It would also be interesting to investigate whether (and under 
which circumstances) confirmatory information search is an intentional, deliberate process 
Another, but related, issue that should be considered in future research is whether 
decision-makers actively generate confirming information through changing or biasing the 
available information or even through creating new, at times, incorrect, information It would 
be interesting to research to what extent creation of confirming inlormation or purposeful use 
of incorrect, but confirming, information occurs in decision-making situations In case 
decision-makers do engage in such information manipulation, it would be important to 
understand their reasons and develop strategies to disable such processes 
Escalation of commitment: The co-existencc of cognitive biases seems to be an interesting 
research direction In this thesis, selective exposure to inlormation was shown to co-exist 
with escalation bias and the possible effects of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic was 
proposed Pnor research also showed the existence of framing effects under escalation 
conditions Understanding how different cognitive biases stimulate or trigger one another 
would be important lor learning more about how people make decisions 
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Studying the effects of different cultures on escalation would be interesting as well 
Most of the work on escalation has been done in the US This dissertation used a Dutch 
sample and showed consistent results with previous research In one of the expenments, 
however, a group of Chinese subjects joined the study Analysis showed that contrary to the 
Dutch subjects, choice did not affect the commitment level of the Chinese subjects Whether 
they chose the strategy themselves or it was imposed on them did not make any difference for 
commitment, they all had high commitment levels Given that the current study was not 
designed to consider such cultural differences, this finding should only be seen as an 
indication of cultural effects on escalation Future research could study cultural influences 
Most research in escalation targeted individual and static decision-making Studying 
escalation tendencies of groups (e g Whyte, 1993, Rutledge, 1995) as well as escalation in 
dynamic decision tasks would be very interesting future lines of research For instance, 
simulation games could be used to generate dynamic task environments in which subjects 
make decisions 
Use of System Dynamics: A final set of future research directions arc related to the use of 
System Dynamics as a de-escalation tool Further research needs to be done to understand 
what feature of the causal loop diagrams (CLD) stimulates de-escalation For instance, the 
contribution of feedback loops and their analysis should be better understood Moreover, it 
should be studied whether building the model rather than being presented with the ready 
model increases the benefits of using a CLD 
The System Dynamics approach provides much more than causal modeling The 
essence of the approach is in its use ot quantitative dynamic simulation models based on 
feedback thinking Even though CLDs are useful in representing the feedback structure, they 
are inadequate for understanding the dynamic implications of actions (Sterman, 2000) In 
order to see the full effect of System Dynamics in de-escalation, the effectiveness of formal 
models should be tested23 
In line with the recommendation to carry escalation research to the group level, 
studying the use of System Dynamics in enabling de-escalation in groups could be an 
interesting direction for future research It is generally advised to go through the model 
It should also be realized that building a valid quantitative System Dynamics model is a very time consuming 
process Understanding and analyzing the model requires expert knowledge that may not be available at the time 
of a pressing decision This should be one of the factors that is taken into account while testing the effectiveness 
of formal models as a de escalation technique 
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building process with a group of decision-makers each of whom might possess different 
relevant knowledge about the problem The so-called group model building (GMB) process 
can help decision-makers share their mental models with one another and help generate 
consensus and commitment to the decisions taken (Venmx, 1996, Rouwette, 2003) A 
potential advantage of such a process for escalation situation is that if the decision-makers 
and the evaluators of the results would go through the model building process together this 
could increase the shared understanding and hence, decrease the justification needs of the 
decision-makers Testing the effectiveness of a GMB study (qualitative and/or quantitative) 
in decreasing the escalation of individuals functioning within a group or the escalation at the 
group level could be very rewarding to research on de-escalation 
Similar recommendations as above apply to understanding more about the use ol 
System Dynamics in decreasing confirmation tendencies Future studies should try to 
understand what exactly makes CLDs useful for such de-biasing and examine whether going 
through the modeling process or using a quantitative model instead of a CLD are more 
effective For instance. Pala et al (2004) developed an extensive procedure for using causal 
loop diagrams to help decision-makers identify the relevant information cues in their 
environment Future research could focus on developing such procedures and testing whether 
they can be useful in overcoming selective perception tendencies 
7.5 Final words 
The study presented in this dissertation contributes to the research on escalation of 
commitment in three ways ι by studying selective exposure to information under escalation 
situation, n by proposing and testing a new measure of commitment and escalation, and m 
by proposing and testing causal loop modeling as a de-escalation technique The academic 
interest to this domain had grown over the years, yet many questions remain unexplored 
Hopefully, this dissertation can inspire additional research in the areas of selective exposure 
and (de-)escalation of commitment 
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APPENDIX I 
Case description and questions used in 
experiment one 
AM General Instructions 
The company you will be analyzing is a British restaurant chain, named Bcctcater You will 
first need to read a description of this company, its market, customers, and competitors 
Consecutively, you will read information on the strdtegy the Beefeater will lollow over the 
coming 5 years and your role within the company // is very important that you get into this 
role and answer the questions as the manager of this restaurant chain. 
There are altogether 3 stages of questions you will need to answer You have already received 
the first of these This stage includes the case description, description of the strategy, and 
your role as well as questions you need to answer to evaluate the strategy as the manager of 
Beefeater Please let the experimenter know when you are finished with this stage so that you 
can receive the questions in the second stage 
If you have any questions at any point in lime please do not hesitate to ask them to the 
experimenter 
Al.Il Case Description 
Beefeater Restaurants 
Background 
Bccfcdtcr restaurants is the name of d steak house chain in the retail services portfolio of 
Whitbread PLC, that owns other known chains such as Pina Hut, TGI Fridays Marriott 
Hotels 
English steak houses can be traced back to the early I96()s The concept was simple The 
menu offered just a few different steaks, with one fish and one chicken alternative To start, 
there was prawn cocktail, soup, pate or Iruit-juice The main meal price included only ice-
cream or cheese to follow The wine list was short and to keep tables busy both prc-dinncr 
drinks and after-dinner coffees were served in the bar 
In the 1970s, the declining beer sales in pubs alerted the attention of brewers (who in 
England, own their own pubs) to the fact that drink sales were not the only potential source ol 
retail profit - food might offer additional income too Amongst the first firms to identify the 
emerging opportunity was Whitbread PLC, until 1980 the fourth largest brewer The 
company produced and marketed a full range of beer products, both its own brands of ale and 
licensed international brands of lager, such as Hcincken and Stella Artois 
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Amongst Whitbread's initiative was the Beefeater steak-house concept This picked the best 
principles Irom existing steak-houses - the short menu and wine list, the inclusive prices, the 
friendly service - but added three further features First, with consumers being increasingly 
mobile, attractive, prominent, out-of-town pubs were chosen Whitbread had many such sites 
Second, steak-house designs were dreary and uninteresting An exciting new design style was 
adopted, creating intimate areas in the shell of the building, with steps and comers making an 
interesting atmosphere Lastly, the bars in existing steak-houses were out-dated and 
dominated by the restaurant operation A traditional pub style was used instead, welcoming to 
drinkers who were not using the restaurant This not only added interest, but also improved 
the overall economics of the sites 
The first Beeleater opened m 1976 from a large suburban pub and its immediate success set a 
frantic pace By 1979, there were 30 steak-houses around Whitbread's regional companies 
and in 1981, all were transferred to the Beefeater team It was estimated that up to 120 
existing pubs would meet the demanding Beefeater criteria Beefeater continued to grow, and 
by February 1983 operated 1 \S units 
The UK Eating Out Market - Customer profile 
Beefeater benefited greatly Irom the early 1980s growth in UK eating out demand The 
increasing consumer affluence, greater mobility, and a wish to eat out in groups and lamihes 
boosted restaurant demand considerably Beefeater's core users were in upper-middle socio-
economic groups, most having families and owning their own houses Friday and Saturday 
evenings were the most popular lor eating out Restaurants were much quieter on midweek 
evenings, lunch-times, and Sundays, with some sites barely able to justify opening at all 
Couples took a quarter of the meals sold Families were another important group, at about 
20% The rest consisted of single-sex groups and individuals, usually business people having 
lunch during the week Although Beefeater knew its customer profile and trade pattern quite 
well, there was some dissatisfaction with the simplistic segmentation The weekly trade 
pattern seemed to otter unexploiled potential, though how this potential could be taken was 
not clear 
Restaurant Competition 
The first ever steak-house, Bcmi. lost its leadership in the market in the early 1980s 
Consumers believed service and value to be at least as high as Beefeater's in spite of 
objective measures suggesting that quality, service, and restaurant environment were tailing 
below public expectations A bigger threat came from a new competitor, Harvester, which 
continued to grow strongly Most worrying tor Beefeater was Harvester's unit sales 
performance Not only did Harvester have larger sites, located in high-spending areas, but 
also promoted its restaurant heavily with 2-tor-l meal offers, early-dinner promotions and 
discounting Other rivals continued to grow their businesses, seduced by the success of 
Beeleater Many brewers invested heavily in catering operations that encroached on 
Beefeater's segment 
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The restaurant 
The restaurant operating procedures were designed with simplicity in mind Labor was a key 
cost item A key task for the manager was balancing demands to keep down his labor cost 
percent against demands for good service Whilst labor cost could be cut easily in the short 
tern, disappointing service discouraged customers from returning many weeks in the future 
A busy restaurant soon fell into despair, and a key part of the annual discretionary budget was 
dedicated to maintenance At the same time, sites were olten redeveloped to extend their 
trading area or redesign the interior Unfortunately, as the number ol Beeleaters and imitators 
grew, and as pub standard generally improved, consumers' expectations tended to increase as 
well 
Support functions 
Beefeater head office departments covered marketing, product development, finance 
personnel, design, and purchasing Marketing dealt with regular promotions Marketing 
heavily influenced restaurant design and menu changes, working with product development 
Changing menus and pricing was time-consuming, but changes had to be made to keep ahead 
of rivals and to meet rising consumer expectations Prices were high compared with other 
pubs in the area 
Beefeater was cautious about using TV advertising, wondering how to promote a branded 
chain concept without losing each site's local appeal The main competitors, though, 
advertised heavily on TV, but were believed to have gained little sustainable business lorm 
this spending 
The main human resource challenge was to recruit, keep and train large numbers of restaurant 
managers as well as help restaurants to find and train staff 
Procurement was central to Beefeater's profit performance Consumers were laking lood 
quality as a given, rather than a motivating (actor, so consistent high quality was crucial 
Sites 
The initial expansion ol Beeleater was through converting Whitbread-owned sites However, 
as time passed, there were fewer quality sites to be used and Whilbread had no sites at all in 
important parts of the country Beefeater had to look outside the Company for growth Even 
old industrial buildings and water mills were converted Such developments, however, came 
at high costs In 1980s, a £40,000 pub improvement was thought extravagant by Whilbread 
Yet, Beefeater's development costs were up to £400,000 by the end ol 1980s 
This problem of capital cost was made worse by the later need tor refurbishment This led to 
concern over the financial performance of Beefeater as a whole Over the 1990s, as the level 
of capital expenditure needed to construct each restaurant was high and rising whereas the 
average sales per unit were apparently falling in real terms 
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ALMI Choice manipulation 
Choice group 
You have been managing the business of Beefeater for several years and you have done a 
good job Restaurant numbers, sales, and profit have remained strong and you have 
continuously assured that consumers are happy enough with the value that your restaurants 
offer Your team earned regular bonuses during the past 
However, lately, the business has proved more challenging A new competitor recently 
started up and seems to be developing quickly They are opening restaurants quickly and are 
heading towards overtaking the market lead Irom you within the next year The restaurant 
sector, in general, is also becoming more competitive, especially with widespread discounting 
in meal prices Moreover, the country once again went into recession, consumer incomes fell 
back, and eating out expenditures declined 
Your task is to invest in the future strategy of Beefeater in order to repel the competitive 
threats and sustain a lead in the market, while continuing to deliver growth and financial 
pcrlormance The headquarters have made 5 million pounds (£ 5,000,000) available for the 
next 5 years, at the end of which there will be an evaluation of the performance of Beefeater 
As the manager, it is your task to choose and implement a strategy Given the current market 
situation, you would like to choose one of the following two strategies to implement 
Strategy A: You can choose a strategy that invests specifically in service quality and targets 
high-income groups Choosing this strategy, you would put emphasis on 
• Growth by opening restaurants in high-income areas onh while closing down smaller, 
non-profitable restaurants, especially those in low-income areas 
• High quality by investing specifically in serate and menu appeal 
• Keeping the prices at their current level slighth abo\e those ol the competitors 
Strategy B: You can choose a strategy that targets the general population and focuses on the 
market pressures Choosing this strategy, you would put emphasis on 
• Growth by acquiring new restaurants while closing down smaller restaurants that are 
not profitable 
• High quality by investing specifically in restaurant environment 
• Responding to competitive pressures by following the competitors in discounting so 
that the prices would at the same level or slighth less than those of the competitors 
No-choice group, strategy A 
You are taking over the management of the business ol Beefeater after the unexpected early 
departure of the previous managing director The previous director made sure that restaurant 
numbers, sales, and profit have remained strong and he has continuously assured that 
consumers are happy enough with the value that your restaurants offer You have been 
informed that the managing team, under the previous manager, earned regular bonuses during 
the past 
However, lately, the business has proved more challenging A new competitor recently 
started up and seems to be developing quickly They are opening restaurants quickly and are 
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heading towards overtaking you within the next year The restaurant sector, in general, is also 
becoming more competitive, especially with widespread discounting in meal prices 
Moreover, the country once again went into recession, consumer incomes fell back and 
eating out expenditures declined 
Your task is to invest in the future strategy of Beefeater in order to repel the competitive 
threats and sustain a lead in the market, while continuing to deliver growth and financial 
performance The headquarters have made 5 million pounds (£ 5,000 000) available for the 
next 5 years, at the end ol which there will be an evaluation of the perlormance ol Beeleater 
Although it is your task to invest in the future strategy, the headquarters imposed on you the 
strategy they want implemented They want you to follow a strategy that invests specifically 
in service quality and targets high-income groups They would like you to keep on 
emphasizing growth by acquiring new restaurants However, now they want you to locus on 
opening restaurants only in high-income areas while closing down smaller, non-profitable 
restaurants, especially those in low-income areas In the meanwhile, they want you to keep 
high quality by investing specifically in service and menu appeal while keeping the prices at 
their current level slightly above those of the competitors 
No-choice group, strategy Β 
You are taking over the management of the business ol Beeleater alter the unexpected early 
departure of the previous managing director The previous director made sure that restaurant 
numbers, sales, and profit have remained strong and he has continuously assured that 
consumers arc happy enough with the value that your restaurants offer You have been 
informed that the managing team, under the previous manager earned regular bonuses during 
the past 
However, lately, the business has proved more challenging A new competitor recently 
started up and seems to be developing quickly They are opening restaurants quickly and are 
heading towards overtaking you within the next year The restaurant sector in general, is also 
becoming more competitive, especially with widespread discounting in meal prices 
Moreover, the country once again went into recession, consumer incomes fell back and 
eating out expenditures declined 
Your task is to invest in the future strategy of Beefeater in order to repel the competitive 
threats and sustain a lead in the market, while continuing to deliver growth and financial 
performance The headquarters have made 5 million pounds (£ 5,000,()(X)) available lor the 
next 5 years, at the end ol which there will be an evaluation of the performance of Beefeater 
Although it is your task to invest in the future strategy, the headquarters imposed on you the 
strategy they want implemented They want you to follow a strategy that targets the general 
population and focuses on the market pressures They would like you to keep on emphasizing 
growth by acquiring new restaurants However, now, they want you to close down smaller, 
non-profitable restaurants In the meanwhile, they want you to keep high quality by investing 
specifically in restaurant environment They would also like you to respond to competitive 
pressures by lollowing the competitors in discounting so that the prices of Beefeater would be 
at the same level or slightly less than those of the competitors 
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ΑΙ.IV Measurement of initial commitment 
A. Below, there are questions regarding the strategy of Beefeater. Based on the information 
you read and the case description, please answer the following questions. We arc interested in 
your opinion as the manager of Beefeater. 
1 ) Which of the two strategies would you choose? Please circle the alternative that you 
choose: 
A) Strategy A 
B) Strategy Β 
2) Over the coming 5 years, how much of the total funds (£ 5,000,000) would you be willing 
to spend on the strategy you have chosen? 
Pounds 
AI.V Decision consequences 
B. Below, you will find information on the performance of Beefeater's strategy over the past 
five-year period. After reading it, please answer the questions on the next pages as the 
manager of Beefeater. 
At the end of the 5 years, your performance has been evaluated to see how well the strategy 
served in meeting the targets of Beelcater repel the competitive threats and sustain a lead in 
the market, while continuing to deliver growth and financial performance. The following 
contains a summary of the performance measures of Beefeater. 
Over the last five years, the overall profit of Beefeater has been below the target of the 
headquarters. Hence, you have been receiving continuous warnings from the headquarters. 
The number of Beeleater restaurants has been increasing. However, the growth has been very 
slow. Some of the inefficient restaurants were closed down but this process has not been very 
effective due to two main reasons. Firstly, the managers and the workers of these sites as well 
as the labor unions have been opposing the idea very fiercely. Secondly, it was not clear how 
to divert the customers of these sites to other Beefeater restaurants without losing them to the 
competitors. As a result, closing of restaurants has been very slow 
Just like the number of Beefeater restaurants, the number of the competitor restaurants has 
also been increasing. The competitor has been growing at a dangerous pace over the five 
years and coming closer to Beefeater in terms of the number of customers. Beefeater could 
not overcome the danger of losing the lead in the market and moreover, it seems like, over 
the coming year, the competitor is going to take over the market lead from Beefeater. 
It is not only the number of restaurants of the competitor that alarm the headquarters but also 
the reported customers' perception of value. Market research shows that over the 5 years, the 
customers' perception of different quality measures has decreased whereas the customers' 
perception of competitor's quality has been increasing. This fact coupled with the 
continuously declining number of meals served per restaurant leads to warnings from the 
headquarters. 
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All in all. Beefeater could not fulfill the targets set five years ago Headquarters are willing to 
authonze another 5 million pounds (£ 5,000,000) but they would first like you to explain how 
you would spend this money 
ALVI Measurement of final commitment 
C. Given the information you have just read, please answer the following questions regarding 
the strategy that was implemented over the last 5 years as the manager of Beefeater 
1) If new funds in the amount of 5 million pounds (£ 5,000,000) were made available now, 
how much of these funds would you be willing to spend on the continuation of the 
implementation of the strategy that was implemented 5 years aso0 
Pounds 
Al.VII Measurement of information preference 
D.I. In part C, you made a decision regarding whether you will keep on supporting the 
strategy of Beefeater over the coming period That is, you indicated how much of the funds 
you will use for continuing to implement the strategy that was implemented 5 years ago In 
order to support your decision, you need to write a report to the headquarters To write your 
report, you have the opportunity of requesting further information A consulting firm in 
which you trust will gather this information for you They have done excellent jobs for you in 
the past 
There are a total of 6 information categories you could get information on The consultancy 
firm will gather the information, do the necessary research, and present you with a report per 
information category Hence, you will receive a total of 6 reports, which you can use to 
defend the decision you have made in part C 
However, due to time and monetary constraints, you cannot ask the firm to gather all the 
information you would like to have Hence, within each information category, you need to 
make a choice for the type of information you would like to request To enable this, the 
consulting company provided you with two possible reports for each information category 
They would like you to choose the report you would like to receive most Below, for each 
information category, you are given two questions In the first question, we would like you to 
choose the report you prefer In the second question, we would like you to state how much 
you prefer this report 
Report 1: 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 Please indicate your choice by 
circling the letter corresponding to the report of your choice 
a) A report that estimates the likelihood that the further implementation of this strategy 
will bring success to the company and explains the reasons for this possible success 
b) A report that estimates the likelihood that the further implementation of this strategy 
will bring failure to the company and explains the reasons for this possible failure 
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Report 2: 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 Please indicate your choice by 
circling the letter corresponding to the report of your choice 
a) A report that focuses on linking the failure of the strategy to factors that were part of 
the strategy itself and hence, were under your control 
b) A report that focuses on linking the failure of the strategy to environmental factors 
and hence, were out of your control 
Report 3: 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 Please indicate your choice by 
circling the letter corresponding to the report of your choice 
a) A report that calculates the total amount of money invested in this strategy so far 
b) A report that calculates the required future costs in case this strategy is continued 
Report 4: 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 Please indicate your choice by 
circling the letter corresponding to the report of your choice 
a) A report that lists possible alternative strategies and explains why these are better than 
this strategy 
b) A report that lists the advantages of this strategy over other possible alternative 
strategies and explains why this strategy is better than the others 
Report 5: 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 Please indicate your choice by 
circling the letter corresponding to the report of your choice 
a) A report that outlines those causes of the setback that were temporary and are not 
likely to occur again in the future 
b) A report that outlines those causes of the setback that are likely to occur again in the 
future 
Report 6: 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 Please indicate your choice by 
circling the letter corresponding to the report of your choice 
a) A report that gives an overview of similar companies where the implementation of the 
same strategy brought success to the company 
b) A report that gives an overview of similar companies where the implementation of the 
same strategy brought failure to the company 
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APPENDIX II 
Case description and questions used in 
experiment two 
All.I General Instructions 
The company you will be analyzing is a British restaurant chain, named Beefeater You will 
first read a description of this company, its market, customers, and competitors 
Consecutively, you will read information on your role within Beefeater It is very important 
that you get into this role and answer the questions as the managing director of this 
restaurant chain. 
There are altogether 3 stages, each stage having its own set ol questions These sets of 
questions are to your right upside down in the correct order It is very important that you 
finish working on one stage before you move onto the next one So please DO NOT LOOK 
AT THE NEXT SET OF QUESTIONS BEFORE YOU FINISH WORKING ON THE 
CURRENT SET It is also very important that once you move onto the next stage, you do not 
go back and re-work on the previous stages When you are finished with one stage, please 
first put the set of questions belonging to this stage to your left and then take the questions of 
the next stage and start working on them 
You can now take the first set of questions This set includes the case description, 
information on your role and the strategy of the company, and the questions you need to 
answer to evaluate the strategy as the managing director of Beefeater 
If you have any questions at any point in time please do not hesitate to ask them to the 
experimenter Thank you 
All.II Case Description 
Beefeater Restaurants 
Beefeater restaurants is the name of a steak-house chain in the retail services portfolio ol 
Whitbread PLC, that owns other known chains such as Pizza Hut, TGI Friday's, Marriott 
Hotels 
In the 1970s, the declining beer sales in pubs alerted the attention of brewers (who, in 
England, own their own pubs) to the fact that dnnk sales were not the only potential source of 
retail profit - food might offer additional income too Amongst the first firms to identify the 
emerging opportunity was Whitbread PLC, until 1980 the fourth largest brewer The 
company produced and marketed a full range of beer products, both Us own brands of ale and 
licensed international brands of lager, such as Heineken and Stella Artois 
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Amongst Whitbread's initiative was the Beefeater steak-house concept This picked the best 
principles from existing steak-houses - the short menu and wine list, the all-inclusive prices, 
the friendly service - but added three further features First, with consumers being 
increasingly mobile, attractive out-of-town pubs were chosen Second, an exciting new 
design style was adopted, creating intimate areas in the shell of the building, with steps and 
comers making an interesting atmosphere Lastly, the bars in existing steak-houses were out-
dated A traditional pub style was used instead, welcoming to drinkers who were not using 
the restaurant This not only added interest, but also improved the overall economics of the 
sites 
The first Beefeater opened in 1976 from a large suburban pub and its immediate success set a 
frantic pace Today, Beefeater operates more than 150 restaurants all over the country 
The UK Eating Out Market - Customer profile 
Beefeater's core users were in upper-middle socio-economic groups, most having families 
and owning their own houses Friday and Saturday evenings were the most popular for eating 
out Restaurants were much quieter on midweek evenings, lunch-times, and Sundays, with 
some sites barely able to justify opening at all Couples took a quarter of the meals sold 
Families were another important group, at about 20% The rest consisted of single-sex 
groups and individuals, usually business people having lunch during the week Although 
Beefeater knew its customer profile and trade pattern quite well, there was some 
dissatisfaction with the simplistic segmentation The weekly trade pattern seemed to offer 
unexploited potential, though how this potential could be taken was not clear 
Restaurant Competition 
The success of Beefeater inspired many similar restaurants However, there was one main 
competitor. Harvester, which continued to grow strongly Most worrying for Beefeater was 
Harvester's unit sales performance Not only did Harvester have larger sites, located in high-
spending areas, but also promoted its restaurant heavily with 2-for-1 meal offers, early-dinner 
promotions, and discounting 
The restaurant 
The restaurant operating procedures were designed with simplicity in mind Labor was a key 
cost item A key task for the manager was balancing demands to keep down his labor cost 
percent against demands for good service Whilst labor cost could be cut easily in the short 
term, disappointing service discouraged customers from returning many weeks in the future 
A key part of the annual budget was dedicated to maintenance Sites were also often 
redeveloped to extend their trading area or redesign the interior Unfortunately, as the number 
of Beefeaters and imitators grew, and as pub standard generally improved, consumers' 
expectations tended to increase as well 
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Support functions 
Beefeater head office departments covered marketing, product development, finance, 
personnel, design, and purchasing Marketing dealt with regular promotions Marketing 
heavily influenced restaurant design and menu changes 
Changing menus and pricing was time-consuming, but changes had to be made to keep ahead 
of nvals and to meet rising consumer expectations Prices were high compared with other 
pubs in the area 
Beefeater was cautious about using TV advertising, wondering how to promote a branded 
chain concept without losing each site's local appeal. The main competitors, though, 
advertised heavily on TV 
The main human resource challenge was to recruit, keep, and train large numbers of 
restaurant managers as well as help restaurants to find and train staff 
Procurement was central to Beefeater's profit performance Consumers were taking food 
quality as a given, rather than a motivating factor, so consistent high quality was crucial 
Past performance and the future 
Beefeater has been performing very well since it started its operations in the 70s Even 
though there have been occasional threats from competitors, the market position of Beefeater 
has not been harmed The customers' eating out expenditures increased steadily over the 70s 
and 80s Even though due to the recession of the 90s the customers' eating out expenditures 
declined. Beefeater came out of the recession without too much damage Beefeater entered 
the 2000 with high hopes for the future However during the last years, new worries, such as 
a new competitor and a new economic recession, have come up Now, in 2005, business 
seems to be more challenging than ever 
You will be managing Beefeater in the coming years In the following page, you will find 
information on the current state of the business and your task in the company 
All.Ill Experimental manipulations 
Choice - Responsible group 
You have been the managing director of Beefeater for several years and you have done a 
good job Restaurant numbers, sales, and profit have remained strong and you have 
continuously assured that consumers are happy enough with the value that your restaurants 
offer. 
However, lately, the business has proved more challenging. A new competitor, Harvester, 
recently started up and seems to be developing quickly They are opening restaurants quickly 
and are heading towards overtaking the market lead from you within the next year The 
restaurant sector, in general, is also becoming more competitive, especially with widespread 
discounting in meal prices Moreover, the country once again went into recession, consumer 
incomes fell back, and eating out expenditures declined. 
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Your task is to manage Beefeater in order to repel the competitive threats and sustain a lead 
in the market, while continuing to deliver growth and financial performance The 
headquarters made 5 million pounds (£ 5,000,000) available for the next 5 years, at the end of 
which there will be an evaluation of the performance of Beefeater 
As the manager, it is your task to choose and implement a strategy Given the current market 
situation, you came up with the following two alternative strategies, one of which you are 
going to choose and implement 
Strategy A: A strategy that invests specifically in service quality and targets high-income 
groups Choosing this strategy, you would put emphasis on 
• Growth by opening restaurants in high-income areas only while closing down smaller, 
non-profitable restaurants, especially those in low-income areas 
• High quality by investing specifically in service and menu appeal 
• Keeping the prices at their current level slightly above those of the competitors 
Strategy B: A strategy that targets the general population and focuses on the market 
pressures Choosing this strategy, you would put emphasis on 
• Growth by acquiring new restaurants while closing down smaller restaurants that are 
not profitable 
• High quality by investing specifically in restaurant environment 
• Responding to competitive pressures by following the competitors in discounting so 
that the prices of Beefeater would at the same level or slightly less than those of the 
competitors 
You have recently been informed that you will be held personally responsible for the 
performance results attained in the coming years The bonus you will receive will depend on 
the performance outcomes, that is, how well you meet the targets of the headquarters 
Choice - Not-Responsible group 
You have been the managing director of Beefeater for several years and you have done a 
good job Restaurant numbers, sales, and profit have remained strong and you have 
continuously assured that consumers are happy enough with the value that your restaurants 
offer 
However, lately, the business has proved more challenging A new competitor. Harvester, 
recently started up and seems to be developing quickly They are opening restaurants quickly 
and are heading towards overtaking the market lead from you within the next year The 
restaurant sector, in general, is also becoming more competitive, especially with widespread 
discounting in meal prices Moreover, the country once again went into recession, consumer 
incomes fell back, and eating out expenditures declined 
Your task is to manage Beefeater in order to repel the competitive threats and sustain a lead 
in the market, while continuing to deliver growth and financial performance The 
headquarters made 5 million pounds (£ 5,000,000) available for the next 5 years, at the end of 
which there will be an evaluation of the performance of Beefeater 
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As the manager, it is your task to choose and implement a strategy Given the current market 
situation, you came up with the following two alternative strategies, one of which you are 
going to choose and implement 
Strategy A: A strategy that invests specifically in service quality and targets high-income 
groups Choosing this strategy, you would put emphasis on 
• Growth by opening restaurants in high-income areas only while closing down smaller, 
non-profitable restaurants, especially those in low-income areas 
• High quality by investing specifically in service and menu appeal 
• Keeping the prices at their current level slightly above those of the competitors 
Strategy B: A strategy that targets the general population and focuses on the market 
pressures Choosing this strategy, you would put emphasis on 
• Growth by acquiring new restaurants while closing down smaller restaurants that are 
not profitable 
• High quality by investing specifically in restaurant environment 
• Responding to competitive pressures by following the competitors in discounting so 
that the prices of Beefeater would at the same level or slightly less than those of the 
competitors 
You have recently been informed that you will not be held personally responsible for the 
performance results attained in the coming years The bonus you will receive will not depend 
on the performance outcomes, that is, how well you meet the targets of the headquarters, but 
will be a fixed percentage of your yearly salary 
No-choice - Responsible - Strategy A group 
You are taking over the management of the business of Beefeater after the unexpected early 
departure of the previous managing director The previous director made sure that restaurant 
numbers, sales, and profit have remained strong and he has continuously assured that 
consumers are happy enough with the value that Beefeater offers 
However, lately, the business has proved more challenging A new competitor, Harvester, 
recently started up and seems to be developing quickly They are opening restaurants quickly 
and are heading towards overtaking the market lead from you within the next year The 
restaurant sector, in general, is also becoming more competitive, especially with widespread 
discounting in meal prices Moreover, the country once again went into recession, consumer 
incomes fell back, and eating out expenditures declined 
Your task is to manage Beefeater in order to repel the competitive threats and sustain a lead 
in the market, while continuing to deliver growth and financial performance The 
headquarters made 5 million pounds (£ 5,000,000) available for the next 5 years, at the end of 
which there will be an evaluation of the performance of Beefeater 
As the manager, it is your task to implement a strategy The headquarters imposed on you the 
strategy they want implemented They want you to follow a strategy that invests specifically 
in service quality and targets high-income groups With such a strategy, they would like you 
to put emphasis on 
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• Growth by opening restaurants in high-income areas only while closing down smaller, 
non-profitable restaurants, especially those in low-income areas 
• High quality by investing specifically in lenuce and menu appeal 
• Keeping the prices at their current level slightly above those of the competitors 
You have recently been informed that you will be held personally responsible for the 
performance results attained in the coming years The bonus you will receive will depend on 
the performance outcomes, that is, how well you meet the targets of the headquarters 
No-choice - Responsible - Strategy Β group 
You are taking over the management of the business of Beefeater after the unexpected early 
departure of the previous managing director The previous director made sure that restaurant 
numbers, sales, and profit have remained strong and he has continuously assured that 
consumers are happy enough with the value that Beefeater offers 
However, lately, the business has proved more challenging A new competitor, Harvester, 
recently started up and seems to be developing quickly They are opening restaurants quickly 
and are heading towards overtaking the market lead from you within the next year The 
restaurant sector, in general, is also becoming more competitive, especially with widespread 
discounting in meal prices Moreover, the country once again went into recession, consumer 
incomes fell back, and eating out expenditures declined 
Your task is to manage Beefeater in order to repel the competitive threats and sustain a lead 
in the market, while continuing to deliver growth and financial performance The 
headquarters made 5 million pounds (£ 5,000,000) available for the next 5 years, at the end of 
which there will be an evaluation of the performance of Beefeater 
As the manager, it is your task to implement a strategy The headquarters imposed on you the 
strategy they want implemented They want you to follow a strategy that targets the general 
population and focuses on the market pressures With such a strategy, they would like you to 
put emphasis on 
• Growth by acquiring new restaurants while closing down smaller restaurants that are not 
profitable. 
• High quality by investing specifically in restaurant environment 
• Responding to competitive pressures by following the competitors in discounting so that 
the prices of Beefeater would be at the same level or slightly less than those of the 
competitors 
You have recently been informed that you will be held personally responsible for the 
performance results attained in the coming years The bonus you will receive will depend on 
the performance outcomes, that is, how well you meet the targets of the headquarters 
No-choice - Not-Responsible - Strategy A group 
You are taking over the management of the business of Beefeater after the unexpected early 
departure of the previous managing director The previous director made sure that restaurant 
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numbers, sales, and profit have remained strong and he has continuously assured that 
consumers are happy enough with the value that Beefeater offers 
However, lately, the business has proved more challenging A new competitor. Harvester 
recently started up and seems to be developing quickly They are opening restaurants quickly 
and are heading towards overtaking the market lead from you within the next year The 
restaurant sector, in general, is also becoming more competitive, especially with widespread 
discounting in meal prices Moreover, the country once again went into recession, consumer 
incomes fell back, and eating out expenditures declined 
Your task is to manage Beefeater in order to repel the competitive threats and sustain a lead 
in the market, while continuing to deliver growth and financial performance The 
headquarters made 5 million pounds (£ 5,000,000) available for the next 5 years, at the end ol 
which there will be an evaluation of the performance of Beeteater 
As the manager, it is your task to implement a strategy The headquarters imposed on you the 
strategy they want implemented They want you to follow a strategy that invests specifically 
in service quality and targets high-income groups With such a strategy, they would like you 
to put emphasis on 
• Growth by opening restaurants in high mtome arcai onl\ while closing down smaller, 
non-profitable restaurants, especially those in low-income areas 
• High quality by investing specifically in lemce and menu appeal 
• Keeping the pnees at their current level slighth abo\e those ol the competitors 
You have recently been informed that you will not be held personally responsible for the 
performance results attained in the coming years The bonus you will receive will not depend 
on the performance outcomes, that is, how well you meet the targets of the headquarters but 
will be a fixed percentage of your yearly salary 
No-choice - Not-Responsible - Strategy Β group 
You are taking over the management of the business of Beeleater after the unexpected early 
departure of the previous managing director The previous director made sure that restaurant 
numbers, sales, and profit have remained strong and he has continuously assured that 
consumers are happy enough with the value that Beefeater offers 
However, lately, the business has proved more challenging A new competitor, Harvester, 
recently started up and seems to be developing quickly They are opening restaurants quickly 
and are heading towards overtaking the market lead from you within the next year The 
restaurant sector, in general, is also becoming more competitive, especially with widespread 
discounting in meal prices Moreover, the country once again went into recession, consumer 
incomes fell back, and eating out expenditures declined 
Your task is to manage Beefeater in order to repel the competitive threats and sustain a lead 
in the market, while continuing to deliver growth and financial performance The 
headquarters made 5 million pounds (£ 5,000,000) available for the next 5 years, at the end of 
which there will be an evaluation of the performance of Beefeater 
2Π 
APPENDICES 
As the manager, it is your task to implement a strategy The headquarters imposed on you the 
strategy they want implemented They want you to follow a strategy that targets the general 
population and focuses on the market pressures With such a strategy, they would like you to 
put emphasis on 
• Growth by acquiring new restaurants while closing down smaller restaurants that are not 
profitable 
• High quality by investing specifically in restaurant environment 
• Responding to competitive pressures by following the competitors in discounting so that 
the prices of Beefeater would be at the same level or shghth less than those ol the 
competitors 
You have recently been informed that you will not be held personally responsible for the 
performance results attained in the coming years The bonus you will receive will not depend 
on the performance outcomes, that is, how well you meet the targets of the headquarters, but 
will be a fixed percentage of your yearly salary 
NOTE: Responsibility manipulation was also included at the end ot the decision 
consequences See section All V 
All.IV Measurement of initial commitment, confidence, and responsibility 
A. Below, there are questions regarding the way you would like to spend the funds (£ 
5,000,000) made available by the headquarters Based on the information you read, please 
answer the following questions We are interested in your opinion as the managing director 
of Beefeater 
1) Which of the two strategies would you choose'' Please circle the alternative that you 
choose 
A) Strategy A 
B) Strategy Β 
2) Over the coming 5 years, how much of the total funds (£ 5,000,000) would you be willing 
to spend on the strategy that is imposed on you by the headquarters9 
Pounds 
3) Below, you are given ten statements As the managing director of Beefeater, please 
identify the extent to which you agree with these statements For each statement, a scale 
ranging from 1 to 7 is provided with 1 indicating "strongly disagree" and 7 indicating 
"strongly agree" Please indicate your choice by circling the value you choose 
a) I will stick to this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
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Strongly agree 
Strongly agree 
Strongly agree 
Strongly agree 
b) I do not feel any loyalty to this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 " / 
c) I am committed to this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 ' / 
d) I feel obligated to invest in this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 ' / 
e) 1 feel attached to this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 " / 
0 I intend to stick to this strategy even though negative performance is encountered 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
g) I do not think this strategy is going to make us meet the headquarters' targets in the 
coming years 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
h) I have confidence in this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 ' / 
i) I feel responsible for the choice of this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 ' / 
j) I feel responsible for the eventual performance outcomes of this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
Strongly agree 
Strongly agree 
AII.V Decision consequences 
It is now 2010 There has recently been a performance evaluation of the strategy you have 
been implementing the last 5 years The purpose of this evaluation was to see how well the 
strategy served in meeting the targets set in 2005 These targets were repelling the 
competitive threats and sustaining a lead in the market, while continuing to deliver growth 
and financial performance The following contains a summary of the pertormance results of 
Beefeater 
Profit below the target Over the last five years, the overall profit of Beeleater has been 
below the target of the headquarters 
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Sion growth The number of Beefeater restaurants has been increasing However, the growth 
has been very slow Some of the inefficient restaurants were closed down but this process has 
been very ineffective 
Increased competitor threat Just like the number of Beefeater restaurants, the number of the 
competitor restaurants has also been increasing The competitor has been growing at a 
dangerous pace over the five years and coming closer to Beefeater in terms of the number of 
customers Beefeater could not overcome the danger of losing the lead in the market and 
moreover, it seems like, over the coming year, the competitor is going to take over the market 
lead from Beefeater 
Decreased customer's perception of value It is not only the number of restaurants of the 
competitor that alarm the headquarters but also the reported customers' perception ol value 
Market research shows that over the 5 years, the customers' perception of quality has 
decreased whereas the customers' perception of competitor's quality has been increasing 
This fact, coupled with the continuously declining number ol meals served per restaurant, 
leads to warnings from the headquarters 
All in all. Beefeater could not fulfill the targets set five years ago 
Responsible: On the same day you received the performance evaluation report, you also 
received a memo from the headquarters In this memo, it was stated that the headquarters 
hold you personally responsible for the perlormance results of the last five years As you 
were informed in 2005, this will have consequences lor the bonus you will get at the end of 
the year 
Not-Responsible: On the same day you received the performance evaluation report, you also 
received a memo from the headquarters In this memo, it was stated that the headquarters do 
not hold you personally responsible for the performance results of the last five years As you 
were informed in 2005, this will not have any consequences for the bonus you will get at the 
end of the year Your bonus will be a fixed percentage of your yearly salary 
AII.VI Measurement of final commitment, confidence, and responsibility 
Given information you just read, please answer the following questions regarding the strategy 
you started implementing in 2005 as the managing director of Beefeater 
1) If new funds in the amount of 5 million pounds (£ 5,000,000) were made available now, 
how much of these funds would you be willing to spend on the continuation of the 
implementation of the strates\ that \ou started implementine in 2005e7 
Pounds 
2) Below, you are given ten statements As the managing director of Beefeater, please 
identify the extent to which you agree with these statements For each statement, a scale 
ranging from I to 7 is provided with 1 indicating "strongly disagree" and 7 indicating 
"strongly agree" Please indicate your choice by circling the value you choose 
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a) I will stick to this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
b) I do not feel any loyalty to this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
c) I am committed to this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
d) I feel obligated to invest in this strategy 
Strongly disagree I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
e) I feel attached to this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
f) I intend to stick to this strategy even though negative perlormance is encountered 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
g) I do not think this strategy is going to make us meet the headquarters' targets in the 
coming years 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
h) I have confidence in this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
i) I feel responsible for the choice ol this strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
j) I feel responsible for the performance results attained over the past 5 years 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
All.VII Measurement of information preference 
Before making further funds available, the headquarters would like you to write a report 
explaining the performance of the last five years and how you would spend the additional 
funds if they were to be made available To write your report, you have the opportunity to 
request further information A consulting firm in which you have confidence will gather this 
information for you They did excellent jobs for you in the past 
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You identified six main information categones you are interested in However, due to time 
and monetary constraints, you need to specify the kind of information you want within each 
category To enable this, the consulting company provided you with two possible reports for 
each information category They would like you to choose the report you prefer the most 
Below, for each information category, you are given two questions In the first, we would like 
you to choose the report you prefer the most In the second, we would like you to slate how 
much you prefer this report over the one you did not choose 
Report 1: 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 Please indicate your choice by 
circling the letter corresponding to the report ol your choice 
a) A report that estimates the likelihood that the further implementation of this strategy 
will bring success to the company and explains the reasons for this possible success 
b) A report that estimates the likelihood that the further implementation of this strategy 
will bring failure to the company and explains the reasons for this possible failure 
Report 2: 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 
a) A report that focuses on linking the failure of the strategy to factors that were under 
your control 
b) A report that focuses on linking the failure of the strategy to factors that were out your 
control 
Report 3: 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 
a) A report that includes an estimate ol the total costs (such as the total investments, 
indirect costs, time investment etc ) of this strategy so far 
b) A report that includes an estimate of the required future costs in case this strategy is 
continued 
Report 4: 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 
a) A report that lists the advantages of this strategy over possible alternative strategies 
and explains why this strategy is better than the others 
b) A report that lists the advantages of possible alternative strategies over this strategy 
and explains why these are better than this strategy 
Report 5: 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 
a) A report that outlines the main causes of the failure that were permanent and are 
likely to occur again in the future 
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b) A report that outlines the main causes of the failure that are temporär) and are not 
likely to occur again in the future 
Report 6: 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 
a) A report that gives an overview of similar restaurants where the implementation of the 
same strategy brought success to the company 
b) A report that gives an overview of similar restaurants where the implementation of the 
same strategy brought failure to the company 
Report 7: Please indicate how much you would like to have the following report 
A report showing that the performance outcomes of the last five years are actually much 
better than they were stated in the performance evaluation of the headquarters 
I would not like to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 would very much like to 
see this report sec this report 
All.VIM Measurement of reasons for commitment 
In question 1 in part D on page 10, you indicated the amount of money you'd like to invest in 
the strategy Please indicate this amount once again pounds 
If the amount you indicated is more than 0 pounds, that is, if you decided to re-invest in the 
strategy please answer the questions in section Τ below 
I) Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements 
1) I decided to re-invest in the strategy so that I will not lose the headquarters' support 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
2) I chose to invest in this strategy in the past Deciding to stop now would undermine my 
reputation as a manager who makes consistent decisions 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
3) I thought the amount of money invested in 2005 was not enough to make this strategy 
work at its full potential Hence, I decided to invest more money to make sure that the 
strategy will work 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
4) I think some aspects of this strategy are good So I decided to invest some of the available 
funds to strengthen these aspects and keep the rest for developing and implementing 
another strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
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5) By re-investing in the strategy, I would like to show that my decision in 2005 was a 
correct one 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
6) I want to keep on supporting this strategy because I have already invested so much time 
and money in it 
Strongly disagree I 2 1 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
7) I do not think we have enough inlormation to evaluate this strategy thoroughly By re-
investing in this strategy, I would like to have collect additional information to understand 
its effects better 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
8) I decided to re-invcst in the strategy, because I did not think that the perlormance results 
were bad 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
All.IX Questions on information preferences prior to the second 
investment decision 
As a manager, to be able to make informed decisions, you have the habit of collecting 
information You work regularly with a consulting company that collects the information you 
request and presents it to you in a report form 
You are now at the eve of implementing a new strategy Headquarters would like you to write 
a report explaining the expected luture performance of Beefeater and how you will spend the 
available funds To use as an input lor this report, you asked the consulting company to 
collect information for you You identified four main inlormation categories you arc 
interested in However, given the time and monetary constraints, you need to specify the kind 
ol information you want within each category To enable this, the consulting company 
provided you with possible reports for each iniormation category They would like you to 
choose the report you prefer the most Below, for each information category, you are given 
two questions In the first question, we would like you to choose the report you prefer In the 
second questions, we would like you to stale how much you prefer this report over the one 
you did not choose 
Information category 1: A report in this category will contain information on Ihc predicted 
future performante of this strategy 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive' Please indicate your choice by 
circling the letter corresponding to the report of your choice 
a) A report that estimates the likelihood that the implementation ol this strategy will 
bring success to the company and explains the reasons lor this possible success 
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b) A report that estimates the likelihood that the implementation of this strategy will 
bring failure to the company and explains the reasons for this possible failure 
Information category 2: A report in this category will contain information on circumstances 
under which this strateg\ could fail Within this report, you can identify two types of 
information 
1) Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 
a) A report that focuses on those factors that are under your control 
b) A report that focuses on those factors that are out your control 
2) Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 
a) A report that outlines the main causes of a possible failure that would be temporan 
and would not he likely to occur again in the future 
b) A report that outlines the main causes of a possible failure that would be permanent 
and would be likely to occur again in the future 
Information category 3: A report in this category will contain inlormation on possible 
alternative strategies 
Which of the tollowing reports would you like to receive9 
a) A report that lists the advantages of possible alternative strategies over this strategy 
and explains why these are better than this strategy 
b) A report that lists the advantages of this strategy over possible alternative strategies 
and explains why this strategy is better than the others 
Information category 4: A report in this category will contain information on other 
restaurants that implemented a similar strategy 
Which of the following reports would you like to receive9 
a) A report that gives an overview of similar restaurants where the implementation of the 
same strategy brought failure to the company 
b) A report that gives an overview of similar restaurants where the implementation of the 
same strategy brought success to the company 
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APPENDIX III: 
Case description and questions used in 
experiments three and four 
AIM.I General Instructions 
Before you begin with answering the questionnaire, read the following instructions carefully 
• In this questionnaire, we ask you to picture yoursell as a member of a board ol 
directors of a big supermarket Try to get into this role as much as possible 
• There are no correct or wrong answers Try to answer the questions as much as 
possible from the point of view ol a member of the board of directors 
• Fill in the questionnaire individually Your neighbors have a different questionnaire 
There are 4 different questionnaires dispersed around the room 
• Take your time to fill in the questionnaire 11 you are ready try not to talk to your 
colleagues 
• The questionnaire is composed of four stages. Before you move onto the next 
stage, make sure to answer the questions in the current stage fully. Do not look at 
the next stages. 
• Once you have move don, do not go back to the previous stages and change your 
answers. 
AIM.II Case Description and initial commitment manipulation 
Committed 
You are a member of the board of directors of a large, nation-wide supermarket chain You 
have been one of the directors lor many years During the period you were in the board, your 
company has always successfully distinguished itself from its rivals with its large variety ol 
high quality products in its assortment and personalized service 01 course, high quality came 
at a price Your supermarkets have always been more expensive than the rivals However, the 
higher prices do not repel the customers who seem to be willing to pay for higher quality The 
customer satisfaction surveys have always shown that customers prêter your supermarket 
over other supermarkets and they do so because they believe that in your supermarket, they 
can lind whatever product they want, there are always alternatives to choose from within 
each product category, and the products are always of high quality 
However, lately, there have been some dilficulties and the business has been more 
challenging During the last year, it has been getting more and more dilficult to sustain the 
same quality standards In the past, there had been times with similar problems, however. 
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now, the number of customers showed a decline for the first lime in many years This new 
problem was also reflected in the last customer salislaction survey The customers still 
thought that the quality and variety of your assortment was very good However, this time 
they also thought that the prices are too high 
This undesirable development became the topic of many board meetings during which a new 
strategy is discussed One of the strategies you proposed is something you proposed so many 
limes in the past discounting Every lime there have been similar problems, you promoted 
that the prices should be lowered to be able to cope with the competition and not to lose the 
customers to the competitors However, a senior board member always fiercely opposed the 
idea, advocated the short-comings ol the strategy, and pointed out that the implementation of 
this strategy would lead to the downfall of the company To your dislike, he has been 
successful and this strategy never got implemented. However, now, the situation seems to be 
different At every board meeting, the discounting idea comes up and the number ol 
supporters seems to be increasing As usual, you strongly favor the idea and argue why it is a 
very good strategy You point out, over and over again, that by decreasing prices, you would 
not only keep your customers but also increase the target market group The number of 
customers would increase since some of the customers who avoided your supermarket due to 
high prices would now choose to come to your shops As usual, the opposition is there and 
the senior board member argues that it is impossible to offer a high-quality assortment with 
discounted prices You responded to this by reminding the board the results of the last 
customer salislaction survey and explained that in case the discounting is not implemented, 
the customers will be lost to the competitor and there will not be any customers left to sell 
anything to 
After long discussions, the majonty of the board of directors voted, in agreement with your 
efforts and advice, in lavor of your discounting strategy and hence, the decision was taken to 
start the implementation as ol next month The board decided to allocate a total of 1 million 
euros for the implementation of the strategy (commercials, promotions, subsidizing the price 
discounts etc ) in the coming 6 months It was also decided that in 6 months time, the 
performance of the discounting strategy will be evaluated and the board will then decide 
whether the strategy will be continued with a further allocation ol 1 million euros 
Λ/of-Co/n/n/'tted 
You are a member of the board of directors of a large, nation-wide supermarket chain You 
have been one of the directors for many years During the period you were in the board, your 
company has always successfully distinguished itself from its rivals with its large variety of 
high quality products in Us assortment and personalized service Of course, high quality came 
at a pnee Your supermarkets have always been more expensive than the rivals However, the 
higher prices do not repel the customers who seem to be willing to pay for higher quality The 
customer satisfaction surveys have always shown that customers prefer your supermarket 
over other supermarkets and they do so because they believe that in your supermarket, they 
can find whatever product they want, there are always alternatives to choose from within 
each product category, and the products are always of high quality 
However, lately, there have been some difficulties and the business has been more 
challenging During the last year, it has been getting more and more difficult to sustain the 
same quality standards In the past, there had been times with similar problems, however, 
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now, the number of customers showed a decline lor the first lime in many years This new 
problem was also reflected in the last customer satisfaction survey The customers still 
thought that the quality and variety of your assortment was very good However, this time 
they also thought that the prices are too high 
This undesirable development became the topic of many board meetings during which a new 
strategy is discussed One of the strategies proposed is something that came up so many times 
in the past discounting Every time there have been similar problems, some people in the 
board promoted that the prices should be lowered to be able to cope with the competition and 
not to lose the customers to the competitors You have always fiercely opposed the idea and 
advocated the short-comings of the strategy You pointed out that lower prices signal low 
quality and that this would be detrimental for a company that is known lor its high quality 
standards Moreover, you thought that discounting could initiate a price war and cause you to 
decrease prices even further So you argued, over and over again, that the implementation of 
this strategy would lead to the downfall of the company In the past, you have been successful 
and this strategy never got implemented However, now, the situation seems to be different 
At every board meeting, the discounting idea comes up and the number of supporters seems 
to be increasing As usual, you strongly oppose the idea and argue why it is not a good 
strategy You even said that you will leave the company in case this strategy is implemented 
because you believed that it is impossible to offer a high-quality assortment with discounted 
prices You pointed out, once again, that your target market segment is quality sensitive and 
that the customers will be lost il you would implement the discounting strategy 
After long discussions, the majonty of the board of directors voted, contrary to your eflorts 
and advice, in favor of the discounting strategy and hence, the decision was taken to start the 
implementation as ol next month The board decided to allocate a total of 1 million euros lor 
the implementation of the strategy (commercials, promotions, subsidizing the price discounts 
etc ) in the coming 6 months It was also decided that in 6 months time, the performance of 
the discounting strategy will be evaluated and the board will then decide whether the strategy 
will be continued with a further allocation ol 1 million euros 
AMI.Ill Measurement of initial commitment, confidence, and responsibility 
Below, there are questions regarding your opinion on the discounting strategy In answering 
these questions, please give jour opinion as a long-term member of the board of directors 
I ) Please indicate your level of support for the discounting strategy 
I do not support it at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I support it fully 
2) If you solely were to decide on the amount of money to be invested for the implementation 
of the discounting strategy, how much of the available funds (in the amount of 1 million 
euros) would you invest9 
Euros (Fill in a number between 0 and 1 million) 
3) Below, you are given ten statements As a member of the board of directors, please 
identify the extent to which you agree with these statements For each statement, a scale 
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ranging from 1 to 7 is provided with 1 indicating "strongly disagree" and 7 indicating 
"strongly agree" Please indicate your choice by circling the value you choose 
a) I will stick to the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
b) I do not feel any loyalty to the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
c) I am committed to the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
d) I feel obligated to invest in the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
e) I feel attached to the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
f) I do not think the discounting strategy is a good strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
g) I have confidence in the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
h) I feel responsible for the choice of the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
i) I feel responsible for the future performance outcomes of the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
j) I leel responsible for the idea behind the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
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AHI.IV Decision consequences manipulation 
Positive consequences 
Now that the 6 months are past, it is time for a performance evaluation The overall results 
attained with the implementation of the discounting strategy are as follows As expected, the 
number of customers and sales earnings increased over the last 6 months 
The discounting strategy worked very well As the customer satisfaction survey 6 months ago 
showed, your own customers were starting to thinking that the prices were a bit too high By 
decreasing the prices, you could keep these customers The customer satisfaction surveys of 
the last months have shown that your customers are very satisfied with the quality and price 
level your supermarket offers 
By decreasing the prices, you were also able to target a larger segment of the population 
Those consumers who value quality but found your supermarket a bit too expensive in the 
past preferred your supermarket once the prices were lowered They also rate your 
supermarkets as very pleasant environment which serves high quality products at reasonable 
prices 
The competitors responded by decreasing their prices. This led to a price war during which 
all parlies were forced to decrease their prices over an over again But overall, this did not 
have an undesired effect for your business Even though you were forced to set the prices 
lower than you intended to at the beginning you managed to attract a greater share of 
customers 
The overall result of the last 6 months was that, even though you decreased prices, the sales 
earnings increased due to the increase in the number of customers 
Negative consequences 
Now that the 6 months are past, it is time for a performance evaluation The overall results 
attained with the implementation of the discounting strategy are as follows The expected 
increase in customer numbers did not take place This coupled with the decrease in pnees, 
there was an overall decrease in sales earnings 
During the first month of its implementation, the discounting strategy worked very well The 
decreased prices stimulated the customers to choose for your supermarket However, this 
trend did not last for long The competitors responded by decreasing their prices slightly 
below your prices This took away the advantage of previous discounting To fight with this 
new trend, your supermarket chain had to decrease prices even further As a result, there was 
a furious pnee war going on and your company was right in the middle of it. Every time you 
decreased prices, the competitor responded by lower prices, forcing you to decrease your 
prices even further 
The main difficulty was with the high quality products To be able to offer them at lower 
prices you needed to reduce the costs of these products However, it seems like there are 
problems with some of the producers You are now right in the middle of negotiation with the 
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producers but if they are not willing to adjust their prices you will end up selling some 
products almost at your cost price 
Yet another difficulty arose when you wanted to introduce new products Since the customers 
got used to low prices it turned out to be dilficult to introduce new, higher-priced products 
The customers appeared to be less willing to pay for them This threatens to weaken one of 
your competitive advantages regularly adding new, interesting, high-quality products to your 
assortment 
As lor the customers' evaluation of quality, they thought that there was a slight decrease in 
the level of quality but the overall average rating of your quality still remained above that of 
the competitors 
AIII.V Measurement of final commitment, confidence, and responsibility 
Now that the performance information has been made available to each board member it is 
time for the next board meeting During the last meeting, it was decided that before coming to 
the next meeting each board member will individually indicate his or her level ot support lor 
the continuation of the discounting strategy Hence the lollowing questions were prepared 
As a member of the board, you are asked to answer these questions The answers of all the 
board members will be used as an input for the next board meeting 
1 ) Please indicate your level ot support for the continuation of the discounting strategy 
I do not support it at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I support it lully 
2) If you solely were to decide on the amount of money to be invested lor the continuation of 
the discounting strategy, how much of the available funds (in the amount of 1 million euros) 
would you invest'' 
Euros (Fill a number between 0 and I million) 
3) Below, you are given ten statements As a member ot the board of directors, please 
identify the extent to which you agree with these statements For each statement, a scale 
ranging from I to 7 is provided with I indicating "strongly disagree" and 7 indicating 
"strongly agree" Please indicate your choice by circling the value you choose 
a) I will stick to the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
b) I do not feel any loyalty to the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
c) I am committed to the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
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d) I feel obligated to invest in the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
e) I feel attached to the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
f) I do not think the discounting strategy is a good strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
g) I have confidence in the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
h) I feel responsible for the choice of the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
i) I feel responsible for the future perlormance outcomes ol the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
j) I feel responsible for the idea behind the discounting strategy 
Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
AIM.VI Measurement of information preference 
The board will get together soon to evaluate the discounting strategy It is likely that there 
will be members supporting the strategy as well as those who oppose it and that there will be 
discussions on the pros and cons of the discounting strategy and comparisons will be made 
with other possible strategies It is expected that the discussions during the meeting will result 
in a decision on whether to go on with the discounting strategy or not To facilitate this 
discussion and explain your point of view better, you want to write a report to present to the 
board before the meeting In this report, you would like lo explain the developments of the 
last year, defend your point of view, and explain the level of support you currently give to 
the continuation of the discounting strategy 
You identified 7 main information categories that you definitely would like to include in your 
report You asked a consulting company, with whom you worked many times in the past, to 
collect the information for you Below, these 7 categories and the kinds of information 
available in each category arc listed Please identify which type of inlormation you would 
prefer to include in your report the most 
Below, for each information category, you are given two types ol questions In the first, we 
would like you to choose the information type you prefer the most (please choose onh one) 
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In the second, we would like you to state how much you prefer this information over the one 
you did not choose 
Information category 1: This category contains information on the predicted future 
performance of the discounting strategy in case the strategy is continued 
Which of the following information items would you like to include in your report ' Please 
indicate your choice by circling the letter corresponding to the item of your choice 
a) An estimation of the likelihood that the further implementation ol the discounting 
strategy will bring swcceçç (ι e increase in customer numbers and sustained high 
quality) to the company and the reasons for this possible success 
b) An estimation of the likelihood that the further implementation of the discounting 
strategy will bring failure (i e decrease in customer numbers and lower quality) to the 
company and the reasons for this possible failure 
Information category 2: This category contains information on the factors that contributed 
to the performance of the discounting strateg\ 
1) Which ol the following information items would you like to include in your report9 
a) Information that focuses on linking the performance ot the discounting strategy to 
factors that are intrinsic to the strategy (c g the way the strategy is implemented, the 
appropriateness of the strategy) and hence were under your control 
b) Information that locuses on linking the performance of the discounting strategy to 
factors that are not intrinsic to the strategy (e g the economic developments, market 
structure) and hence were out of your control 
2) Which ol the following information items would you like to include in your report7 
a) Information that stresses that the main causes of the achieved performance were 
permanent causes and are likeh to occur again in the future 
b) Information that stresses that the main causes ol the achieved performance were 
temporan causes and are not likeh to occur again m the future 
Information category 3: This category contains information on the costs associated with 
implementing the discounting <;trciteg\ Within this category you can identily two types of 
information 
1) Which of the following information items would you like to include in your report7 
a) Information indicating that 70-to-80% of the costs required lor successful 
implementation is already invested 
b) Information indicating that only 30-to-40% of the costs required for successful 
implementation is invested 
2) Which ol the following information items would you like to include in your report ' 
a) An estimate ol the total costs (such as the total investments, indirect costs time 
investment etc ) made for the discounting strategy so far 
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b) An estimate ol the required future costs in case the discounting strategy is continued 
Information category 4: This category contains information on possible altematne 
strategies 
Which ol the following information items would you like to include in your report ' 
a) Information on the advantages of the discounting strategy over possible alternative 
strategies and why the discounting strategy is better than the others 
b) Information on the advantages of possible alternative strategies over the discounting 
strategy and why these are better than the discounting strategy 
Information category 5: This category contains information on similar Hipeimarkets that 
implemented the discounting strategy in the past 
Which of the following information items would you like to include in your report9 
a) An overview of similar supermarkets where the implementation ol the discounting 
strategy brought success to the company 
b) An overview of similar supermarkets where the implementation ol the discounting 
strategy brought Iallure the company 
Information category 6: This category contains more detailed information on the actual 
performance of the discounting itrciteg\ o\ er the past 6 months 
Which of the following inlormation items would you like to include in your report ' 
a) Information indicating that the performance of the discounting strategy over the past 6 
months is actually much better than it was slated in the perlormance evaluation 
b) Inlormation indicating that the performance ol the discounting strategy over the past 6 
months is actually much Morse than it was stated in the performance evaluation 
c) Information indicating that the performance ol the discounting strategy over the past 6 
months is correctly reflected in the perlormance evaluation 
Information category 7: This category contains information on the correctness of the 
criteria used for judging the performance of the discounting strateg\ 
Which of the following information items would you like to include in your report ' 
a) Information stressing that the criteria to judge the perlormance of the discounting 
strategy were set correct!) the reported performance is an accurate representation ol 
the actual performance 
b) Information stressing that the criteria to judge the performance of the discounting 
strategy were set incorrecth the reported performance seems better than it really is 
c) Information stressing that the criteria to judge the performance of the discounting 
strategy were set incorrecth the reported performance seems uorse than it really is 
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English Summary 
Selective Exposure to Information in the context of Escalation of 
Commitment 
What should decision-makers do in the face of failure9 Should they continue to invest money 
with the hope of turning things around or pull the plug and change course of action ' In the 
last decades, an extended body ol literature has investigated the commitment ol decision­
makers to losing courses of action Numerous studies have shown that those responsible for 
the choice of an initial course of action keep on remaining committed more than those not 
responsible for the initial choice This phenomenon is relcrred to as escalation of 
commitment This dissertation deals with the occurrence of selective exposure to confirming 
information under these so-called escalation situations 
This dissertation aims to make two contributions 
The common approach in past research has been to consider information as an 
'objective' given without considering how the perception ot the decision-makers can affect 
the choice and perception of the information used Unlike prior research, this dissertation 
does not make this assumption and focuses on the information preference of decision makers 
While doing so, the occurrence of a cognitive bias, ι c selective exposure to information, 
alongside escalation is studied Selective exposure to information is the tendency of decision­
makers to prelcr and use information that is consistent with their beliefs, attitudes, and 
decisions (Festinger, 1957, Frey, 1986, Fischer, Jonas, Frey, and Schulz-Hardt, 2005) in this 
dissertation, the assertion is that the tendency to prefer and use confirming information is one 
of the consequences of escalation It is important to study this assertion since if confirming 
information leads to further escalation and decision-makers prefer and actively select 
confirming information under escalation situations then they can get trapped in a vicious 
circle of escalation and information biasing. In such a situation, withdrawal from a failing 
course of action can become a very unlikely outcome From a practical perspective, the 
insight into the information preference of escalating decision-makers gained from this 
research can be used to devise better information search and processing strategies Such 
strategies could be useful in avoiding unnecessary escalation and unnecessary time and 
money investments From a theoretical perspective, this research makes a step to jointly 
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studying escalation of commitment and selective exposure to information and understanding 
the consequences of their co-occurrence Moreover, this research can provide insight into the 
role of information (categorized under the project determinants of escalation) in the 
escalation research Staw (1997) pointed out the importance of perceived project 
determinants in escalation decisions Prior research, on the other hand, focused mainly on 
project determinants and not their perception This research aims at bridging that gap by 
focusing on the perception of the project determinants 
A second contribution of this dissertation is in the domain of de-escalation which is an under-
studied area within the domain ol escalation Causal loop diagrams based on the principles of 
System Dynamics are proposed as a de-escalation tool that can also potentially decrease 
selective exposure tendencies System Dynamics (SD) is a methodology for modeling and 
analyzing complex problems Irom a feedback perspective (Forrester, 1961, Slerman, 2000) 
The main purpose ol modeling in SD is understanding why a certain situation has occurred 
(c g the failure of the strategy) and use this information to design robust strategies to 
improve the situation (e g adjustments to the existing strategy or development of a new 
strategy to solve the problem) Such a tool could get the decision-makers to actively think 
about the problem and its causes and get them involved in the generation ol alternative 
strategies As such, through providing the decision-makers more objective grounds to base 
their decisions on, using an SD model could help eliminate the irrational reasons that 
stimulate escalation From a practical perspective, using such a technique would not only 
help to decrease escalation tendencies but also provide grounds for more thorough decision-
making From a theoretical perspective, this research will introduce System Dynamics as a 
potentially useful method that has not previously been considered as a possible de-biasing 
technique 
Even though it was not one ot the main goals of this research, this study also has a 
contribution regarding the operationalization of both commitment and escalation of 
commitment In this research, a new measure of commitment and escalation were developed 
Regarding the measure of commitment, alongside money invested, which measures (stated) 
behavioral commitment, felt-commitment was measured as a proxy for (stated) allitudinal 
commitment To do so, a 5-item scale was developed Regarding the measure of escalation, 
the change in commitment, calculated as the dillerence between commitment levels belore 
and after the decision consequences was used 
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The dissertation is organized as follows: In chapter 2, literature on escalation of commitment 
and selective exposure to information is reviewed. In chapter 3, the link between justification 
motives and selective exposure to information is developed further. While doing so, 
dissonance theory is used. The conceptual model, the research questions, and the hypotheses 
for the research are presented. The conceptual model for the research depicts choice, 
responsibility for decision consequences, initial commitment, and decision consequences as 
the four factors that are expected to stimulate not only escalation of commitment but also 
selective exposure to confirming information. In this thesis, laboratory experiments are used 
as the research method. Subjects were asked to take part in a role-playing decision-making 
scenario that simulates a situation in which escalation of commitment may take place. A 
questionnaire was used to gather data on the choices, commitment levels, and information 
preference of the subjects. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are empirical in nature. In chapter 4, the focus 
is on the effect of choice and responsibility for decision consequences on the selective 
exposure to confirming information. The hypotheses on whether decision-makers who are 
responsible for the choice and consequences of a strategy prefer confirming information over 
disconfirming information are tested. In chapter 5, the focus is on the effect of initial 
commitment and decision consequences on selective exposure tendencies. In chapter 6, the 
focus is on establishing an instrument that can work both as a de-escalation tool and 
counterbalance the tendencies to selectively search for confirming information. Such a tool 
based on the System Dynamics method is proposed and tested by means of an experiment. 
Finally, in chapter 7, the conclusions of the four experiments presented in the preceding 
chapters and the implications of this thesis for theory and practice are discussed, limitations 
of this research are pointed out, and recommendations for future research are identified. 
Summary of the conclusions: The main conclusions based on the empirical findings are that 
choice and initial commitment to a failing course of action lead to selective exposure to 
information but only when information is related to the past and future performance of the 
strategy. When the information is of a diagnostic nature or related to costs, no selective 
exposure tendencies are found. Interestingly, however, the overall tendency during 
information search seems to be for disconfirming rather than confirming information since 
the total number of confirming information items requested remained low both for the 
committed and non-committed subjects. 
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Use ol causal loop diagrams prior to the second investment decision stimulates both de-
escalation and a decrease in selective exposure tendencies in information items related to the 
(future) performance of the course of action 
Given the results that the attitudinal and the behavioral commitment levels of a subject 
differ at a given situation, it was concluded that to understand escalation situations better, 
measures for both behavioral and attitudinal commitment arc necessary Moreover, given the 
different insights that can be gained from the measure of escalation as change in commitment 
versus commitment alter second investment decision, it was concluded that to understand 
escalation situations better, both measures are necessary 
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
Selectieve Blootstelling aan Informatie in de context van Escalatie van 
Commitment 
Wat moeten besluitvormers doen wanneer geconfronteerd met falen? Moeten zij verder 
blijven investeren in de hoop het tij te doen keren of het project beëindigen en van koers 
veranderen? In de voorbije decennia werd een uitgebreide literatuurstroom gewijd aan de 
commitment van besluitvormers tot verlieslatende strategieën. Verscheidene studies hebben 
aangetoond dat zij die verantwoordelijk waren voor de keuze van een initiële strategische 
richting zich meer blijven committeren dan zij die niet verantwoordelijk waren voor de 
initiële keuze. Dit fenomeen wordt 'escalatie van commitment' genoemd. Dit proefschrift 
handelt over selectieve blootstelling aan bevestigende informatie in dit soort 
escalatiesituaties. 
Met dit proefschrift worden twee bijdragen nagestreefd. 
De algemene benadering in voorgaand onderzoek was uit te gaan van de 
veronderstelling dat informatie een objectief gegeven is zonder rekening te houden met hoe 
de perceptie van besluitvormers de keuze en perceptie van de gebruikte informatie kan 
beïnvloeden. In tegenstelling tot voorgaand onderzoek wordt in dit proefschrift niet van deze 
veronderstelling uitgegaan en slaat de voorkeur voor informatie van besluitvormers centraal. 
Zo wordt naast escalatie een cognitieve bias bestudeerd, namelijk selectieve blootstelling aan 
informatie. Selectieve blootstelling aan informatie is de neiging van besluitvormers om 
informatie te verkiezen en te gebruiken die consistent is met hun overtuigingen, attitudes en 
beslissingen (Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986; Fischer, Jonas, Frey, and Schulz-Hardt, 2005). In 
dit proefschrift wordt gesteld dat de neiging om bevestigende informatie te verkiezen en te 
gebruiken een van de gevolgen is van escalatie van commitment. Hel is belangrijk deze 
stelling te onderzoeken want als bevestigende informatie leidt tot verdere escalatie en 
besluitvormers bevestigende informatie verkiezen en actief selecteren in escalatiesituaties, 
kunnen zij terechtkomen in een vicieuze cirkel van escalatie en eenzijdige/imperfecte 
informatieselectie. In dat soort situatie kan het erg onwaarschijnlijk worden dat men zich zal 
terugtrekken uit een verlieslatende strategie. Vanuit een praktijkperspectief kan het inzicht uit 
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dit onderzoek betreffende de informatievoorkeur van escalerende besluitvormers worden 
gebruikt om strategieën van zoeken en verwerken van informatie beter vorm te geven. Deze 
strategieën zouden kunnen helpen onnodige escalatie en onnodige investeringen in tijd en 
geld te vermijden. Vanuit een theoretisch perspectief is dit onderzoek een stap in de richting 
van de gezamenlijke studie van escalatie van commitment en selectieve blootstelling aan 
informatie en inzicht geven in de gevolgen wanneer deze beide fenomenen samen 
voorkomen. Bovendien kan dit onderzoek inzicht geven in de rol van informatie 
(gecategoriseerd als een projectgerelateerde determinant van escalatie) in de 
escalatiehteratuur. Staw (1997) wees op het belang van de perceptie van 
projectdeterminanten in escalatiebeslissingen. Voorgaand onderzoek heeft zich echter 
voornamelijk gericht op projectdeterminanten en niet op hun perceptie. Dit onderzoek heeft 
tot doel deze lacune te overbruggen door zich te richten op de perceptie van 
projectdeterminanten. 
Een tweede bijdrage van dit proefschrift ligt in het domein van de-escalatie, een domein dat 
in voorgaand escalatie-onderzoek weinig aandacht heeft gekregen. Causale loop diagrams 
gebaseerd op de principes van systeemdynamica worden voorgesteld als een middel tot de-
escalatie dat ook de neiging tot selectieve blootstelling zou kunnen verzwakken. 
Systeemdynamica (SD) is een methodologie om complexe problemen te modelleren en te 
analyseren vanuit een feedbackperspectief (Forrester, 1961; Sterman, 2000). Het hoofddoel 
van modelleren in SD is inzicht te verkrijgen in waarom een situatie zich heeft voorgedaan 
(bv. het falen van een strategie) en deze informatie te gebruiken om robuuste strategieën te 
ontwikkelen om de situatie te verbeteren (bv. aanpassen van de bestaande strategie of 
ontwikkelen van een nieuwe strategie om het probleem aan te pakken). Dit soort hulpmiddel 
kan besluitvormers ertoe aanzetten actief over het probleem en zijn oorzaken na te denken en 
kan hen beter betrekken bij het genereren van alternatieve strategieën. Als dusdanig kan het 
gebruik van een SD model, door het verschaffen aan besluitvormers van een meer objectieve 
basis voor hun beslissingen, irrationale factoren die escalatie stimuleren helpen elimineren. 
Vanuit een praktijkperspectief zou het gebruik van dit soort techniek niet enkel helpen bij het 
verminderen van de neiging tot escalatie maar ook een basis bieden voor meer gegronde 
besluitvorming. Vanuit een theoretisch perspectief zal dit onderzoek systeemdynamica 
introduceren als een mogelijk nuttige methode die niet eerder werd besproken als mogelijke 
de-escalatietechniek. 
238 
DUTCH SUMMARY 
Al was het met een van de belangrijkste doelstellingen van dit onderzoek, deze studie draagt 
ook bij tot de operationalisering van zowel commitment als escalatie van commitment In dit 
onderzoek werden nieuwe maatstaven voor commitment en escalatie ontwikkeld Wat betreft 
de maatstaf van commitment werd naast het geïnvesteerde geldbedrag wat (zelf-
gerapporteerde) gedragsmatige commitment meet, gevoelsmatige commitment gemeten als 
benadering van (zelf-gerapporteerde) attitudinale commitment Daarvoor werd een 5-item 
meetschaal ontwikkeld Wat betrell de maatstaf van escalatie werd de verandering in 
commitment gemeten, berekend als het verschil tussen de niveau's van commitment voor en 
na de gevolgen van de beslissing 
Het proefschrift is als volgt gestructureerd: Fn hoofdstuk 2 wordt een overzicht gegeven van 
de literatuur over escalatie van commitment en selectieve blootstelling aan informatie In 
hoofdstuk 3 wordt het verband tussen motieven van rechtvaardiging en selectieve 
blootstelling aan informatie verder ontwikkeld Hierbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van 
dissonantietheorie Het conceptuele model, de onderzoeksvragen en de hypotheses voor het 
onderzoek worden gepresenteerd Het conceptuele model voor het onderzoek identificeert 
keuze, verantwoordelijkheid voor de gevolgen van de beslissing, initiële commitment en de 
gevolgen van de beslissing als de vier factoren waarvan verwacht wordt dat ze niet alleen 
escalatie van commitment maar ook selectieve blootstelling aan bevestigende informatie 
stimuleren In dit proefschrift worden laboratoriumexperimenten gebruikt als 
onderzoeksmethode Respondenten werd gevraagd deel te nemen in een 
besluitvormingsscenario, in de vorm van een rollenspel, dat een situatie simuleert waarin 
escalatie van commitment zou kunnen plaatsvinden Data over keuzes, niveau's van 
commitment en voorkeuren voor inlormatie van de respondenten werden via een vragenlijst 
verzameld Hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 zijn empirisch van aard In hoofdstuk 4 ligt de focus op 
het effect van keuze en verantwoordelijkheid voor de gevolgen van de beslissing op 
selectieve blootstelling aan bevestigende informatie De hypothesen dat besluitvormers die 
verantwoordelijk zijn voor de keuze en gevolgen van een strategie, bevestigende informatie 
verkiezen boven met-bevestigende informatie worden getest In hoofdstuk 5 ligt de focus op 
het effect van initiële commitment en gevolgen van de beslissing op de neiging tot selectieve 
blootstelling In hoofdstuk 6 ligt de focus op het bepalen van een instrument dat kan werken 
als middel tot de-escalatie en een tegenwicht kan vormen voor de neiging tot selectief 
zoekgedrag naar bevestigende informatie Een hulpmiddel gebaseerd op de methode van 
systeemdynamica wordt voorgesteld en getest door middel van een experiment Tot slot 
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worden in hoofdstuk 7 de conclusies besproken van de vier expenmenten die werden 
gepresenteerd in de voorgaande hoofdstukken evenals de gevolgen van dit proefschnft voor 
theorie en praktijk, de beperkingen van dit onderzoek worden op een rijtje gezet en 
aanbevelingen voor toekomstig onderzoek worden geformuleerd 
Samenvatting van de conclusies: De belangrijkste gevolgen gebaseerd op de empirische 
bevindingen zijn dat keuze en initiële commitment tot een verlieslatende strategie leiden tot 
selectieve blootstelling aan informatie maar alleen als het gaat om informatie over de 
voorbije of toekomstige performantie van de strategie Wanneer de informatie van 
diagnostische aard is of gerelateerd aan kosten wordt deze neiging lot selectieve blootstelling 
met vastgesteld Echter de algemene tendens bij het zoeken naar informatie lijkt te zijn 
nchling met-bevestigende in plaats van bevestigende informatie, want het totaal aantal 
aangevraagde bevestigende informatie-items was laag voor zowel gecommileerde als niet-
gecommiteerde respondenten 
Het gebruik van causale loop diagrams voor de tweede investeringsbeslissing 
plaatsvindt, stimuleert de-cscalatie en leidt tot een venmindering in de tendens naar selectieve 
blootstelling wat betreft inlormatie-items over de (toekomstige) pcrtormantie van de 
strategie 
Omdat de niveau's van attitudinale en gedragsmatige commitment van een respondent 
verschillen in een gegeven situatie, werd besloten dat om escalatiesiluaties beter te begrijpen 
maatstaven voor zowel gedragsmatige als attitudinale commitment nodig zijn Verder, 
gegeven de verschillende inzichten die voortvloeien uit de maatstaf van escalatie als 
verandering in commitment versus commitment na de tweede investeringsbeslissing, werd 
besloten dat om escalatiesiluaties beter te begrijpen beide maatstaven nodig zijn 
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